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How to Dissolve a Partnership

Benny Moldovanu
2002 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics  
Since the double auction is always BB, and by the results of Section 3, we obtain that, in any equilibrium of the k¡double auction with veto, the indivisible good may not always be allocated to the agent  ...  This is in fact a sequence of double auctions connected by a common budget constraint.  ... 
doi:10.1628/0932456022975619 fatcat:crdo2qy3bvfdvjquta74exv6ya

A double-sided multiunit combinatorial auction for substitutes: Theory and algorithms

Henry Schellhorn
2009 European Journal of Operational Research  
This article considers a doubled-sided multiunit combinatorial auction for substitutes, that is, a uniform price auction where buyers and sellers place both types of orders, conjunctive and disjunctive  ...  Only the goods with the best attributes and prices will be matched.  ...  This paper focuses on the description of a (uniform price) "double-sided, multiunit, combinatorial, with substitutes" auction, or DMCS auction 1 .  ... 
doi:10.1016/j.ejor.2008.07.049 fatcat:4bcr5umswzde7g2e6zqjf6vi6u

Capacity as a Fundamental Metric for Mechanism Design in the Information Economy [article]

Sudhir Kumar Singh, Vwani P. Roychowdhury
2007 arXiv   pre-print
We show that in the case of a single indivisible item one simple way to incorporate capacity constraints is via designing mechanisms to sell probability distributions, and that under certain conditions  ...  We define a quantity called price of capacity to capture the tradeoff between capacity and revenue/efficiency. We also study the case of sponsored search auctions.  ...  In Section 3, we start with the capacity constrained framework for selling an indivisible item.  ... 
arXiv:0711.1569v1 fatcat:sckn34lfubfnphepgzidhjfapy

Solving the combinatorial double auction problem

Mu Xia, Jan Stallaert, Andrew B. Whinston
2005 European Journal of Operational Research  
This paper studies the solution of several types of combinatorial (double) auctions.  ...  We show that a general combinatorial double auction can be reduced to a combinatorial single-sided auction, which is a multi-dimensional knapsack problem.  ...  The combinatorial double auction can be modeled as an integer programming problem by modifying the model for a divisible continuous double auction originally presented in (Fan et al., 1999) : (CDA) max  ... 
doi:10.1016/j.ejor.2003.11.018 fatcat:pvnyi3jgdvgi7gez2d5eykqbra

Introduction to Sunspots and Lotteries

Edward C. Prescott, Karl Shell
2002 Journal of Economic Theory  
Consider, for example, an economy with an integer number N units of an indivisible good and 2N consumers.  ...  One possible allocation is that each individual receive one unit of the indivisible good with probability 1 2 .  ... 
doi:10.1006/jeth.2002.2946 fatcat:fplldohcfrfnnguwb4ikkjruja

Combination Exchange Mechanisms for Efficient Bandwidth Allocation

Rahul Jain, Pravin P. Varaiya
2003 Communications in Information and Systems  
We finally introduce a market mechanism called the combinatorial seller's bid double auction whose outcome, in the continuum model, is a competitive equilibrium.  ...  This suggests that approximate competitive equilibria with good performance may be attainable in real networks.  ...  A buyer's bid double auction with single type of item that maximizes surplus is studied in [37] .  ... 
doi:10.4310/cis.2003.v3.n4.a5 fatcat:hbe4mfn7wrgojezmrvkab3ocuy

Market-Based Allocation with Indivisible Bids

L. Julian Schvartzman, Michael P. Wellman
2009 Production and operations management  
W e study multiunit double auctions accepting bids with indivisibility constraints.  ...  Using a reconfigurable manufacturing scenario where agents trade large quantities of multiple goods, we demonstrate potential benefits of supporting indivisibility constraints in bidding.  ...  The simplest solution would be to have the auction accept bids with indivisibility constraints.  ... 
doi:10.1111/j.1937-5956.2007.tb00275.x fatcat:vtm45xubn5gqnbxuj4rjy5k5d4

Market-Based Allocation with Indivisible Bids [chapter]

L. Julian Schvartzman, Michael P. Wellman
2006 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
W e study multiunit double auctions accepting bids with indivisibility constraints.  ...  Using a reconfigurable manufacturing scenario where agents trade large quantities of multiple goods, we demonstrate potential benefits of supporting indivisibility constraints in bidding.  ...  The simplest solution would be to have the auction accept bids with indivisibility constraints.  ... 
doi:10.1007/11888727_5 fatcat:wflfsj7zezf4lhaph7fqluoypq

Betting Boolean-style: a framework for trading in securities based on logical formulas

Lance Fortnow, Joe Kilian, David M. Pennock, Michael P. Wellman
2005 Decision Support Systems  
With log n events, the problem is tractable (polynomial) in the divisible case and worst-case intractable (NP-complete) in the indivisible case.  ...  We show that, with n events, the matching problem is worst-case intractable: specifically, the problem is co-NPcomplete in the divisible case and Σ p 2 -complete in the indivisible case.  ...  Acknowledgments We thank Rahul Sami for his help with Section 5.4.4. We thank Rahul, Joan Feigenbaum and Robin Hanson for useful discussions and the anonymous ref-  ... 
doi:10.1016/j.dss.2004.08.010 fatcat:hdam4aigi5czflcyink742huyq

Betting boolean-style: a framework for trading in securities based on logical formulas

Lance Fortnow, Joe Kilian, David M. Pennock, Michael P. Wellman
2003 Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce - EC '03  
With log n events, the problem is tractable (polynomial) in the divisible case and worst-case intractable (NP-complete) in the indivisible case.  ...  We show that, with n events, the matching problem is worst-case intractable: specifically, the problem is co-NPcomplete in the divisible case and Σ p 2 -complete in the indivisible case.  ...  Acknowledgments We thank Rahul Sami for his help with Section 5.4.4. We thank Rahul, Joan Feigenbaum and Robin Hanson for useful discussions and the anonymous ref-  ... 
doi:10.1145/779928.779946 dblp:conf/sigecom/FortnowKPW03 fatcat:sqevn4lamnctblt5nl37jzoff4

Revenue maximization in a Bayesian double auction market

Xiaotie Deng, Paul Goldberg, Bo Tang, Jinshan Zhang
2014 Theoretical Computer Science  
We study double auction market design where the market maker wants to maximize its total revenue by buying low from the sellers and selling high to the buyers.  ...  For the simplest setting, each seller has one kind of indivisible good with a bounded (integer) amount that can be sold to a buyer, who may demand a bounded number of copies.  ...  When in addition we assume public knowledge of distributions of buyers' private values from the previous sales, we call it a revenue maximization Bayesian double auction market maker.  ... 
doi:10.1016/j.tcs.2014.04.013 fatcat:47bvdhd7z5dtdc7bvevxa5elea

Revenue Maximization in a Bayesian Double Auction Market [chapter]

Xiaotie Deng, Paul Goldberg, Bo Tang, Jinshan Zhang
2012 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
We study double auction market design where the market maker wants to maximize its total revenue by buying low from the sellers and selling high to the buyers.  ...  For the simplest setting, each seller has one kind of indivisible good with a bounded (integer) amount that can be sold to a buyer, who may demand a bounded number of copies.  ...  When in addition we assume public knowledge of distributions of buyers' private values from the previous sales, we call it a revenue maximization Bayesian double auction market maker.  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-642-35261-4_71 fatcat:krjohpcnhvanjaceaw5xdjgqxu

A Parametrization of the Auction Design Space

Peter R. Wurman, Michael P. Wellman, William E. Walsh
2001 Games and Economic Behavior  
The structured characterization of auction rules can be exploited for the modular design of configurable auction servers.  ...  We present an extensive breakdown of the auction design space that captures the essential similarities and differences of many auction mechanisms in a format more descriptive and useful than simple taxonomies  ...  Call markets and continuous double auctions CDAs are favored institutions for trading securities and financial instruments.  ... 
doi:10.1006/game.2000.0828 fatcat:cfvpu5gxmfakjadvgzytdx67mi

Combinatorial auctions

Jawad Abrache, Teodor Gabriel Crainic, Michel Gendreau, Monia Rekik
2007 Annals of Operations Research  
In this paper, we discuss several complex issues that are encountered in the design of combinatorial auctions.  ...  Combinatorial auctions are an important class of market mechanisms in which participants are allowed to bid on bundles of multiple heterogeneous items.  ...  (Das et al., 2001) undertook to compare the performances of software agents against humans in a continuous double auction where multiple units of a single hypothetical commodity could be bought or sold  ... 
doi:10.1007/s10479-007-0179-z fatcat:dt2oav6acjesjcdfbqz3526dqa

USING LABORATORY EXPERIMENTS TO DESIGN EFFICIENT MARKET INSTITUTIONS: THE CASE OF WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY MARKETS

Carine Staropoli, Céline Jullien
2006 Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics  
dedicated to wholesale markets, and reviews the results accumulated to date concerning both the general architecture of power markets and the very details of the market rules or institution, that is the auction  ...  The market institution used to trade electricity at each node is the continuous double auction, where both the demand-side and the seller-side are active.  ...  The first one concerns the timing of auction in the spot market, and is to know whether sealed-bid (i.e. simultaneous) auctions perform better than continuous double auctions (i.e. sequential) or not.  ... 
doi:10.1111/j.1467-8292.2006.00319.x fatcat:j33w3fotg5efrf7reg2svjgrci
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