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Constraining Pseudorandom Functions Privately
[chapter]

2017
*
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
*

In a

doi:10.1007/978-3-662-54388-7_17
fatcat:lu5msiz6pvcg7cudife5adpr4a
*constrained**pseudorandom**function*(PRF), the holder of the master secret key can derive*constrained*keys with respect to a boolean circuit C. ... As a primitive,*private**constrained*PRFs have many natural applications in searchable symmetric encryption, deniable encryption, and more. We then show how to instantiate*private**constrained*PRFs. ...*Pseudorandom**Functions*We first review the definition of a*pseudorandom**function*(PRF) [GGM86] . ...##
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Chosen Ciphertext Secure Functional Encryption from Constrained Witness PRF
[article]

2021
*
IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive
*

More specifically, CWPRF computes

dblp:journals/iacr/PalD21a
fatcat:js5hcslvrveilmxwefx3fnwe5e
*pseudorandom*values associated with NP statements and generates*constrained*keys for boolean*functions*. ... First, we define a new cryptographic tool called*constrained*witness*pseudorandom**function*(CW-PRF) which is motivated by combining WPRF of Zhandry (TCC 2016) and*constrained*PRF of Boneh and Waters (ASIACRYPT ... We call this notion as weak*function*privacy. It is trivial to verify that a*function**private*CPRF (Def. 6) is also weak*function**private*. ...##
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Beyond Software Watermarking: Traitor-Tracing for Pseudorandom Functions
[article]

2020
*
IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive
*

We provide a general framework for constructing traceable PRFs via an intermediate primitive called

dblp:journals/iacr/GoyalKWW20
fatcat:te4mdolhgfa5xfujkt4fivluk4
*private*linear*constrained*PRFs. ... Existing constructions of watermarking have focused primarily on watermarking*pseudorandom**functions*(PRFs). ... Recall first that a*private**constrained*PRF is a*constrained*PRF where the*constrained*key sk f hides the associated constraint*function*f . ...##
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Constrained Keys for Invertible Pseudorandom Functions
[chapter]

2017
*
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
*

A

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-70500-2_9
fatcat:gusmoqldtzg27m7nylzhsm27ca
*constrained**pseudorandom**function*(PRF) is a secure PRF for which one can generate*constrained*keys that can only be used to evaluate the PRF on a subset of the domain. ... Both constructions rely on recent work on*private**constrained*PRFs. We also show that*constrained**pseudorandom*permutations are impossible under our definition.*Constrained*PRFs. ...*Constraining**pseudorandom**functions**privately*. In PKC, 2017. Oded Goldreich, Shafi Goldwasser, and Silvio Micali. How to construct random*functions*. In FOCS, 1984. ...##
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Constrained PRFs for Bit-fixing from OWFs with Constant Collusion Resistance
[article]

2018
*
IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive
*

*Constrained*

*pseudorandom*

*functions*(CPRFs) allow learning "

*constrained*" PRF keys that can evaluate the PRF on a subset of the input space, or based on some sort of predicate. ... , only requiring the existence of one-way

*functions*(OWFs). ... It is a well known fact that PRFs can be built entirely from one-way

*functions*[GGM86, HILL99].

*Constrained*

*Pseudorandom*

*Functions*We now define

*constrained*

*pseudorandom*

*functions*(CPRFs). ...

##
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Private Puncturable PRFs from Standard Lattice Assumptions
[chapter]

2017
*
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
*

A puncturable

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-56620-7_15
fatcat:k2fxfxv5wbannavvm4rcz5vdzm
*pseudorandom**function*(PRF) has a master key k that enables one to evaluate the PRF at all points of the domain, and has a punctured key kx that enables one to evaluate the PRF at all points ... In addition, we also study the simulation based definition of*private**constrained*PRFs for general circuits, and show that the definition is not satisfiable. ... We also thank David Wu for his helpful comments on the definition of*privately**constrained*PRFs. This work is supported by NSF, DARPA, the Simons foundation, and a grant from ONR. ...##
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Watermarking Cryptographic Functionalities from Standard Lattice Assumptions
[chapter]

2017
*
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
*

(PKC 2017) showed how to watermark cryptographic

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-63688-7_17
fatcat:obocwkvgifgt3mgwahuep24xvu
*functions*such as PRFs using indistinguishability obfuscation. ... Moreover, it should be difficult to remove the watermark without destroying the*functionality*of the program. Recently, Cohen et al. (STOC 2016) and Boneh et al. ... Acknowledgments We thank Vinod Vaikuntanathan and Daniel Wichs for pointing out the connection between*private*programmable PRFs and*private*puncturable PRFs. ...##
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Constraint-Hiding Constrained PRFs for NC $$^1$$ from LWE
[chapter]

2017
*
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
*

Constraint-hiding

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-56620-7_16
fatcat:zeoidimozzglxfanuz7tkatxau
*constrained*PRFs (CHCPRFs), initially studied by Boneh, Lewi and Wu [PKC 2017], are*constrained*PRFs where the*constrained*key hides the description of the constraint. ... We also show how to build from CHCPRFs reusable garbled circuits (RGC), or equivalently privatekey*function*-hiding*functional*encryptions with 1-key security. ... From CHCPRF, it is rather simple to construct a*private*-key*functional*encryption scheme that is both*function*-*private*and input-*private*. ...##
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Multiparty Key Exchange, Efficient Traitor Tracing, and More from Indistinguishability Obfuscation
[chapter]

2014
*
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
*

We say that a

doi:10.1007/978-3-662-44371-2_27
fatcat:3cz3xxubczc53kvim4j3e5mffy
*constrained*PRF is secure if for all probabilistic polynomial time adversaries A, the*function*PRF (adv) (λ) is negligible. ... In subsequent work, Sahai and Waters [SW13] showed that indistinguishability obfuscation is a powerful cryptographic primitive: it can be used to build public-key encryption from*pseudorandom**functions*...*Constrained**Pseudorandom**Functions*A*pseudorandom**function*(PRF) is a*function*PRF : K × X → Y where PRF(k, ·) is indistinguishable from a random*function*for a randomly chosen key k [GGM86] . ...##
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Multiparty Key Exchange, Efficient Traitor Tracing, and More from Indistinguishability Obfuscation

2016
*
Algorithmica
*

We say that a

doi:10.1007/s00453-016-0242-8
fatcat:rkwrtoma7nbehl4b23wztuq3vu
*constrained*PRF is secure if for all probabilistic polynomial time adversaries A, the*function*PRF (adv) (λ) is negligible. ... In subsequent work, Sahai and Waters [SW13] showed that indistinguishability obfuscation is a powerful cryptographic primitive: it can be used to build public-key encryption from*pseudorandom**functions*...*Constrained**Pseudorandom**Functions*A*pseudorandom**function*(PRF) is a*function*PRF : K × X → Y where PRF(k, ·) is indistinguishable from a random*function*for a randomly chosen key k [GGM86] . ...##
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Key Derivation Function: The SCKDF Scheme
[chapter]

2013
*
IFIP Advances in Information and Communication Technology
*

A key derivation

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-39218-4_10
fatcat:tmacfyygfrakvdrnme7at5jb4e
*function*is used to generate one or more cryptographic keys from a*private*(secret) input value. ... The simulation results show these stream cipher based key derivation*functions*offer efficiency advantages over the more commonly used key derivation*functions*based on block ciphers and hash*functions*... Let Ext be a (t X , X )-computational extractor with the respect to the*private*string p and Exp a (t Y , q Y , Y )-secure variable-length-output*pseudorandom**function*family, then the above extract-then-expand ...##
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One-One Constrained Pseudorandom Functions

2020
*
Conference on Information-Theoretic Cryptography
*

We define and study a new cryptographic primitive, named One-One

doi:10.4230/lipics.itc.2020.13
dblp:conf/icits/PeterTW20
fatcat:jjvydridozaq7exp3va3s7yj5q
*Constrained**Pseudorandom**Functions*. ... We consider a third party that sees the values (x,f,K_f) and the goal is to allow her to reconstruct K_x whenever f(x)=1, while keeping K_x*pseudorandom*whenever f(x)=0. ... Notions of*Pseudorandom**Functions*Definition 4 (*Constrained*PRFs). ...##
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Publicly Evaluable Pseudorandom Functions and Their Applications
[chapter]

2014
*
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
*

We put forth the notion of publicly evaluable

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-10879-7_8
fatcat:ouxmsfvqcrda5koglc6gqtwfi4
*pseudorandom**functions*(PEPRFs), which can be viewed as a counterpart of standard*pseudorandom**functions*(PRFs) in the publickey setting. ... The basic one is weak*pseudorandomness*which stipulates a PEPRF cannot be distinguished from a real random*function*on uniformly random chosen inputs. ... Examples of general assumptions include one-way (trapdoor)*functions*/permutations and*pseudorandom*generators/*functions*, etc. ...##
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Publicly evaluable pseudorandom functions and their applications

2016
*
Journal of Computer Security
*

We put forth the notion of publicly evaluable

doi:10.3233/jcs-160547
fatcat:gghghrqak5aadiuh6osvduofa4
*pseudorandom**functions*(PEPRFs), which can be viewed as a counterpart of standard*pseudorandom**functions*(PRFs) in the publickey setting. ... The basic one is weak*pseudorandomness*which stipulates a PEPRF cannot be distinguished from a real random*function*on uniformly random chosen inputs. ... Examples of general assumptions include one-way (trapdoor)*functions*/permutations and*pseudorandom*generators/*functions*, etc. ...##
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Attribute-Based Signatures for Circuits from Multilinear Maps
[chapter]

2014
*
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
*

signatures [14],

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-13257-0_4
fatcat:dvnj4uoszjgdxfhpepx6be5nly
*private*outsourcing of polynomial evaluation and matrix multiplication [28], broadcast encryption [5], attribute-based encryption [10], and*constrained**pseudorandom**functions*(PRF) [4 ... Whereafter, Boneh and Waters [4] utilized their technique to design a*constrained**pseudorandom**functions*where the accepting set for a key can be described by a polynomial size We have notice that ...
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