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Cooperation under Incomplete Contracting
2009
Social Science Research Network
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We examine the notion of the core when cooperation takes place in a setting with time and uncertainty. We do so in a two-period general equilibrium setting with incomplete markets. ...
We examine the notion of cooperation with incomplete contracts. We do so in a twoperiod general equilibrium model with incomplete markets. ...
Many papers in the contract theory literature argue that contracts are generally incomplete. ...
doi:10.2139/ssrn.1440096
fatcat:d2lkmjskorb2ddrywpecsd5rfu
Trust, contract and economic cooperation
1999
Cambridge Journal of Economics
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An inevitable consequence of this alternative understanding of incomplete contracts is that there is no guarantee that cooperation will succeed, even when the circumstances appear to promise mutual gain ...
In this alternative vision of economic cooperation, the purpose of incomplete contracts is not so much to enforce commitments as to provide a framework agreement within which on-going discussions and negotiations ...
doi:10.1093/cje/23.3.301
fatcat:zn4kgfso5vgx7azbfycfbyizxi
Contract-Based Cooperative Spectrum Sharing
[article]
2011
arXiv
pre-print
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2011
2011 IEEE International Symposium on Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks (DySPAN)
unpublished
doi:10.1109/dyspan.2011.5936229 fatcat:7x3ycmqa7ndjbidzmhsi7qxs4m
doi:10.1109/dyspan.2011.5936229 fatcat:7x3ycmqa7ndjbidzmhsi7qxs4m
Cooperative spectrum sharing is one effective way to achieve this goal. ...
In cooperative spectrum sharing, secondary users (SUs) relay traffics for primary users (PUs), in exchange for dedicated transmission time for the SUs' own communication needs. ...
To tackle this problem, we propose a contract-based cooperative spectrum sharing mechanism. ...
arXiv:1102.4176v1
fatcat:eujpmyrbtvexnhhxicsvmnx5hy
Debt contracts and cooperative improvements
2005
Journal of Mathematical Economics
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The cPBNE solution concept captures both the non-cooperative aspect of firm liquidation and the cooperative aspect of firm restructuring. JEL Classification Numbers: C70, D60, G30, K40 ...
Deterministic contracts that resemble debt are optimal for a general class of economies. ...
game. 8 At t = 0 the contract choice is individually rational and ex-ante efficient (i.e., cooperative), and at t = 1 and t = 2 agents can cooperatively change the continuation contract. ...
doi:10.1016/j.jmateco.2004.04.002
fatcat:i6ompc4r25cibcvkkm36vsrzly
Contracts. Implied Promise to Cooperate. Torts. Negligent Interference with Contract
1928
Harvard Law Review
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ConTRAcTs—ImpiLieD PROMISE TO COOPERATE — TorTS— NEGLIGENT INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT. — The plaintiff, a tug-owner, agreed to beach the ship of the defendant for an agreed sum. ...
The action is said to sound in contract on an implied promise to give codperation where it is nec- essary for the plaintiffs performance. 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1920) §§ 1293, 1318. ...
doi:10.2307/1331146
fatcat:vjoljqmgungujmkcsix2ega7gu
Contract design and non-cooperative renegotiation
2015
Journal of Economic Theory
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We study a contract design setting in which the contracting parties cannot commit not to renegotiate previous contract agreements. ...
new menu of contracts in its place. ...
However, it also has the drawback that the implied renegotiation process does not have a non-cooperative character. ...
doi:10.1016/j.jet.2014.12.001
fatcat:4f3jy6zg55azfphmetnw5x4aii
Risk Management in the Cooperative Contract
2009
American Journal of Agricultural Economics
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It may not be practical or natural to write the membership agreement, by-laws, and so on for the cooperative in these terms; so, in this section we make an effort to recast the optimal contract in terms ...
The Optimal Contract with Limited Commitment In this section we pursue three main extensions to the standard dynamic model of limited commitment (e.g. ...
doi:10.1111/j.1467-8276.2009.01286.x
fatcat:yv62scfwnjg3bdd5h7qdcsajgq
Social Contracts for Non-Cooperative Games
2020
Proceedings of the AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society
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CCS CONCEPTS • Computing methodologies → Cooperation and coordination; Philosophical/theoretical foundations of artificial intelligence; Multi-agent systems. ...
We show that for any game, a suitable social contract can be designed to produce an optimal outcome in terms of social welfare. ...
Heckathorn and Maser [16] argue that the agreement to cooperate is the result of a bargaining process where the players settle on one of many possible contracts, and that this choice will be dictated ...
doi:10.1145/3375627.3375829
dblp:conf/aies/DavoustR20
fatcat:x4mx5r4yjferhnvpbvc3gaewoe
Cooperation and Mistrust in Relational Contracts
2016
Social Science Research Network
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Abstract Work and trade relationships are often governed by relational contracts, in which incentives for cooperative action today stem from the prospective future benefits of the relationship. ...
This can impede the joint understanding of what constitutes cooperative behavior, and may thus inject mistrust into relationships, even if credibility is held constant. ...
Introduction The theory of relational contracts investigates the conditions under which cooperative and efficient behavior is sustainable through repeated interaction even if contracts are not enforceable ...
doi:10.2139/ssrn.2828709
fatcat:r3l2atofmff2hdp3ed3xgvkr3i
Cooperation and mistrust in relational contracts
2019
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
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Work and trade relationships are often governed by relational contracts, in which incentives for cooperative action today stem from the prospective future benefits of the relationship. ...
This can impede the joint understanding of what constitutes cooperative behavior, and may thus inject mistrust into relationships, even if credibility is held constant. ...
Introduction The theory of relational contracts investigates the conditions under which cooperative and efficient behavior is sustainable through repeated interaction even if contracts are not enforceable ...
doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2019.07.007
fatcat:yjiqazqo25hlzkmndn6j24ibuu
Cooperative investments induced by contract law
2006
The Rand Journal of Economics
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This paper revisits the economic analysis of contract law for a setting of cooperative investments. ...
Yet, the very nature of cooperative investments gives rise to the possibility that both parties may claim expectation damages. ...
Does this mean that (German) contract law is not well designed to handle
incomplete contracts among parties facing a situation of cooperative invest-
while Che and Chung have provided a very interesting ...
doi:10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00008.x
fatcat:z7tdmyzp5fccrojl66ggnbhpoe
Risk Management in the Cooperative Contract
2008
Social Science Research Network
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It may not be practical or natural to write the membership agreement, by-laws, and so on for the cooperative in these terms; so, in this section we make an effort to recast the optimal contract in terms ...
The Optimal Contract with Limited Commitment In this section we pursue three main extensions to the standard dynamic model of limited commitment (e.g. ...
doi:10.2139/ssrn.1774021
fatcat:4umqjc4qgbhmxay4bpunxtl3h4
Energy Contract Settlements through Automated Negotiation in Residential Cooperatives
[article]
2018
arXiv
pre-print
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2018 pre-print arXiv:1807.10978v3 fatcat:3rckvc4fenhqpepchu7axmga24Other Versions
This paper presents an automated peer-to-peer (P2P) negotiation strategy for settling energy contracts among prosumers in a Residential Energy Cooperative (REC) considering heterogeneous prosumer preferences ...
The prosumers keep an ordered preference profile of possible energy contracts by evaluating the contracts from their own valuations on the entailed criteria, and iteratively offer the peers contracts until ...
Abstract-This paper presents an automated peer-to-peer (P2P) negotiation strategy for settling energy contracts among prosumers in a Residential Energy Cooperative (REC) considering heterogeneous prosumer ...
arXiv:1807.10978v4
fatcat:rdylpuj46beqxnzkom7qf77lmi
The cooperative genome: organisms as social contracts
2009
International Journal of Developmental Biology
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The organizing principles by which organisms are made are thoroughly based on complex hierarchies of molecular interactions that require multiple factors to be relentlessly cooperating with each other. ...
Reconciling these two points of view involves changing the scale of observation, and a different understanding of evolution, in which cooperation and tolerance are more important than competition and intolerance ...
The evolution of cooperation, or coevolution From a classically selection-driven perspective, cooperation is viewed as but a form of competition in disguise: if cooperation involves a cost, it can only ...
doi:10.1387/ijdb.072497kw
pmid:19557681
fatcat:7xcvwbkfwbhtvmhzj7ctdarv5y
Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting
1999
The American Economic Review
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As the investments become more cooperative, the range for which contracting is worthless expands; and it covers the entire range if both investments are purely cooperative. ...
With cooperative i n v estments, the value of contracting varies depending on whether the parties can or cannot commit not to renegotiate the contract. ...
T h us, s s w for all q 0, so the simple contract can do no better than the Williamson outcome. In this case, therefore, it is optimal to set q = 0 . ...
doi:10.1257/aer.89.1.125
fatcat:wxy42c7jojfmhhohvl6j5fueee
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