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Cooperation under Incomplete Contracting

Helga Habis, P. Jean-Jacques Herings
2009 Social Science Research Network  
We examine the notion of the core when cooperation takes place in a setting with time and uncertainty. We do so in a two-period general equilibrium setting with incomplete markets.  ...  We examine the notion of cooperation with incomplete contracts. We do so in a twoperiod general equilibrium model with incomplete markets.  ...  Many papers in the contract theory literature argue that contracts are generally incomplete.  ... 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.1440096 fatcat:d2lkmjskorb2ddrywpecsd5rfu

Trust, contract and economic cooperation

E. Lorenz
1999 Cambridge Journal of Economics  
An inevitable consequence of this alternative understanding of incomplete contracts is that there is no guarantee that cooperation will succeed, even when the circumstances appear to promise mutual gain  ...  In this alternative vision of economic cooperation, the purpose of incomplete contracts is not so much to enforce commitments as to provide a framework agreement within which on-going discussions and negotiations  ... 
doi:10.1093/cje/23.3.301 fatcat:zn4kgfso5vgx7azbfycfbyizxi

Contract-Based Cooperative Spectrum Sharing [article]

Lingjie Duan, Lin Gao, Jianwei Huang
2011 arXiv   pre-print
Cooperative spectrum sharing is one effective way to achieve this goal.  ...  In cooperative spectrum sharing, secondary users (SUs) relay traffics for primary users (PUs), in exchange for dedicated transmission time for the SUs' own communication needs.  ...  To tackle this problem, we propose a contract-based cooperative spectrum sharing mechanism.  ... 
arXiv:1102.4176v1 fatcat:eujpmyrbtvexnhhxicsvmnx5hy

Debt contracts and cooperative improvements

Stefan Krasa, Tridib Sharma, Anne P. Villamil
2005 Journal of Mathematical Economics  
The cPBNE solution concept captures both the non-cooperative aspect of firm liquidation and the cooperative aspect of firm restructuring. JEL Classification Numbers: C70, D60, G30, K40  ...  Deterministic contracts that resemble debt are optimal for a general class of economies.  ...  game. 8 At t = 0 the contract choice is individually rational and ex-ante efficient (i.e., cooperative), and at t = 1 and t = 2 agents can cooperatively change the continuation contract.  ... 
doi:10.1016/j.jmateco.2004.04.002 fatcat:i6ompc4r25cibcvkkm36vsrzly

Contracts. Implied Promise to Cooperate. Torts. Negligent Interference with Contract

1928 Harvard Law Review  
ConTRAcTs—ImpiLieD PROMISE TO COOPERATE — TorTS— NEGLIGENT INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT. — The plaintiff, a tug-owner, agreed to beach the ship of the defendant for an agreed sum.  ...  The action is said to sound in contract on an implied promise to give codperation where it is nec- essary for the plaintiffs performance. 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1920) §§ 1293, 1318.  ... 
doi:10.2307/1331146 fatcat:vjoljqmgungujmkcsix2ega7gu

Contract design and non-cooperative renegotiation

Robert Evans, Sönje Reiche
2015 Journal of Economic Theory  
We study a contract design setting in which the contracting parties cannot commit not to renegotiate previous contract agreements.  ...  new menu of contracts in its place.  ...  However, it also has the drawback that the implied renegotiation process does not have a non-cooperative character.  ... 
doi:10.1016/j.jet.2014.12.001 fatcat:4f3jy6zg55azfphmetnw5x4aii

Risk Management in the Cooperative Contract

Ethan Ligon
2009 American Journal of Agricultural Economics  
It may not be practical or natural to write the membership agreement, by-laws, and so on for the cooperative in these terms; so, in this section we make an effort to recast the optimal contract in terms  ...  The Optimal Contract with Limited Commitment In this section we pursue three main extensions to the standard dynamic model of limited commitment (e.g.  ... 
doi:10.1111/j.1467-8276.2009.01286.x fatcat:yv62scfwnjg3bdd5h7qdcsajgq

Social Contracts for Non-Cooperative Games

Alan Davoust, Michael Rovatsos
2020 Proceedings of the AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society  
CCS CONCEPTS • Computing methodologies → Cooperation and coordination; Philosophical/theoretical foundations of artificial intelligence; Multi-agent systems.  ...  We show that for any game, a suitable social contract can be designed to produce an optimal outcome in terms of social welfare.  ...  Heckathorn and Maser [16] argue that the agreement to cooperate is the result of a bargaining process where the players settle on one of many possible contracts, and that this choice will be dictated  ... 
doi:10.1145/3375627.3375829 dblp:conf/aies/DavoustR20 fatcat:x4mx5r4yjferhnvpbvc3gaewoe

Cooperation and Mistrust in Relational Contracts

Holger Herz, Armin Schmutzler
2016 Social Science Research Network  
Abstract Work and trade relationships are often governed by relational contracts, in which incentives for cooperative action today stem from the prospective future benefits of the relationship.  ...  This can impede the joint understanding of what constitutes cooperative behavior, and may thus inject mistrust into relationships, even if credibility is held constant.  ...  Introduction The theory of relational contracts investigates the conditions under which cooperative and efficient behavior is sustainable through repeated interaction even if contracts are not enforceable  ... 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.2828709 fatcat:r3l2atofmff2hdp3ed3xgvkr3i

Cooperation and mistrust in relational contracts

Holger Herz, Armin Schmutzler, André Volk
2019 Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization  
Work and trade relationships are often governed by relational contracts, in which incentives for cooperative action today stem from the prospective future benefits of the relationship.  ...  This can impede the joint understanding of what constitutes cooperative behavior, and may thus inject mistrust into relationships, even if credibility is held constant.  ...  Introduction The theory of relational contracts investigates the conditions under which cooperative and efficient behavior is sustainable through repeated interaction even if contracts are not enforceable  ... 
doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2019.07.007 fatcat:yjiqazqo25hlzkmndn6j24ibuu

Cooperative investments induced by contract law

Urs Schweizer
2006 The Rand Journal of Economics  
This paper revisits the economic analysis of contract law for a setting of cooperative investments.  ...  Yet, the very nature of cooperative investments gives rise to the possibility that both parties may claim expectation damages.  ...  Does this mean that (German) contract law is not well designed to handle incomplete contracts among parties facing a situation of cooperative invest- while Che and Chung have provided a very interesting  ... 
doi:10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00008.x fatcat:z7tdmyzp5fccrojl66ggnbhpoe

Risk Management in the Cooperative Contract

Ethan A. Ligon
2008 Social Science Research Network  
It may not be practical or natural to write the membership agreement, by-laws, and so on for the cooperative in these terms; so, in this section we make an effort to recast the optimal contract in terms  ...  The Optimal Contract with Limited Commitment In this section we pursue three main extensions to the standard dynamic model of limited commitment (e.g.  ... 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.1774021 fatcat:4umqjc4qgbhmxay4bpunxtl3h4

Energy Contract Settlements through Automated Negotiation in Residential Cooperatives [article]

Shantanu Chakraborty, Tim Baarslag, Michael Kaisers
2018 arXiv   pre-print
This paper presents an automated peer-to-peer (P2P) negotiation strategy for settling energy contracts among prosumers in a Residential Energy Cooperative (REC) considering heterogeneous prosumer preferences  ...  The prosumers keep an ordered preference profile of possible energy contracts by evaluating the contracts from their own valuations on the entailed criteria, and iteratively offer the peers contracts until  ...  Abstract-This paper presents an automated peer-to-peer (P2P) negotiation strategy for settling energy contracts among prosumers in a Residential Energy Cooperative (REC) considering heterogeneous prosumer  ... 
arXiv:1807.10978v4 fatcat:rdylpuj46beqxnzkom7qf77lmi

The cooperative genome: organisms as social contracts

Kenneth M. Weiss, Anne V. Buchanan
2009 International Journal of Developmental Biology  
The organizing principles by which organisms are made are thoroughly based on complex hierarchies of molecular interactions that require multiple factors to be relentlessly cooperating with each other.  ...  Reconciling these two points of view involves changing the scale of observation, and a different understanding of evolution, in which cooperation and tolerance are more important than competition and intolerance  ...  The evolution of cooperation, or coevolution From a classically selection-driven perspective, cooperation is viewed as but a form of competition in disguise: if cooperation involves a cost, it can only  ... 
doi:10.1387/ijdb.072497kw pmid:19557681 fatcat:7xcvwbkfwbhtvmhzj7ctdarv5y

Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting

Yeon-Koo Che, Donald B Hausch
1999 The American Economic Review  
As the investments become more cooperative, the range for which contracting is worthless expands; and it covers the entire range if both investments are purely cooperative.  ...  With cooperative i n v estments, the value of contracting varies depending on whether the parties can or cannot commit not to renegotiate the contract.  ...  T h us, s s w for all q 0, so the simple contract can do no better than the Williamson outcome. In this case, therefore, it is optimal to set q = 0 .  ... 
doi:10.1257/aer.89.1.125 fatcat:wxy42c7jojfmhhohvl6j5fueee
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