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Cooperation in Threshold Public Projects with Binary Actions [article]

Yiling Chen, Biaoshuai Tao, Fang-Yi Yu
<span title="2021-05-18">2021</span> <i > arXiv </i> &nbsp; <span class="release-stage" >pre-print</span>
When can cooperation arise from self-interested decisions in public goods games? And how can we help agents to act cooperatively?  ...  We then propose two algorithms to help cooperation in the game. Our first algorithm adds an external investment to the public project, and our second algorithm uses matching funds.  ...  Our model falls in the category of threshold public goods with binary actions.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.08572v1">arXiv:2105.08572v1</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/d6mo5bmhevbjzcpa4adpnyyrxa">fatcat:d6mo5bmhevbjzcpa4adpnyyrxa</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20210520042522/https://arxiv.org/pdf/2105.08572v1.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/1c/eb/1ceb0128b0c7abb80fb2084af6136b71bf3d0905.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.08572v1" title="arxiv.org access"> <button class="ui compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="file alternate outline icon"></i> arxiv.org </button> </a>

Cooperation in Threshold Public Projects with Binary Actions

Yiling Chen, Biaoshuai Tao, Fang-Yi Yu
<span title="">2021</span> <i title="International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization"> Proceedings of the Thirtieth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence </i> &nbsp; <span class="release-stage">unpublished</span>
When can cooperation arise from self-interested decisions in public goods games? And how can we help agents to act cooperatively?  ...  We then propose two algorithms to help cooperation in the game. Our first algorithm adds an external investment to the public project, and our second algorithm uses matching funds.  ...  Our model falls in the category of threshold public goods with binary actions.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2021/15">doi:10.24963/ijcai.2021/15</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/g6lks3yxbvdolpbvr5ud2xwmf4">fatcat:g6lks3yxbvdolpbvr5ud2xwmf4</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20210813192813/https://www.ijcai.org/proceedings/2021/0015.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/ed/1c/ed1c14dca1bc2591c4f50a338d968e4bfa12fb0c.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2021/15"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="external alternate icon"></i> Publisher / doi.org </button> </a>

On the Limits of Cheap Talk for Public Good Provision

Francisco J. M. Costa, Humberto Moreira
<span title="">2012</span> <i title="Elsevier BV"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/tol7woxlqjeg5bmzadeg6qrg3e" style="color: black;">Social Science Research Network</a> </i> &nbsp;
We study a situation where, as a consequence of private information, agents do not have the incentive to invest in a public good if they are unable to have prior discussion with their partners.  ...  We show that in a voluntary contribution mechanism with cheap talk, any finite message space does not provide efficiency gain relative to a binary message space when agents truthfully report their type  ...  Palfrey and Rosenthal (1991) tested their theoretical findings with an experiment where both messages and actions are binary.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2029331">doi:10.2139/ssrn.2029331</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/dyxuasm34vcxpdzbgfvoedquby">fatcat:dyxuasm34vcxpdzbgfvoedquby</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20170808051159/http://personal.lse.ac.uk/costaf/research/cheap_talk_2012(3).pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/56/82/56825994356151dfc8c553d22a6755ba74ed1566.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2029331"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="external alternate icon"></i> ssrn.com </button> </a>

How insurance affects altruistic provision in threshold public goods games

Jianlei Zhang, Chunyan Zhang, Ming Cao
<span title="2015-03-13">2015</span> <i title="Springer Nature"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/tnqhc2x2aneavcd3gx5h7mswhm" style="color: black;">Scientific Reports</a> </i> &nbsp;
authors are supported by the Dutch Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) (82301006), the European Research Council (ERC-StG-307207) and the EU INTERREG program under the auspices of the SMARTBOT project  ...  Although defectors always do better than cooperators in the public goods games with binary contributions, insurance proposed here can offer the possibility for contributors of receiving higher payoffs  ...  In section 2 we describe the threshold public goods games with three strategies in the static context.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1038/srep09098">doi:10.1038/srep09098</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/25765206">pmid:25765206</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/PMC4357994/">pmcid:PMC4357994</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/pw2w3drvvngjzmaqdd2g5n5dhe">fatcat:pw2w3drvvngjzmaqdd2g5n5dhe</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20180722033948/https://pure.rug.nl/ws/files/17404863/2015_public_goods.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/83/9d/839ddc951b172a116eeb3b2bc8c801137b76d465.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1038/srep09098"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="unlock alternate icon" style="background-color: #fb971f;"></i> Publisher / doi.org </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4357994" title="pubmed link"> <button class="ui compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="file alternate outline icon"></i> pubmed.gov </button> </a>

Diffusing Coordination Risk

Deepal Basak, Zhen Zhou
<span title="">2017</span> <i title="Elsevier BV"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/tol7woxlqjeg5bmzadeg6qrg3e" style="color: black;">Social Science Research Network</a> </i> &nbsp;
The public information of survival works as a coordination device and helps in mitigating the coordination risk.  ...  A planner wants her agents to coordinate on a cooperative action. Agents gather noisy private information regarding the underlying fundamental and decide whether to cooperate or not.  ...  In equilibrium, the threshold agent will be indifferent between the cooperative action and the non-cooperative action.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2999636">doi:10.2139/ssrn.2999636</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/aisjarbka5arfo4zamewx6jrle">fatcat:aisjarbka5arfo4zamewx6jrle</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20190429134258/https://economicdynamics.org/meetpapers/2015/paper_1350.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/a7/5f/a75f884722f27ee88356daf8f6c499d922435c86.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2999636"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="external alternate icon"></i> ssrn.com </button> </a>

The impact of uncertainty on cooperation intent in a conservation conflict

Chris R.J. Pollard, Steve Redpath, Luc F. Bussière, Aidan Keane, Des B.A. Thompson, Juliette C. Young, Nils Bunnefeld
<span title="2019-02-15">2019</span> <i title="Wiley"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/ze472vx5x5e4vnluj2eqiskwka" style="color: black;">Journal of Applied Ecology</a> </i> &nbsp;
Scientific uncertainty and political uncertainty both had less of an effect, with over 95% of crofters predicted to be willing to cooperate in these scenarios.  ...  Stakeholder cooperation can be vital in managing conservation conflicts. Laboratory experiments show cooperation is less likely in the presence of uncertainty.  ...  Two anonymous reviewers are also thanked for their help in improving this paper.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1111/1365-2664.13361">doi:10.1111/1365-2664.13361</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/g53msovc2fcadclqkgqvg32dni">fatcat:g53msovc2fcadclqkgqvg32dni</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20190429202134/http://nora.nerc.ac.uk/id/eprint/522532/1/Pollard_et_al-2019-Journal_of_Applied_Ecology.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/5b/fc/5bfce924e92b5e755a6b438bdc2f085126366a4f.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1111/1365-2664.13361"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="external alternate icon"></i> Publisher / doi.org </button> </a>

COOPERATION SPILLOVERS AND PRICE COMPETITION IN EXPERIMENTAL MARKETS

TIMOTHY N. CASON, LATA GANGADHARAN
<span title="2012-11-08">2012</span> <i title="Wiley"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/tbimpvntdjecbkgyq4fepmui7y" style="color: black;">Economic Inquiry</a> </i> &nbsp;
The experiment includes control treatments with separate R&D cooperation and markets.  ...  Our results show that although participants usually cooperate when given an opportunity, cooperation is less common when they also compete in the market.  ...  The Public Good Only treatment examines whether subjects coordinate and cooperate with each other when threshold public good returns are uncertain, and studies how communication affects cooperation.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.2012.00486.x">doi:10.1111/j.1465-7295.2012.00486.x</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/mkktfh6jojfj7mugzhhwdlhmku">fatcat:mkktfh6jojfj7mugzhhwdlhmku</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20120113024550/http://www.krannert.purdue.edu:80/faculty/cason/papers/Cooperation-Competition.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/af/ab/afab6826fb8f7cb56266ee4567b3b45e43a3dbb9.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.2012.00486.x"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="external alternate icon"></i> Publisher / doi.org </button> </a>

Influencing Factors on Profit Distribution of Public-Private Partnership Projects: Private Sector's Perspective

Jing Du, Hongyue Wu, Lei Zhu
<span title="2018-06-05">2018</span> <i title="Hindawi Limited"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/afelmew3cvcs3mjotxlfalsrai" style="color: black;">Advances in Civil Engineering</a> </i> &nbsp;
As an important issue in the public-private partnership (PPP) projects, the profit distribution has a critical impact on both the public and private sectors.  ...  Besides, the public and private sectors can make appropriate profit distribution proposals in practice based on the conclusion of this study.  ...  However, in many projects, the private sector is the major investor who shares more profits than the public sector. Considering this, this study adjusted the binary threshold of the outcome as 60%.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1155/2018/2143173">doi:10.1155/2018/2143173</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/ucqyjfoajvfpbdaceizmf5nbuq">fatcat:ucqyjfoajvfpbdaceizmf5nbuq</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20190218143935/http://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/0cd9/a0dae8395e2f9d2369afedc810d0fe83688c.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/0c/d9/0cd9a0dae8395e2f9d2369afedc810d0fe83688c.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1155/2018/2143173"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="unlock alternate icon" style="background-color: #fb971f;"></i> hindawi.com </button> </a>

Strike one hundred to educate one: Measuring the efficacy of collective sanctions experimentally

Philipp Chapkovski, The Anh Han
<span title="2021-04-08">2021</span> <i title="Public Library of Science (PLoS)"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/s3gm7274mfe6fcs7e3jterqlri" style="color: black;">PLoS ONE</a> </i> &nbsp;
In this paper, we test whether sanctions applied to an entire group on account of the free-riding of one of its members can promote group cooperation.  ...  Moreover, when subjects are able to punish their peers, the level of cooperation is lower in the regime of collective sanctions than under individual sanctions.  ...  This threshold was set at half of the total endowment: out of 20 tokens, 11'should' be invested in the group project.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0248599">doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0248599</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/33831026">pmid:33831026</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/ysgj6u6kx5al3kqffqlgiqcvcu">fatcat:ysgj6u6kx5al3kqffqlgiqcvcu</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20210501152908/https://storage.googleapis.com/plos-corpus-prod/10.1371/journal.pone.0248599/1/pone.0248599.pdf?X-Goog-Algorithm=GOOG4-RSA-SHA256&amp;X-Goog-Credential=wombat-sa%40plos-prod.iam.gserviceaccount.com%2F20210501%2Fauto%2Fstorage%2Fgoog4_request&amp;X-Goog-Date=20210501T152908Z&amp;X-Goog-Expires=3600&amp;X-Goog-SignedHeaders=host&amp;X-Goog-Signature=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" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/68/36/68362536db7798197308dad2f56754003b1e36bb.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0248599"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="unlock alternate icon" style="background-color: #fb971f;"></i> plos.org </button> </a>

Coordination vs. voluntarism and enforcement in sustaining international environmental cooperation

Scott Barrett
<span title="2016-11-07">2016</span> <i title="Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/nvtuoas5pbdsllkntnhizy4f4q" style="color: black;">Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America</a> </i> &nbsp;
I show that, as a general matter, states struggle to cooperate voluntarily and enforce agreements to cooperate but that they find it relatively easy to coordinate actions.  ...  Coordination may fall short of supporting an ideal outcome, but it nearly always works better than the alternatives. multilateral cooperation | coordination | public goods | treaties | environment  ...  Without deliberately trying to avoid a threshold, collective action succeeded in avoiding a threshold anyway.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1604989113">doi:10.1073/pnas.1604989113</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/27821746">pmid:27821746</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/PMC5187718/">pmcid:PMC5187718</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/myjbdfj7fzcklisapnmvktfusi">fatcat:myjbdfj7fzcklisapnmvktfusi</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20180730022338/http://www.pnas.org/content/pnas/113/51/14515.full.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/9c/9f/9c9f75c8230127d6d33e8fa41aefd85f3f406771.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1604989113"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="unlock alternate icon" style="background-color: #fb971f;"></i> Publisher / doi.org </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5187718" title="pubmed link"> <button class="ui compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="file alternate outline icon"></i> pubmed.gov </button> </a>

It's Your Turn: Experiments with Three-Player Public Good Games

Yohanes E. Riyanto, Nilanjan Roy
<span title="">2017</span> <i title="Elsevier BV"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/tol7woxlqjeg5bmzadeg6qrg3e" style="color: black;">Social Science Research Network</a> </i> &nbsp;
We report results from experiments designed to investigate the prevalence of turn-taking in three-person finitely repeated threshold public good games without communication.  ...  When the turn-taking path is at odds with efficiency or under private information of endowments, players seldom engage in taking turns.  ...  The provision of threshold public goods combines free riding incentives with a coordination problem.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2910806">doi:10.2139/ssrn.2910806</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/k6gslgd5sjbzjl67hcelnivq7a">fatcat:k6gslgd5sjbzjl67hcelnivq7a</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20180722164728/https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/76565/1/MPRA_paper_76565.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/9b/6c/9b6cd18dededc4ae69054647a3166568f49ecd7d.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2910806"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="external alternate icon"></i> ssrn.com </button> </a>

LIMITED LIABILITY, MORAL HAZARD, AND RISK TAKING: A SAFETY NET GAME EXPERIMENT

SASCHA FÜLLBRUNN, TIBOR NEUGEBAUER
<span title="2012-05-03">2012</span> <i title="Wiley"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/tbimpvntdjecbkgyq4fepmui7y" style="color: black;">Economic Inquiry</a> </i> &nbsp;
In the safety net game, subjects behave as if socially responsible for the losses they impose on the group. With repetition, nevertheless, a gradual emergence of the moral hazard problem arises.  ...  The safety net game is compared to both an individual decision task involving full liability and the deterministic public goods game.  ...  We observe that most chosen loss avoidance levels are in the interior upper half of the action space, and cooperation levels are larger than in the deterministic public goods game.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.2012.00464.x">doi:10.1111/j.1465-7295.2012.00464.x</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/ggwjzwwbk5a57hwzvobh73h7ca">fatcat:ggwjzwwbk5a57hwzvobh73h7ca</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20170921213852/http://repository.ubn.ru.nl/bitstream/handle/2066/112118/112118-a.pdf?sequence=3" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/bf/65/bf65e04e751a4870e170e17e9b5d9ba30fb0bd84.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.2012.00464.x"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="external alternate icon"></i> Publisher / doi.org </button> </a>

International Cooperation and Institution Formation: A Game Theoretic Perspective [chapter]

Akira Okada
<span title="">2017</span> <i title="Springer Japan"> The Political Economy of the Asia Pacific </i> &nbsp;
We consider a multi-stage game model of institution formation and show that a group of participants voluntarily forms an institution for international cooperation in a strict subgame perfect equilibrium  ...  Some of the implications on the international frameworks that attempt to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in East Asia are finally discussed.  ...  Countries with smaller thresholds are more willing to cooperate than those with higher thresholds. Hence, it holds that a country with a larger MPCR has a stronger incentive to cooperate.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-4-431-56466-9_6">doi:10.1007/978-4-431-56466-9_6</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/sn434utdxva4bfm3fflatkmahm">fatcat:sn434utdxva4bfm3fflatkmahm</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20170813020006/http://hermes-ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/rs/bitstream/10086/26955/1/070econDP14-17.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/b5/78/b578bf387320222ec6df026ad12994d16068efa1.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-4-431-56466-9_6"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="external alternate icon"></i> springer.com </button> </a>

Academic Social Networks [chapter]

Jose Palazzo Moreira de Oliveira, Giseli Rabello Lopes, Mirella Moura Moro
<span title="">2011</span> <i title="Springer Berlin Heidelberg"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/2w3awgokqne6te4nvlofavy5a4" style="color: black;">Lecture Notes in Computer Science</a> </i> &nbsp;
The Social Network helps us to better understand how and why we interact with each other, as well as how technology can alter this interaction"  But how is possible to interpret the SN scenarios in the  ...  and Results 32 * Tested by the significance threshold of 0.01  Evaluation and Results How stimulate researchers to cooperate?  ...  before the beginning of the INWeb project.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-24574-9_2">doi:10.1007/978-3-642-24574-9_2</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/5zqp2ryhpbcdvjekqqe2r5qh2m">fatcat:5zqp2ryhpbcdvjekqqe2r5qh2m</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20170808034502/http://er2011.ulb.ac.be/media/palazzo_keynote_wism2011.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/b8/b1/b8b150c8c17f1a17aa831197b36f7ce46d3f3d9d.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-24574-9_2"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="external alternate icon"></i> springer.com </button> </a>

Can Bottom-Up Institutional Reform Improve Service Delivery?

Ezequiel Molina
<span title="">2014</span> <i title="Elsevier BV"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/tol7woxlqjeg5bmzadeg6qrg3e" style="color: black;">Social Science Research Network</a> </i> &nbsp;
Not only teachers, nurses, and doctors are missing in action but also public resources.  ...  TREATED is a binary variable which equals 1 for respondents in communities with CVA projects and 0 otherwise. OUTCOME refers to the variables explained in Table 4 .  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2559636">doi:10.2139/ssrn.2559636</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/hnwgqf6ky5gkjpjc4cavs4vk6i">fatcat:hnwgqf6ky5gkjpjc4cavs4vk6i</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20170812082500/http://siteresources.worldbank.org/PUBLICSECTORANDGOVERNANCE/Resources/285741-1360860859986/9049944-1379360318549/ImactEvaluationCVA.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/eb/a7/eba78d0f8e707b42b7ea5cb465a2ed09a8a9de75.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2559636"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="external alternate icon"></i> ssrn.com </button> </a>
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