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Dynamic Inefficiency: Anarchy without Stability [chapter]

Noam Berger, Michal Feldman, Ofer Neiman, Mishael Rosenthal
2011 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
We show that the dynamic inefficiency may be arbitrarily higher than the price of anarchy, in any of the three dynamic rules.  ...  Both the price of anarchy [16] and the price of sinking [9] can be obtained as special cases of the dynamic inefficiency measure.  ...  An important observation is that both the price of anarchy and the price of sinking are obtained as special cases of the dynamic inefficiency.  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-642-24829-0_7 fatcat:7wzyiz6jsze3nksvmc6aqqypse

Inefficiencies in Networked Markets

Matthew Elliott
2015 American Economic Journal: Microeconomics  
Either way, inefficiencies can be severe and consume all the gains from trade, but for different reasons.  ...  Key Words: Networked markets, network formation, network bargaining, matching, outside option, inefficient investment, relationship-specific investment, hold up. 2 These are lump-sum transfers made from  ...  To investigate the size of different types of inefficiency, we define measures of overinvestment inefficiency and underinvestment inefficiency by adapting the cost of anarchy and price of anarchy to these  ... 
doi:10.1257/mic.20130098 fatcat:4yc4xpukbvgjlpjxjv4seycqsq

Inefficiencies in Networked Markets

Matthew Elliott
2014 Social Science Research Network  
Investment inefficiencies can eliminate all the gains from trade, but for reasons that differ depending on how investments are made.  ...  Although stronger than pairwise stability, pairwise Nash stability is a relatively weak stability criterion.  ...  pairwise Nash stability.  ... 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.2445658 fatcat:6ilqah65l5cfrgictdamobioqi

Tight Inefficiency Bounds for Perception-Parameterized Affine Congestion Games [article]

Pieter Kleer, Guido Schäfer
2017 arXiv   pre-print
As a result, we obtain tight bounds on the price of anarchy and the price of stability for the above mentioned extensions.  ...  Despite the fact that we deal with a more general class of congestion games, we manage to derive tight bounds on the price of anarchy and the price of stability for a large range of pa- rameters.  ...  Inefficiency of Equilibria.  ... 
arXiv:1701.07614v1 fatcat:6xuhelmcdrdx7euk2dnbll4mtq

Bounding the inefficiency of compromise in opinion formation [article]

Ioannis Caragiannis, Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, Alexandros A. Voudouris
2018 arXiv   pre-print
We formulate simple games that capture this behavior and quantify the inefficiency of equilibria using the well-known notion of the price of anarchy.  ...  To quantify this inefficiency, we show that the optimistic measure known as the price of stability (introduced by Anshelevich et al.  ...  will now prove that the price of stability of k-COF games is strictly higher than 1, i.e., there exist games without any efficient pure Nash equilibria (even when they exist).  ... 
arXiv:1702.07309v2 fatcat:3tnjqxsc6rdhplqzp7adlumu5m

Tight inefficiency bounds for perception-parameterized affine congestion games

Pieter Kleer, Guido Schäfer
2018 Theoretical Computer Science  
We derive tight bounds on the price of anarchy and the price of stability for a large range of parameters. Our bounds provide a complete picture of the inefficiency of equilibria for these games.  ...  As a result, we obtain tight bounds on the price of anarchy and the price of stability for the above mentioned extensions.  ...  We can without loss of generality assume that a e = 1 and b e = 0. The Nash inequalities (as in the price of anarchy analysis) yield e∈E x e (1 + ρ(x e − 1)) ≤ e∈E (1 + ρx e )x * e .  ... 
doi:10.1016/j.tcs.2018.04.025 fatcat:7zogde56hngdxm633m5apy4nya

On the Inefficiency Ratio of Stable Equilibria in Congestion Games [chapter]

Arash Asadpour, Amin Saberi
2009 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
Price of anarchy and price of stability are the primary notions for measuring the efficiency (i.e. the social welfare) of the outcome of a game.  ...  The inefficiency ratio in the neighborhood of these "stable" equilibria is much better than the price of anarchy. Furthermore, the dynamics reaches these equilibria in polynomial time.  ...  They show that the inefficiency ratio of stable equilibria in such games are usually much better than the price of anarchy and often close to the price of stability.  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-642-10841-9_54 fatcat:y4mdkjvgyvaptojxr7qxmkxlpi

Bounding the Inefficiency of Route Control in Intelligent Transport Systems [article]

Charlotte Roman, Paolo Turrini
2021 arXiv   pre-print
Then we find the inefficiency of the routing equilibria by calculating the Price of Anarchy for polynomial cost functions.  ...  Then we used a simple example to show that MARL suffers from this price of anarchy in practice.  ...  We have found the exact bound on the price of anarchy of the induced game for polynomial edgecost functions.  ... 
arXiv:2104.00357v1 fatcat:jv3qhhncm5gmtpouxct5qi57ni

Equilibrium Inefficiency and Computation in Cost-Sharing Games in Real-Time Scheduling Systems

Eirini Georgoulaki, Kostas Kollias, Tami Tamir
2021 Algorithms  
For the former case, we provide tight bounds on the price of anarchy, and show that the price of anarchy grows to infinity as a polynomial of the number of jobs in the game.  ...  We show that our mechanism reduces the price of anarchy of games with n jobs and unit server costs from Θ(n) to 2.  ...  The strong price of anarchy (SPoA) and the strong price of stability (SPoS) introduced in [41] , measure the inefficiency of strong equilibria.  ... 
doi:10.3390/a14040103 fatcat:z2ztitdgqnempbffct5mxv5k3a

Bounding the inefficiency of outcomes in generalized second price auctions [article]

Ioannis Caragiannis, Christos Kaklamanis, Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, Maria Kyropoulou, Brendan Lucier, Renato Paes Leme, Éva Tardos
2014 arXiv   pre-print
It is well-known that truthtelling is not a dominant strategy in this auction and that inefficient equilibria can arise.  ...  We present a constant bound (2.927) on the factor of the efficiency loss (price of anarchy) of the corresponding game for the Bayesian model of partial information about other participants and about ad  ...  However, such dynamic provision of content complicates the process of selling ad space to potential advertisers.  ... 
arXiv:1201.6429v2 fatcat:j7xz3tyfajeebcbm6jxs6bgor4

Tighter Bounds on the Inefficiency Ratio of Stable Equilibria in Load Balancing Games [article]

Akaki Mamageishvili, Paolo Penna
2015 arXiv   pre-print
In this paper we study the inefficiency ratio of stable equilibria in load balancing games introduced by Asadpour and Saberi [3]. We prove tighter lower and upper bounds of 7/6 and 4/3, respectively.  ...  Intuitively, these dynamics will most likely rest on pure Nash equilibria minimizing the potential of the game, and the IRSE can be seen as the price of anarchy restricted to these selected equilibria  ...  Significance of the results and related work The inefficiency of Nash equilibria is often measured through two classical notions: The pice of anarchy (PoA) introduced in Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou  ... 
arXiv:1512.03484v1 fatcat:t3yozmq3oja2feaeoevrr2myje

Discrete Strategies in Keyword Auctions and Their Inefficiency for Locally Aware Bidders [chapter]

Evangelos Markakis, Orestis Telelis
2010 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
Finally, our analysis for Theorem 3 can be used in bounding the inefficiency of stable configurations of iterative L-AB and L-CB: Theorem 4.  ...  For γ < 1 and ǫ ≤ ǫ * , the Local Stability Ratio of stable configurations with respect to iterative L-AB and L-CB is at most (1 − γ) −1 + γ −1 .  ...  In analogy to the Price of Anarchy [6] , we quantify the inefficiency of locally stable configurations by the following worst-case ratio: Definition 2.  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-642-17572-5_46 fatcat:z3jyzlenezenbbi5a56tptnkb4

Ad auctions and cascade model: GSP inefficiency and algorithms [article]

Gabriele Farina, Nicola Gatti
2015 arXiv   pre-print
We study Price of Anarchy (PoA) and Price of Stability (PoS) over social welfare and auctioneer's revenue of GSP w.r.t. the VCG when the users follow the famous cascade model.  ...  The crucial point is that we can find the maximum of W 1 for each k in dynamic programming.  ...  Inefficiency of GSP and VCG with PDC GSP analysis Lemma 1. The GSP is not IR, when users follow the APDC. Proof.  ... 
arXiv:1511.07397v1 fatcat:enohcj5wjrbnlom7zsxhndvdwi

Expected Price of Anarchy for the Dynamic Network Formation Game Model

Tetsuo Imai, Atsushi Tanaka
2013 Journal of Information Processing  
In this paper, we introduce the expected price of anarchy which is proposed as a valid measure for evaluating the inefficiency of the dynamic network formation game whose solution space is divided into  ...  Several works such as the price of anarchy are known as a measure for evaluating the inefficiency of solutions obtained by selfish multiple agents compared to the social optimal solution.  ...  , known as the name of the price of anarchy (PoA) and the price of stability (PoS).  ... 
doi:10.2197/ipsjjip.21.2 fatcat:r55pw4jmpzcyrhdqkn72pwaqn4

Strong Price of Anarchy and Coalitional Dynamics [article]

Yoram Bachrach, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Eva Tardos, Milan Vojnovic
2013 arXiv   pre-print
Additionally, we show that in potential games the strong price of anarchy is close to the price of stability, the quality of the best Nash equilibrium.  ...  sink equilibria, which we define as out-of-equilibrium myopic behavior as determined by a natural coalitional version of best-response dynamics.  ...  Epstein et al [7] showed an H n bound on the the strong price of anarchy, matching the price of stability bound.  ... 
arXiv:1307.2537v1 fatcat:f5ceczy2uvb5bilrytsngs7n5m
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