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Cooperate Delegation of Computation for Rational Party using Zero-determinant Strategy Approach

Duo Zhang, Youliang Tian, Chaoyue Yue, Meimei Fan
2020 IEEE Access  
Finally, the performance analysis results show that the entrusting party can regulate the betrayers in the computing party through Zero-determinant Strategy to ensure the interests of honest people in  ...  Then, through the iterative implementation of the Zero-determinant Strategy, the participants will cooperate with each other actively.  ...  ACKNOWLEDGMENT The authors would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments and suggestions.  ... 
doi:10.1109/access.2020.2971544 fatcat:u4hqn4xiw5hq5pqpgswqopqawm

Rational verification: game-theoretic verification of multi-agent systems

Alessandro Abate, Julian Gutierrez, Lewis Hammond, Paul Harrenstein, Marta Kwiatkowska, Muhammad Najib, Giuseppe Perelli, Thomas Steeples, Michael Wooldridge
2021 Applied intelligence (Boston)  
After motivating and introducing the overall framework of rational verification, we discuss key results obtained in the past few years as well as relevant related work in logic, AI, and computer science  ...  multi-agent system – that is, whether the system will exhibit the behavior ϕ represents under the assumption that agents within the system act rationally in pursuit of their preferences.  ...  For zero-sum properties PRISM-games relies on using value iteration to approximate values for all states of the game, and then solves a linear program for each state in order to compute a minimax strategy  ... 
doi:10.1007/s10489-021-02658-y fatcat:k6revqme4bfhtakfsh4jldm7bq

Nash equilibrium in a spatial model of coalition bargaining

Norman Schofield, Robert Parks
2000 Mathematical Social Sciences  
It is shown that with this outcome function and with three parties there exists a stable, pure strategy Nash equilibrium, z* for certain classes of policy preferences.  ...  We suggest that the existence of stable, pure strategy Nash equilibria in general political games of this type accounts for the non-convergence of party platforms in multiparty electoral systems based  ...  Empirical and computational work mentioned here was undertaken in collaboration with Andrew Martin, David Nixon, Dganit Ofek, Kevin Quinn, Itai Sened th and Andrew Whitford.  ... 
doi:10.1016/s0165-4896(99)00027-x fatcat:5enro25rfzdnnjermoimwwsa2e

Zero-Knowledge Proof-of-Identity: Sybil-Resistant, Anonymous Authentication on Permissionless Blockchains and Incentive Compatible, Strictly Dominant Cryptocurrencies [article]

David Cerezo Sánchez
2020 arXiv   pre-print
Zero-Knowledge Proof-of-Identity from trusted public certificates (e.g., national identity cards and/or ePassports; eSIM) is introduced here to permissionless blockchains in order to remove the inefficiencies  ...  Solving one of the most pressing problems in blockchains, a zk-PoI cryptocurrency is proved to have the following advantageous properties: - an incentive-compatible protocol for the issuing of cryptocurrency  ...  The substitution of costly PoW for cheap Zero-Knowledge Proof-of-Identity only increases the attractiveness of this rational strategy, that can only be counteracted by using an incentive-compatible protocol  ... 
arXiv:1905.09093v2 fatcat:djetqb5mcvh3vo4hdsenyobiuu

Some Experimental Games

Merrill M. Flood
1958 Management science  
I have not computed the Nash solution in this case, but this would be done by finding the point (uw , U2, us) on the convex set (determined by the Q} jx) Where U Ue Us is maximum.  ...  House of Delegates Summary: The problem faced by the 4ouse of Delegates of the State of West Vir- ginia in determining the distribution among the counties of aid for schools for the next biennium is analyzed  ... 
doi:10.1287/mnsc.5.1.5 fatcat:zo227pwbyzaapiopivrflrh7nm

Non-Cooperative Rational Interactive Proofs

Jing Chen, Samuel McCauley, Shikha Singh, Michael Wagner
2019 European Symposium on Algorithms  
Interactive proofs are increasingly used as a framework to design protocols for computation outsourcing.  ...  We show, for example, that the power of non-cooperative rational interactive proofs with a polynomial utility gap is exactly equal to the complexity class P NEXP .  ...  More recently, the study of IPs has resulted in extremely efficient (e.g., near linear or even logarithmic time) protocols for delegation of computation [7, 9, 15, 30, 41] .  ... 
doi:10.4230/lipics.esa.2019.29 dblp:conf/esa/0017M019 fatcat:qzysidq7izgi7lxro3rpe2rrke

A Social Contract Account for CSR as Extended Model of Corporate Governance (Part I): Rational Bargaining and Justification

Lorenzo Sacconi
2005 Social Science Research Network  
of corporate governance and strategy -is answered, so that I am able to define an objective function for the firm consistent with the idea of CSR as a model of governance.  ...  Both the games are solved in terms of the proper cooperative bargaining and coalition game solution concept, and results are interpreted not only according to the perspective of the theory of rational  ...  There is therefore an efficiency rationale for the idea of the firm as 'unified governance' of transactions: if one party (a class of stakeholders) has made a specific investment of greater importance  ... 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.731647 fatcat:grtbcb7dofa4hldefgapii7dcu

A commitment folk theorem

Adam Tauman Kalai, Ehud Kalai, Ehud Lehrer, Dov Samet
2010 Games and Economic Behavior  
All feasible and individually rational payoffs of a two-person strategic game can be attained at the equilibria of one (universal) commitment game that uses simple commitment devices.  ...  JEL classification: C70 Real world players often increase their payoffs by voluntarily committing to play a fixed strategy, prior to the start of a strategic game.  ...  Such numbers are represented using O (log n) bits. It is straightforward to efficiently compute the function L n , i.e., compute in time polynomial in the input length.  ... 
doi:10.1016/j.geb.2009.09.008 fatcat:dw5afcfxzvh7jbsi5ctqblq6le

Contingent Delegation and Ambiguous Property Rights: The Case of China's Reform

2004 Annales d Économie et de Statistique  
E then rationally chooses to play Nashreversion strategy.  ...  For simplicity's sake, let us split the game played by the three parties into two games, one is linked with another. One is the delegation game between the central and the local government.  ... 
doi:10.2307/20079106 fatcat:iywegm5v2redbmuwezd427hbzy

The strategic constitution

2000 ChoiceReviews  
computes his best strategy by assuming that the agent will use discretion to reallocate resources.  ...  When the agent diverts, the principal's best strategy is "don't delegate." 100 Conversely, when the agent implements, the principal's best strategy is "delegate". 101 So the rational principal exercises  ...  The consequences of this decision for the owner and the public are given in Figure 66 .  ... 
doi:10.5860/choice.38-1787 fatcat:zbrbzf7dcbgnxlc37bqpp2k47e

Rational Protocols and Attacks in Blockchain System

Tao Li, Yuling Chen, Yanli Wang, Yilei Wang, Minghao Zhao, Haojia Zhu, Youliang Tian, Xiaomei Yu, Yixian Yang
2020 Security and Communication Networks  
When put differently, the rational parties, who manage to maximize their utilities, involved in blockchain chose their strategies according to the economic incentives.  ...  Consequently, we focus on the influence of rational parties with respect to building blocks.  ...  the tragedy of the commons game is a social trap for rational parties. ey must leverage their strategies such that they may maximize their utilities in the long run.  ... 
doi:10.1155/2020/8839047 fatcat:pjtlnwxh3baq7pu667g22b2bdu

On the Nash bargaining solution with noise

Werner Güth, Klaus Ritzberger, Eric van Damme
2004 European Economic Review  
Suppose two parties have to share a surplus of random size.  ...  Adding the strategy to wait to the noisy Nash demand game results in two strict equilibria, in each of which one player takes almost the whole surplus, provided uncertainty is small.  ...  This literature has also introduced \games with observable delay" which can be used to model the situation where bargaining parties may, or may not, send delegates with rigid instructions.  ... 
doi:10.1016/s0014-2921(02)00316-1 fatcat:afptn4dsifa3xitmhhxjz5s24m

A Generic Platform for Conducting SLA Negotiations [chapter]

Edwin Yaqub, Philipp Wieder, Constantinos Kotsokalis, Valentina Mazza, Liliana Pasquale, Juan Lambea Rueda, Sergio García Gómez, Augustín Escámez Chimeno
2011 Service Level Agreements for Cloud Computing  
We strive for a generic approach for protocol description and execution that also caters for domain-based rationality and ease of adoption.  ...  It is during negotiations that parties are brought together in an interactive mechanism determined by the negotiation protocols.  ...  These patterns freely compete or cooperate based on individual rationality.  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-1-4614-1614-2_12 fatcat:zxzb2tpnrje3dgkf62isb6id6u

ZERO: Playing Mathematical Programming Games [article]

Gabriele Dragotto, Sriram Sankaranarayanan, Margarida Carvalho, Andrea Lodi
2021 arXiv   pre-print
ZERO provides a comprehensive toolkit of modeling interfaces and algorithms for Reciprocally Bilinear Games (RBGs), i.e., simultaneous non-cooperative games where each player solves a mathematical program  ...  ZERO modular structure gives users all the elementary ingredients to design new game-theoretic models and algorithms for RBGs, and find their Nash equilibria.  ...  On the one side, ZERO provides high-level APIs for practitioners and industrial parties to experiment with our high-level APIs.  ... 
arXiv:2111.07932v2 fatcat:hpm3p6vx5rgvbjhdf73kh53bz4

Delegation and commitment in durable goods monopolies

Tarek Coury, Vladimir P. Petkov
2008 Games and Economic Behavior  
We also provide a numerical characterization of the Markov-perfect equilibrium pricing and remuneration strategies for the case of linear-quadratic payoffs.  ...  The delegation contract allows for continual interference with managerial incentives: in each period the principal rewards the manager according to her performance.  ...  Numerical Example Now we use a base scenario parameter set to compute the MPE of the delegation game.  ... 
doi:10.1016/j.geb.2007.06.009 fatcat:wd5ui3fvazhyxoorhz66vxojja
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