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Dictionary attacks using keyboard acoustic emanations

Yigael Berger, Avishai Wool, Arie Yeredor
2006 Proceedings of the 13th ACM conference on Computer and communications security - CCS '06  
We present a dictionary attack that is based on keyboard acoustic emanations.  ...  Our attack can be used as an effective acoustic-based password cracker.  ...  Acknowledgments We would like to thank Miriam Furst-Yust, Zvi Gutterman, and Benny Ben-Ami for many useful discussions and tips.  ... 
doi:10.1145/1180405.1180436 dblp:conf/ccs/BergerWY06 fatcat:5cnj5i7qtjhgtc44zxmud5bae4

A closer look at keyboard acoustic emanations

T. Halevi, N. Saxena
2012 Proceedings of the 7th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security - ASIACCS '12  
In this paper, we revisit such keyboard acoustic emanations for the purpose of eavesdropping over "strong" (random) passwords.  ...  Prior work that capitalized on dictionary and HMM language models is not applicable in this scenario; rather the attacker can only utilize the raw acoustic information which has been recorded.  ...  ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS We thank Avishai Wool, Yigael Berger and Doug Tygar for discussions related to prior work on keyboard acoustic emanations.  ... 
doi:10.1145/2414456.2414509 dblp:conf/ccs/HaleviS12 fatcat:ddh6sxtua5cqxh6cmtqkok2d5a

(sp)iPhone

Philip Marquardt, Arunabh Verma, Henry Carter, Patrick Traynor
2011 Proceedings of the 18th ACM conference on Computer and communications security - CCS '11  
In this paper, we demonstrate that an application with access to accelerometer readings on a modern mobile phone can use such information to recover text entered on a nearby keyboard.  ...  We then match abstracted words against candidate dictionaries and record word recovery rates as high as 80%.  ...  Acknowledgments This work was supported in part by the US National Science Foundation (CNS-0916047, CAREER CNS-0952959).  ... 
doi:10.1145/2046707.2046771 dblp:conf/ccs/MarquardtVCT11 fatcat:wjsoyut5jzaq5ik7u5ck2ngvoi

Don't Skype & Type! Acoustic Eavesdropping in Voice-Over-IP [article]

Alberto Compagno, Mauro Conti, Daniele Lain, Gene Tsudik
2017 arXiv   pre-print
Acoustic emanations of computer keyboards represent a serious privacy issue. As demonstrated in prior work, physical properties of keystroke sounds might reveal what a user is typing.  ...  This paper presents and explores a new keyboard acoustic eavesdropping attack that involves Voice-over-IP (VoIP), called Skype & Type (S&T), while avoiding prior strong adversary assumptions.  ...  Attacks Using Other Emanations. Another body of work focused on keyboard eavesdropping via non-acoustic side-channels.  ... 
arXiv:1609.09359v2 fatcat:rmvik6pgx5fhvouayq2o3ixf3q

Keyboard acoustic emanations revisited

Li Zhuang, Feng Zhou, J. D. Tygar
2009 ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security  
We examine the problem of keyboard acoustic emanations.  ...  Most emanations, including acoustic keyboard emanations, are not uniform across different instances, even when the same device model is used; and they are affected by the environment.  ...  CONCLUSION Our new attack on keyboard emanations needs only an acoustic recording of typing using a keyboard and recovers the typed content.  ... 
doi:10.1145/1609956.1609959 fatcat:ruvm3vzb3ncxtiipvuuf5zmihe

Keyboard acoustic emanations revisited

Li Zhuang, Feng Zhou, J. D. Tygar
2005 Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Computer and communications security - CCS '05  
We examine the problem of keyboard acoustic emanations.  ...  Most emanations, including acoustic keyboard emanations, are not uniform across different instances, even when the same device model is used; and they are affected by the environment.  ...  CONCLUSION Our new attack on keyboard emanations needs only an acoustic recording of typing using a keyboard and recovers the typed content.  ... 
doi:10.1145/1102120.1102169 dblp:conf/ccs/ZhuangZT05 fatcat:5snbppts6va7fhmol22g3fjyky

Don't Skype & Type!

Alberto Compagno, Mauro Conti, Daniele Lain, Gene Tsudik
2017 Proceedings of the 2017 ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security - ASIA CCS '17  
Acoustic emanations of computer keyboards represent a serious privacy issue. As demonstrated in prior work, physical properties of keystroke sounds might reveal what a user is typing.  ...  This paper presents and explores a new keyboard acoustic eavesdropping attack that involves Voice-over-IP (VoIP), called Skype & Type (S&T), while avoiding prior strong adversary assumptions.  ...  Attacks Using Other Emanations. Another body of work focused on keyboard eavesdropping via non-acoustic side-channels.  ... 
doi:10.1145/3052973.3053005 dblp:conf/ccs/CompagnoCLT17 fatcat:2z4efqqfpja3xbyk7qnudda5hm

When Good Becomes Evil

Xiangyu Liu, Zhe Zhou, Wenrui Diao, Zhou Li, Kehuan Zhang
2015 Proceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security - CCS '15  
We focus on two major categories of keyboards: one is numeric keypad that is generally used to input digits, and the other is QWERTY keyboard on which a user can type English text.  ...  In this paper, we present a new and practical side-channel attack to infer user inputs on keyboards by exploiting sensors in smartwatch.  ...  Asonov and Agrawal [20] were the first to present a concrete keystroke inference attack using keyboard acoustic emanations.  ... 
doi:10.1145/2810103.2813668 dblp:conf/ccs/LiuZDLZ15 fatcat:26o622pobbcvjlwl63nebj4ko4

Smartwatch-Based Keystroke Inference Attacks and Context-Aware Protection Mechanisms

Anindya Maiti, Oscar Armbruster, Murtuza Jadliwala, Jibo He
2016 Proceedings of the 11th ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security - ASIA CCS '16  
Due to the distinct nature of the perceptible motion sensor data, earlier research efforts on emanation based keystroke inference attacks are not readily applicable in this scenario.  ...  As part of our efforts towards preventing such side-channel attacks, we also develop and evaluate a novel context-aware protection framework which can be used to automatically disable (or downgrade) access  ...  The other major use of acoustic emanation has been in keystroke inference attacks, which targets to recover key presses on a nearby computer keyboard [4, 9] .  ... 
doi:10.1145/2897845.2897905 dblp:conf/ccs/MaitiAJH16 fatcat:inpwi7sqyrfcpidags2kku26lm

A Sound for a Sound: Mitigating Acoustic Side Channel Attacks on Password Keystrokes with Active Sounds [chapter]

S. Abhishek Anand, Nitesh Saxena
2017 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
Keyboard acoustic side channel attacks have been shown to utilize the audio leakage from typing on the keyboard to infer the typed words up to a certain degree of accuracy.  ...  In this paper, we set out to propose a practical defense mechanism against keyboard acoustic attacks specifically on password typing and test its performance against several attack vectors.  ...  Attack Background and Recreation Keyboard acoustic emanations represent a class of attacks that exploit the audio leakage from the system (keyboard) to gain useful information (typed input).  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-662-54970-4_21 fatcat:zsxkjri7ofaehhukz5iz2om3fi

Context-free Attacks Using Keyboard Acoustic Emanations

Tong Zhu, Qiang Ma, Shanfeng Zhang, Yunhao Liu
2014 Proceedings of the 2014 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security - CCS '14  
The emanations of electronic and mechanical devices have raised serious privacy concerns. It proves possible for an attacker to recover the keystrokes by acoustic signal emanations.  ...  Using off-the-shelf smartphones to record acoustic emanations from keystrokes, this design estimates keystrokes' physical positions based on the Time Difference of Arrival (TDoA) method.  ...  However for any two microphones, say i and j, Figure 1 : Attack overview. Context-free attacks to recover random text using keyboard acoustic emanations.  ... 
doi:10.1145/2660267.2660296 dblp:conf/ccs/ZhuMZL14 fatcat:xcdkdnkk3jghnnw743cxa6paoy

Synesthesia: Detecting Screen Content via Remote Acoustic Side Channels [article]

Daniel Genkin, Mihir Pattani, Roei Schuster, Eran Tromer
2018 arXiv   pre-print
We show that subtle acoustic noises emanating from within computer screens can be used to detect the content displayed on the screens.  ...  Empirically demonstrating various attack scenarios, we show how this channel can be used for real-time detection of on-screen text, or users' input into on-screen virtual keyboards.  ...  . 5 Using an onscreen keyboard also protects against attackers with acoustic probes that try to characterize individual key acoustic emanations [AAb, LWK + , ZZT09] .  ... 
arXiv:1809.02629v1 fatcat:ppetoi3gqzaynasuo6ekiunsay

Acoustic Side-Channel Attacks on Printers

Michael Backes, Markus Dürmuth, Sebastian Gerling, Manfred Pinkal, Caroline Sporleder
2010 USENIX Security Symposium  
We examine the problem of acoustic emanations of printers.  ...  After an upfront training phase, the attack is fully automated and uses a combination of machine learning, audio processing, and speech recognition techniques, including spectrum features, Hidden Markov  ...  Related techniques captured the monitor's content from the emanations of the cable connecting the monitor and the computer [21] , and acoustic emanations of keyboards were exploited to reveal the pressed  ... 
dblp:conf/uss/BackesDGPS10 fatcat:owuo2ir2wbe4rgakajzemaiuta

Thermanator: Thermal Residue-Based Post Factum Attacks On Keyboard Password Entry [article]

Tyler Kaczmarek, Ercan Ozturk, Gene Tsudik
2018 arXiv   pre-print
) thermal imaging attacks are realistic, and finally (3) perhaps it is time to either stop using keyboards for password entry, or abandon passwords altogether.  ...  This serves as our main motivation for constructing a means for password harvesting from keyboard thermal emanations.  ...  ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS We would like to thank Derek Dunn-Rankin and Michela Vicariotto for their generosity in lending us the FLIR SC620 for use in this study.  ... 
arXiv:1806.10189v2 fatcat:tnmxtpjmhbe25gd6pfhguhtmva

Behavioral Acoustic Emanations: Attack and Verification of PIN Entry Using Keypress Sounds

Sourav Panda, Yuanzhen Liu, Gerhard Petrus Hancke, Umair Mujtaba Qureshi
2020 Sensors  
The intervals between two keystrokes are extracted from the acoustic emanation and used as features to train machine-learning models. The attack model has a 60% chance to recover the PIN key.  ...  Our attack methods can perform key recovery by using the acoustic side-channel at low cost. As a countermeasure, our verification method can improve the security of PIN entry devices.  ...  Asonov et al. (2004) used acoustic emanations and performed the attack to recognize the key pressing by applying a neural network [36] .  ... 
doi:10.3390/s20113015 pmid:32466431 fatcat:xr33yfo7gjcktatpblrtgcauyq
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