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Computing equilibria for a service provider game with (Im)perfect information

Rene Beier, Artur Czumaj, Piotr Krysta, Berthold Vöcking
2006 ACM Transactions on Algorithms  
"Computing equilibria for congestion games with (im)perfect information" appeared in  ...  Somewhat counterintuitively, we obtain an fully polynomial randomized approximation scheme for the equilibria problem in the model with imperfect information although the problem with perfect information  ...  In Section 8, we present the analysis for the service provider game with imperfect information.  ... 
doi:10.1145/1198513.1198524 fatcat:pqxoww4auvhfnbzjrks77taow4

Payment Schemes from Limited Information with Applications in Distributed Computing [article]

Nikolaj I. Schwartzbach
2022 arXiv   pre-print
We show that finding an optimal payment scheme for games of perfect information is -complete, and conjecture it to be -hard for games of imperfect information.  ...  We propose a generic mechanism for incentivizing behavior in an arbitrary finite game using payments.  ...  Our definition generalizes t-robust subgame perfect equilibria for finite games of perfect information.  ... 
arXiv:2107.08748v2 fatcat:whjgkjdjwnfaloylz3wxradsw4

Learning from Experts: A Survey [article]

Irene Valsecchi
2008 arXiv   pre-print
According to the game-theoretic approach expertise is a case of asymmetric information between the expert, who is the better informed agent, and the non-expert, who is either a decision-maker or an evaluator  ...  The survey is concerned with the issue of information transmission from experts to non-experts. Two main approaches to the use of experts can be traced.  ...  For the case in which agent E is required to send a message after each observation, Li shows that in perfect Bayesian equilibria inconsistent reports within the same period can signal ability, provided  ... 
arXiv:0807.2931v1 fatcat:rqcbj633xbdbvhv3dq4dan4kva

Recent Advances in Structural Econometric Modeling: Dynamics, Product Positioning and Entry

Jean-Pierre Dubé, K. Sudhir, Andrew Ching, Gregory S. Crawford, Michaela Draganska, Jeremy T. Fox, Wesley Hartmann, Günter J. Hitsch, V. Brian Viard, Miguel Villas-Boas, Naufel Vilcassim
2005 Marketing letters  
Structural analysis of these consumer and firm decisions raise a number of substantial computational challenges. We discuss the computational challenges as well as specific empirical applications.  ...  For example, incorporating consumer and firm dynamics may help explain patterns in our data that are not well-captured by static models.  ...  This outcome simplifies the numerical computation of the location equilibrium in comparison with a game of complete information.  ... 
doi:10.1007/s11002-005-5886-0 fatcat:umd2t35dgjge3j66cdluco5k2q


Federico Ciliberto, Zhou Zhang
2016 Economic Inquiry  
We consider a menu of three alternative games that describe the strategic interaction among airlines: simultaneous and sequential move games, and a sequential move game with deterrence investments.  ...  We model the interaction among airlines as a repeated static game, where we allow for a very general form of heterogeneity.  ...  The …rst game is a repeated static simultaneous move entry game with complete information.  ... 
doi:10.1111/ecin.12381 fatcat:rska55iecngn3g2iz3cytjvyoa

Regulatory Competition in Network Interconnection Pricing

Per J. Agrell, Jerome Pouyet
2008 Review of Network Economics  
The model features two countries managing domestic infrastructures, used simultaneously for downstream international service provision.  ...  Illustrations from European network regulation policy for energy and rail are presented.  ...  Since transfers are socially costly, IM i has no incentives to provide his infrastructure with a subsidy.  ... 
doi:10.2202/1446-9022.1141 fatcat:7kfvdpgqmnhyfkyetgaerymem4

Would You Like to be a Prosumer? Information Revelation, Personalization and Price Discrimination in Electronic Markets

Martin Bandulet, Karl Morasch
2005 International Journal of the Economics of Business  
Will customers provide the information necessary for personalization?  ...  Assuming that a consumer can control the amount of information revealed, we analyse how his decision interacts with the pricing strategy of a monopolist who may abuse the information to obtain a larger  ...  However, a manufacturer or a national service provider has until recently been restricted to sell a standardized product or at most a limited number of differentiated goods or services.  ... 
doi:10.1080/13571510500128038 fatcat:aegm3mko75a2zbwmnqc5gecimy

On Spectrum Selection Games in Cognitive Radio Networks

Ilaria Malanchini, Matteo Cesana, Nicola Gatti
2009 GLOBECOM 2009 - 2009 IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference  
Numerical results are reported to assess the quality of the game equilibria.  ...  In this paper, a game theoretic framework is proposed to evaluate spectrum management functionalities in Cognitive Radio Networks.  ...  Due to the impressive number of possible subgames and the unavailability of information over the future states to users, the computation of a subgame perfect equilibrium is not practical in our case.  ... 
doi:10.1109/glocom.2009.5425335 dblp:conf/globecom/MalanchiniCG09 fatcat:xrh5eibu5bcfngmn4imdcc53mu

Quality of service provision in noncooperative networks with diverse user requirements

K. Park, M. Sitharam, S. Chen
2000 Decision Support Systems  
For certain "resource-plentiful" systems, however, we show that the world indeed can be nice with Nash equilibria, Pareto optima, and system optima collapsing into a single class.  ...  We present a comprehensive analysis of the noncooperative multi-class QoS provision game, giving a complete characterization of Nash equilibria and their existence criteria, and show under what conditions  ...  If J + i = ∅, J * i takes on a surrogate role. The next lemma gives a simple sufficiency condition for 2-application/2-service class games in which Nash equilibria do not exist.  ... 
doi:10.1016/s0167-9236(99)00078-0 fatcat:q3jzqzd7erfuhimo5w72ltpocm

Surveys in Game Theory and Related Topics

V. J. Baston, H. J. M. Peters, O. J. Vrieze
1988 Journal of the Royal Statistical Society: Series A (Statistics in Society)  
Service centers have to be located in G in order to provide service to the players. The set Q = {q 1 , .•• ,qt} denotes the possible locations for service centers.  ...  (ii) Generic extensive games with perfect information have a unique subgame perfect equilibrium.  ...  We conclude that this model provides a "noncooperative" foundation for the use of nonsymmetric Nash bargaining solutions.  ... 
doi:10.2307/2982790 fatcat:ynwbj5p5fzeoxdhc6ed626rgxe


Mark Bagnoli, Michael Mckee
1991 Economic Inquiry  
This paper reports on a series of laboratory experiments designed to evaluate a mechanism for the voluntary provision of public good.  ...  The public good is provided i f the total contributions meet or exceed a threshold and all contributions are returned if the public good is not provided.  ...  The actual number of persons in your group, along with other information, is re-ported on a set of information slips that have been provided to you.  ... 
doi:10.1111/j.1465-7295.1991.tb01276.x fatcat:oy77rvprmrexrfrf5ntaebsbbe

User-Centric Radio Access Technology Selection: A Survey of Game Theory Models and Multi-Agent Learning Algorithms

Giuseppe Caso, Ozgu Alay, Guido Carlo Ferrante, Luca De Nardis, Maria-Gabriella Di Benedetto, Anna Brunstrom
2021 IEEE Access  
This paper proposes to fill the above gaps by providing a unified reference for both ongoing research and future research directions in the field.  ...  quality of service (QoS) and quality of experience (QoE) for users.  ...  Extensive games with perfect information have been rarely adopted in wireless communications [32] ; an example for RAT selection is provided in [125] .  ... 
doi:10.1109/access.2021.3087410 fatcat:xjqicfhgdfgy3n6ffss7ppvn44

The strategic timing incentives of commercial radio stations: An empirical analysis using multiple equilibria

Andrew Sweeting
2009 The Rand Journal of Economics  
This paper estimates an incomplete information timing game to examine stations' equilibrium timing incentives.  ...  It shows how identification can be aided by the existence of multiple equilibria when appropriate data are available.  ...  I provide further evidence for these differences in the current paper, which comes out of the estimation of a more formal timing game. I model stations as playing an incomplete information game.  ... 
doi:10.1111/j.1756-2171.2009.00086.x fatcat:6dzk37g5sjcf5ngz5zsgqnne5m

Sequential Estimation of Dynamic Discrete Games

Victor Aguirregabiria, Pedro Mira
2007 Econometrica  
This paper studies the estimation of dynamic discrete games of incomplete information.  ...  Two main econometric issues appear in the estimation of these models: the indeterminacy problem associated with the existence of multiple equilibria, and the computational burden in the solution of the  ...  We are particularly concerned with two estimation problems: the computational burden in the solution of the game, and the problem of multiple equilibria.  ... 
doi:10.1111/j.1468-0262.2007.00731.x fatcat:nes6wuvckbf6pfz35wc5yqjzhe


Agustín Molina-Parra, Diego Martínez-López
2016 Journal of Regional Science  
We estimate a ...scal reaction function for the Spanish regions over the period 1995-2010 paying special attention to the impact of federal ...scal stance on the state ...scal imbalances.  ...  We also ...nd a signi...cant impact of ...scal decisions taken by governments at the same tier of decision on a speci...c state.  ...  purposes and …nancing the public services exclusively provided by the upper level.  ... 
doi:10.1111/jors.12328 fatcat:lpumelueojefrjknilimcebf6a
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