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Page 174 of MIND Vol. 16, Issue 62 [page]

1891 MIND  
In these cases, in which deliberation is at a minimum, but which no one will deny to be conscious volitional actions, we see exemplified the analysis of volition into deliberation and choice, which was  ...  Volitiou is thus a com- plex action, and the mechanism of brain processes, on which  ... 

Deliberation and Decision [chapter]

Philip Pettit
2010 A Companion to the Philosophy of Action  
See also: collective action (9); motivating reasons (19) ; humeanism about motivation (20); practical reasoning (31); akrasia and irrationality (35); rationality (36); motivational internalism and externalism  ...  Decision theory may be consistent with deliberation, as on the decision-plus-deliberation picture, but it is not a good guide as to the form which deliberation ought to take.  ...  Thus, if you claim to have decided something, we naturally assume that you were led to do so on the basis of your desires and beliefs, and we treat the decision in just the way we would treat an action  ... 
doi:10.1002/9781444323528.ch32 fatcat:ezgs5mgfajfadhwu7ckvgkyuda


Philip Pettit
2005 Economics and Philosophy  
that offends, in formulation if not in substance, against our common sense about action.  ...  We are bent on pursuit of our own ends, we discover that acting as they require will frustrate someone else's projects, and then we pause, take stock, and adjust what we were going to do so that the other  ...  Let people instantiate that regime in an act of decision-making, mechanically forming and acting on beliefs and desires, and they cannot be deliberating their way to action.  ... 
doi:10.1017/s0266267104000367 fatcat:4epr2t3xebdphd7wwpqpv756b4

Intentions are Optimality Beliefs – But Optimizing What?

Christoph Lumer
2005 Erkenntnis: An International Journal of Scientific Philosophy  
After stressing the necessity of reckoning with intentions in philosophy of action a strategy for deciding empirically between competing theories of intention is exposed and applied for criticizing various  ...  Based on process theories of deliberation two hypotheses for filling this gap are developed.  ...  Acknowledgement I would like to thank Robert Audi, Wolfgang Lenzen and Hugh McCann for very helpful discussions of this paper as well as two anonymous referees of "Erkenntnis" for their valuable suggestions  ... 
doi:10.1007/s10670-004-7682-2 fatcat:2qvqsmebhvgzxlv7rc2bvlemj4


1891 Mind  
They are actions in which some one desire is adopted as soon as it arises in consciousness, thus preventing alternative desires from rising above the threshold, and excluding all 'possibility of deliberation  ...  A desire or motive wholly undeliberated upon is extraneous to volitional action, but deliberating upon it incorporates it therewith ; and it may be added, that the act of choice, which terminates the deliberation  ... 
doi:10.1093/mind/os-xvi.62.161 fatcat:puysqrxvszhgrcsh7742kozoji

The Desire-Belief Account of Intention Explains Everything

Neil Sinhababu
2012 Noûs  
We should accept the desire-belief account because it explains their presence and absence simply and accurately.  ...  First I'll present a desire-belief account. Then I'll show how it explains belief about doing, reason-choosing, and the three facts Bratman describes.  ...  My opponents deny this, presenting familiar phenomena from actual human deliberation and action which they claim the desire-belief view can't explain.  ... 
doi:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2012.00864.x fatcat:y3a5kukidbbjjdgnujmbd32efu

Asymmetry in Judgments of Moral Blame and Praise

David Pizarro, Eric Uhlmann, Peter Salovey
2003 Psychological Science  
In three experiments, we investigated judgments of moral blame and praise elicited when individuals were presented with vignettes describing actions that were performed either carefully and deliberately  ...  actions).  ...  Acknowledgments-We thank Paul Bloom, David Armor, Frank Keil, Geoffrey Cohen, Wayne Steward, Barbara Spellman, Brian Detweiler-Bedell, Michael Barnes, and three reviewers for helpful comments on drafts  ... 
doi:10.1111/1467-9280.03433 pmid:12741752 fatcat:pf2ycvz4bzentfyqixnvtsr7m4

Page 630 of American Journal of Education Vol. 13, Issue 8 [page]

1905 American Journal of Education  
DELIBERATION AND CHOICE At this point consciousness takes possession of action. Hitherto consciousness has been the spectator or the assistant in action origi- nated largely without itself.  ...  By deliberation we mean the estimating of impulses to action, or motives, and their consequences; and by choice we mean the mind’s affirmation of one of these motives, thereby inhibiting the others.  ... 

Page 181 of American Journal of Philology Vol. 73, Issue 2 [page]

1952 American Journal of Philology  
, we desire in accord- ance with our deliberation (1113a 9-12).  ...  The object of choice being one of the things in our own power which is desired after deliberation, choice will be deliberate desire of things in our own power; for when we have decided as a result of deliberation  ... 

Aristotle on Prohairesis

Wei Liu
2017 Labyrinth: An International Journal for Philosophy, Value Theory and Sociocultural Hermeneutics  
It is prohairesis that determines an action to be rational, that provides the proximate efficient or moving cause of rational action, and that better reveals one's character than the action itself.  ...  strategy in dealing with prohairesis; (3) the structure, i.e., the desiderative and deliberative components of prohairesis; and will conclude with some remarks about the significance of prohairesis.  ...  those up to us, what we deliberate about and desire to do.  ... 
doi:10.25180/lj.v18i2.47 fatcat:ybq5gj5xtjcjtlrxvawwiocmwm

Thinking and Willing in Locke's Theory of Human Freedom

Richard Glauser
2003 Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review  
If it is done voluntarily, Locke could reply to Chappell that by suspending his desires in order to deliberate, the agent postpones both willing the action to exist and willing it not to exist.  ...  Will is directed only to our actions and terminates there." 10 Although a volition is always caused by a desire, not every desire causes a volition.  ...  turn of their actions, does not lie in this, that they can suspend their desires, and stop them from determining their wills to any action, till they have duly and fairly examin'd the good and evil of  ... 
doi:10.1017/s0012217300005710 fatcat:l5yvjqzkcva6hjesrkegrgowii

Practical Reasoning About Complex Activities [chapter]

Esteban Guerrero, Helena Lindgren
2017 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
We propose to use a composed structure called activity as unit for agent deliberation analysis, maintaining actions, goals and observations of the world always situated into a context.  ...  In this paper, we present an argument-based mechanism to generate hypotheses about belief-desire-intentions on dynamic and complex activities of a software agent.  ...  The closest approaches of our bottom-up deliberation are formal models for reasoning about desires, generating desires and plans for achieving them, based on argumentation theory in [2, 24] and [1]  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-319-59930-4_7 fatcat:fcywtjv63baa5kz4k6dm6qztde

Aristotle on the Structure of Akratic Action

Elena Cagnoli Fiecconi
2018 Phronesis: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy  
This thesis explains Aristotle's views on impetuous akrasia, weak akrasia, stubborn opinionated action and inverse akrasia.  ...  Rational actions are coherent primarily with one's commitments to one's conception of the good and only secondarily with one's decisions to perform a particular action.  ...  Impetuous people follow their non-rational desires and emotions without deliberating.  ... 
doi:10.1163/15685284-12341350 fatcat:ddgx4ryp75d2te7lwteomtcloa

Are External Reasons Impossible?

Rachel Cohon
1986 Ethics: An International Journal of Social, Political, and Legal Philosophy  
It is clear that our desires and aims provide us with some reasons for action. Are there also reasons for action that are not contingent upon what desires or aims we have?  ...  He offers an argument intended to show that there are no reasons to perform actions that would not satisfy the agent's desires, aims, or other "motives."  ...  In an example Williams mentions wanting a gin and tonic as a reason to do something; surely the desire for a gin and tonic need not be acquired by deliberation from other elements of S.  ... 
doi:10.1086/292774 fatcat:an3zl3sanvem3ky5thfcb4hm6i

Alienated Belief

2011 Dialectica  
I conclude by speculating that endorsed belief is in important respects like intentional action.  ...  I argue that the possibility of alienated belief is compatible with the so-called 'transparency' of first-person reflection on belief, and that the descriptive and expressive difficulties it involves stem  ...  a belief, and deliberating about what to do concludes in an action.  ... 
doi:10.1111/j.1746-8361.2011.01269.x fatcat:6ckbmy54bzbjnobllakfkwpzbe
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