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Continuous-time games of timing

Rida Laraki, Eilon Solan, Nicolas Vieille
<span title="">2005</span> <i title="Elsevier BV"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/sj24t22gfnfprddmjorsfd6flq" style="color: black;">Journal of Economic Theory</a> </i> &nbsp;
We address the question of existence of equilibrium in general timing games of complete information.  ...  Under weak assumptions, any two-player timing game has a subgame perfect -equilibrium, for each > 0. This result is tight.  ...  Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) discuss the relevance of continuous-time models of timing games, on the following ground.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2004.02.001">doi:10.1016/j.jet.2004.02.001</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/vy2fp7yqyra3bfbdmhxpsgib6q">fatcat:vy2fp7yqyra3bfbdmhxpsgib6q</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20140202195801/http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/1363.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/7d/53/7d53952307155022c7e7b7fe3200deee16a169d6.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2004.02.001"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="external alternate icon"></i> elsevier.com </button> </a>

Approximate solutions of continuous-time stochastic games [article]

Yurii Averboukh
<span title="2016-02-15">2016</span> <i > arXiv </i> &nbsp; <span class="release-stage" >pre-print</span>
The paper is concerned with a zero-sum continuous-time stochastic differential game with a dynamics controlled by a Markov process and a terminal payoff.  ...  The value function of the original game is estimated using the value function of a model game. The dynamics of the model game differs from the original one.  ...  Introduction Continuous-time dynamical games can be classified as differential games, stochastic differential games and Markov games (or continuous-time stochastic games).  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/1602.04785v1">arXiv:1602.04785v1</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/qzvy6hejzndyrbf3cwq2uqolca">fatcat:qzvy6hejzndyrbf3cwq2uqolca</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20200903114443/https://arxiv.org/pdf/1602.04785v1.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/aa/f9/aaf99fa5231f83db69f3d097c0fb285d532b8727.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/1602.04785v1" title="arxiv.org access"> <button class="ui compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="file alternate outline icon"></i> arxiv.org </button> </a>

Continuous-Time Stochastic Games of Fixed Duration

Yehuda Levy
<span title="2012-12-19">2012</span> <i title="Springer Nature"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/6tjsn4snxrctnhuj3ag5azqkvi" style="color: black;">Dynamic Games and Applications</a> </i> &nbsp;
Markov games, of fixed duration.  ...  PHONE: [972]-2-6584135 FAX: [972]-2-6513681 E-MAIL: ratio@math.huji.ac.il URL: http://www.ratio.huji.ac.il/ Abstract We study non-zero-sum continuous-time stochastic games, also known as continuous-time  ...  Layout of this Paper Section 2 presents the model of continuous-time stochastic games.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-012-0067-2">doi:10.1007/s13235-012-0067-2</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/r57mcczenjd4tcu54turkobezm">fatcat:r57mcczenjd4tcu54turkobezm</a> </span>
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Continuous-Time Option Games: Review of Models and Extensions

Marco Antonio Guimarães Dias, José Paulo Teixeira
<span title="2010-12-01">2010</span> <i title="Global Business Publications"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/qwxontqnyvfpbik2xzqhlfztny" style="color: black;">Multinational Finance Journal</a> </i> &nbsp;
This paper discusses a selected literature on continuous-time option games models, providing new insights and extensions.  ...  Before option games models, the best known attempts that appeared to model the competition effect were: Kester (1984) considering a finite time to expiration of a real option, with this time being function  ...  Here the focus is the case of two-firm (duopoly) preemption games in continuous time. The game modeling aim is to find out the equilibrium strategies.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.17578/14-3/4-3">doi:10.17578/14-3/4-3</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/2zjs54d3efgehjkvncc5sugatm">fatcat:2zjs54d3efgehjkvncc5sugatm</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20190429040334/http://www.mfsociety.org/modules/modDashboard/uploadFiles/journals/MJ~775~p1754a05qqpm7qlf3dc1n1p1efg4.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/3c/05/3c05f646c7c638a99087ba7d4c98c9a8f6632ea8.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.17578/14-3/4-3"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="external alternate icon"></i> Publisher / doi.org </button> </a>

Mean field limit of a continuous time finite state game [article]

Diogo A. Gomes, Joana Mohr, Rafael R. Souza
<span title="2011-03-17">2011</span> <i > arXiv </i> &nbsp; <span class="release-stage" >pre-print</span>
Mean field games model situations of competition between large number of rational agents that play non-cooperative dynamic games under certain symmetry assumptions.  ...  Mean field games is a recent area of study introduced by Lions and Lasry in a series of seminal papers in 2006.  ...  We will suppose that β is bounded and continuous as a function of time.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/1011.2918v2">arXiv:1011.2918v2</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/fcsefo4w5vep3j5dfpqy342gqi">fatcat:fcsefo4w5vep3j5dfpqy342gqi</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://archive.org/download/arxiv-1011.2918/1011.2918.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> File Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/2c/47/2c47762d0275394fa434b1e7cb1e04a5a24c7510.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/1011.2918v2" title="arxiv.org access"> <button class="ui compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="file alternate outline icon"></i> arxiv.org </button> </a>

Continuous time dynamics of the thermal minority game

Juan P. Garrahan, Esteban Moro, David Sherrington
<span title="2000-07-01">2000</span> <i title="American Physical Society (APS)"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/hphsuvsjtvgjvnloxbomufglhe" style="color: black;">Physical review. E, Statistical physics, plasmas, fluids, and related interdisciplinary topics</a> </i> &nbsp;
We study the continuous time dynamics of the Thermal Minority Game.  ...  We find that the dynamical equations of the model reduce to a set of stochastic differential equations for an interacting disordered system with non-trivial random diffusion.  ...  We now consider the continuous time limit of Eqs. ͑1͒ in such a way as to preserve all the macroscopic features of the TMG. To this end we introduce an arbitrary time step ⌬t.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1103/physreve.62.r9">doi:10.1103/physreve.62.r9</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/11088512">pmid:11088512</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/mkr3lagnyzcgjc4obvdv7ooyua">fatcat:mkr3lagnyzcgjc4obvdv7ooyua</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20170811130556/http://markov.uc3m.es/~emoro/ps/premg.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/16/4a/164acac87de8934ca8ff9ef2eb34d283c6f0df27.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1103/physreve.62.r9"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="external alternate icon"></i> aps.org </button> </a>

On martingale problems with continuous-time mixing and values of zero-sum games without Isaacs condition [article]

Mihai Sîrbu
<span title="2014-04-15">2014</span> <i > arXiv </i> &nbsp; <span class="release-stage" >pre-print</span>
These are strategies based only on the knowledge of the past state, randomized continuously in time from a sampling distribution which is kept constant in between some stopping rules.  ...  We show that the game defined over martingale solutions has a value, which is the unique continuous viscosity solution of the randomized Isaacs equation.  ...  We can show that, with this limiting definition of strategies, the original continuous-time game has a value.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/1307.4686v4">arXiv:1307.4686v4</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/3osgtqyggbe2xhj6qozl2hoqnq">fatcat:3osgtqyggbe2xhj6qozl2hoqnq</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20200913213731/https://arxiv.org/pdf/1307.4686v4.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/92/e1/92e1cd51efc10502e8b7c3443a4147c3ba0d358a.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/1307.4686v4" title="arxiv.org access"> <button class="ui compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="file alternate outline icon"></i> arxiv.org </button> </a>

Continuous-time limit of dynamic games with incomplete information and a more informed player [article]

Fabien Gensbittel
<span title="2015-09-11">2015</span> <i > arXiv </i> &nbsp; <span class="release-stage" >pre-print</span>
We show the existence of a limit value as the time span between two consecutive stages goes to zero.  ...  We study a two-player, zero-sum, dynamic game with incomplete information where one of the players is more informed than his opponent.  ...  Such an analysis is related to the study of a sequence of discretizations in time of a given continuous-time dynamic game.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/1501.00293v2">arXiv:1501.00293v2</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/oql3rw4sgnfcret7575kv7tvx4">fatcat:oql3rw4sgnfcret7575kv7tvx4</a> </span>
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Nested Pseudo Likelihood Estimation of Continuous-Time Dynamic Discrete Games [article]

Jason R. Blevins, Minhae Kim
<span title="2021-08-04">2021</span> <i > arXiv </i> &nbsp; <span class="release-stage" >pre-print</span>
We introduce a sequential estimator for continuous time dynamic discrete choice models (single-agent models and games) by adapting the nested pseudo likelihood (NPL) estimator of Aguirregabiria and Mira  ...  process is a continuous time model.  ...  We conjecture that ρ(Ψ σ ) is smaller in continuous time games than the spectral radius in a comparable discrete time game since continuous time games do not allow simultaneous moves between agents, making  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2108.02182v1">arXiv:2108.02182v1</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/nsteyom4tnda3nvx7fxubbpdxu">fatcat:nsteyom4tnda3nvx7fxubbpdxu</a> </span>
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An Update on Continuous-Time Stochastic Games of Fixed Duration

Yehuda John Levy
<span title="2020-07-22">2020</span> <i title="Springer Science and Business Media LLC"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/6tjsn4snxrctnhuj3ag5azqkvi" style="color: black;">Dynamic Games and Applications</a> </i> &nbsp;
This paper shows that continuous-time stochastic games of fixed duration need not possess equilibria in Markov strategies.  ...  Hence, the purpose of this note is to remark that the correction offered in Levy and McLennan [6] can be adapted back to continuous-time stochastic games.  ...  Introduction Following [5] , a framework of continuous-time stochastic games of fixed duration is studied.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-020-00361-0">doi:10.1007/s13235-020-00361-0</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/fu4hxz7tqvc6lnolbisgac7ppy">fatcat:fu4hxz7tqvc6lnolbisgac7ppy</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20201108123542/https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s13235-020-00361-0.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/56/ac/56ac0cb120a85b72d8144a95b7b88c5c134c22fb.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-020-00361-0"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="unlock alternate icon" style="background-color: #fb971f;"></i> springer.com </button> </a>

A continuous-time model of bilateral bargaining

Juan Ortner
<span title="">2019</span> <i title="Elsevier BV"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/gjdubbzq4zd3bgbmuwnb2p7neq" style="color: black;">Games and Economic Behavior</a> </i> &nbsp;
This paper constructs a continuous-time model of bilateral bargaining to study how fluctuations in bargaining power affect the outcomes of negotiations.  ...  The paper deals with the technical complexities that arise when modeling games in continuous-time by building strategy restrictions into the equilibrium definition.  ...  One difficulty in continuous-time bargaining games is that subgame perfection doesn't refine the set of equilibria as it does when the game is played in discrete time.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2018.12.001">doi:10.1016/j.geb.2018.12.001</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/yvwl5d6vz5fyzkaz4z4pju7spa">fatcat:yvwl5d6vz5fyzkaz4z4pju7spa</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20170108165454/http://people.bu.edu:80/jortner/index_files/CTBargaining.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/4c/8f/4c8f324ab4be17c3e2c17df545ed5529e50d6979.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2018.12.001"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="external alternate icon"></i> elsevier.com </button> </a>

Continuity, Inertia, and Strategic Uncertainty: A Test of the Theory of Continuous Time Games

Evan Calford, Ryan Oprea
<span title="">2017</span> <i title="The Econometric Society"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/tzeeifoj3jgqphcasnbbgoqblq" style="color: black;">Econometrica</a> </i> &nbsp;
At the end of the last period you will be paid, in cash, the sum of your earnings over all periods. The Basic Idea  ...  If you follow these instructions carefully and make good decisions, you can earn a CON-SIDERABLE AMOUNT OF MONEY, which will be PAID TO YOU IN CASH at the end of the experiment.  ...  Time Freeze After a player first enters, the game will freeze for 5 seconds. During these 5 seconds the player's counterpart can choose whether to enter too by pressing the spacebar.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta14346">doi:10.3982/ecta14346</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/bzrjkmzakrho5ivfbq2w5pik7e">fatcat:bzrjkmzakrho5ivfbq2w5pik7e</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20190429060950/https://www.econometricsociety.org/sites/default/files/ecta1687-sup-0001-Supplement.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/20/6f/206fe22b2a8e82736fd61b3f5f09c12269cc84df.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta14346"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="external alternate icon"></i> Publisher / doi.org </button> </a>

On repeated games with imperfect public monitoring: From discrete to continuous time

Mathias Staudigl, Jan-Henrik Steg
<span title="">2016</span> <i title="American Institute of Mathematical Sciences (AIMS)"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/2tptokoehvh5rgaz5bfmxutgh4" style="color: black;">Journal of Dynamics &amp; Games</a> </i> &nbsp;
of the continuous-time limit game.  ...  of the limit continuous-time game.  ...  We are grateful to Frank Riedel and Max Stinchcombe for their very useful comments, and seminar participants of the workshop "Stochastic Dynamic Games with Applications in Economics and Finance".  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2017001">doi:10.3934/jdg.2017001</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/ft2y2pfoyrgoviqxx7qrp7chxi">fatcat:ft2y2pfoyrgoviqxx7qrp7chxi</a> </span>
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A new formulation of asset trading games in continuous time with essential forcing of variation exponent

Kei Takeuchi, Masayuki Kumon, Akimichi Takemura
<span title="">2009</span> <i title="Bernoulli Society for Mathematical Statistics and Probability"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/ir6muuxg4rbafminkxdo54uzh4" style="color: black;">Bernoulli</a> </i> &nbsp;
Our proof is based on embedding high-frequency discrete-time games into the continuous-time game and the use of the Bayesian strategy of Kumon, Takemura and Takeuchi (Stoch. Anal.  ...  We introduce a new formulation of asset trading games in continuous time in the framework of the game-theoretic probability established by Shafer and Vovk (Probability and Finance: It's Only a Game!  ...  In the book by Shafer and Vovk, continuous-time games are formulated as limits of discrete time games by using techniques of nonstandard analysis.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.3150/08-bej188">doi:10.3150/08-bej188</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/cgsoau65onfppflupc3vo2et6u">fatcat:cgsoau65onfppflupc3vo2et6u</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20191019172923/https://arxiv.org/pdf/0708.0275v1.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download [not primary version]" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <span style="color: #f43e3e;">&#10033;</span> <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/b3/fc/b3fc0de41ba06366be0c7c0a86d3257073fa95b8.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.3150/08-bej188"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="unlock alternate icon" style="background-color: #fb971f;"></i> Publisher / doi.org </button> </a>

Continuous time limits of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring [chapter]

Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine
<span title="">2008</span> <i title="WORLD SCIENTIFIC"> A Long-Run Collaboration on Long-Run Games </i> &nbsp;
Recent research has focused on the case of "frequent monitoring," where the time interval between periods becomes small.  ...  In a repeated game with imperfect public information, the set of equilibria depends on the way that the distribution of public signals varies with the players' actions.  ...  games are simpler and more familiar than games in continuous time, our analysis helps provide intuition for existing results on continuous- time repeated games.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1142/9789812818478_0017">doi:10.1142/9789812818478_0017</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/jkcpl5d6g5ehjbyz46jqhfz23q">fatcat:jkcpl5d6g5ehjbyz46jqhfz23q</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20100713020335/http://levine.sscnet.ucla.edu/papers/time_periods.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/27/48/27489537efc7c19d9a5536b722b9b5dbea93dcfb.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1142/9789812818478_0017"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="external alternate icon"></i> worldscientific.com </button> </a>
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