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The Combinatorial Assignment Problem: Approximate Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes

Eric Budish
2011 Journal of Political Economy  
This paper proposes a new mechanism for combinatorial assignment-for example, assigning schedules of courses to students-based on an approximation to competitive equilibrium from equal incomes (CEEI) in  ...  The mechanism is approximately efficient, satisfies two new criteria of outcome fairness, and is strategyproof in large markets.  ...  -A combinatorial assignment problem consists of a set of objects, each with integral capacity, and a set of agents, each with scheduling constraints and preferences.  ... 
doi:10.1086/664613 fatcat:hngsnsu235cpbnpihpy73r6244

The combinatorial assignment problem

Eric Budish
2010 Proceedings of the Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory on Conference on Future Directions - BQGT '10  
This paper proposes a new mechanism for combinatorial assignment-for example, assigning schedules of courses to students-based on an approximation to competitive equilibrium from equal incomes (CEEI) in  ...  The mechanism is approximately efficient, satisfies two new criteria of outcome fairness, and is strategyproof in large markets.  ...  -A combinatorial assignment problem consists of a set of objects, each with integral capacity, and a set of agents, each with scheduling constraints and preferences.  ... 
doi:10.1145/1807406.1807480 dblp:conf/bqgt/Budish10 fatcat:fe2hvqezsfgqdldcu4arrdj3oq

Combinatorial auctions

Jawad Abrache, Teodor Gabriel Crainic, Michel Gendreau, Monia Rekik
2007 Annals of Operations Research  
Combinatorial auctions are an important class of market mechanisms in which participants are allowed to bid on bundles of multiple heterogeneous items.  ...  In this paper, we discuss several complex issues that are encountered in the design of combinatorial auctions.  ...  and Collaborative Industry-University Research grant programs, and the FQRNT research development fund of the Province of Québec.  ... 
doi:10.1007/s10479-007-0179-z fatcat:dt2oav6acjesjcdfbqz3526dqa

A COMPUTATIONAL MARKET MODEL BASED ON INDIVIDUAL ACTION [chapter]

Ken Steiglitz, Michael L. Honig, Leonard M. Cohen
1996 Market-Based Control  
Time (Supply and demand in the auction, and market-clearing price vs. time, in the absence of speculation.  ...  For example, the group at the University of Arizona used the PLATO computer network to conduct laboratory experiments with double auctions using human participants 17 .  ... 
doi:10.1142/9789814261371_0001 fatcat:cbn4icnbazf2jd3ehr4qy7y7aa

Auctions and bidding

Simon Parsons, Juan A. Rodriguez-Aguilar, Mark Klein
2011 ACM Computing Surveys  
There is a veritable menagerie of auctions -single dimensional, multi-dimensional, single sided, double sided, first price, second price, English, Dutch, Japanese, sealed bid -and these have been extensively  ...  The main purpose of this paper is to survey this literature from a computer science perspective, primarily from the viewpoint of computer scientists who are interested in learning about auction theory,  ...  Finally, we are vey thankful to Kevin Leyton-Brown for kindly providing us with an electronic draft version of his book.  ... 
doi:10.1145/1883612.1883617 fatcat:5lupctonfzcl5ndw5vo3lrwgnm

Auctions, Bidding and Exchange Design [chapter]

Jayant Kalagnanam, David C. Parkes
2004 International Series in Operations Research and Management Science  
There exist two main institutions for double auctions: (i) the continuous double auction, which clears continuously, 8 and (ii) the clearinghouse or call auction, which clears periodically.  ...  The computational aspects of market clearing depends on the market structure [KDL01] .  ...  Briefly, the challenges (and some initial directions) are those of: evaluation Take a mechanism description and compute the performance of the mechanism with respect to models of agent self-interest and  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-1-4020-7953-5_5 fatcat:g55sdree2zgpdd7j6ifjkfqz3q

Auctions — the Big Winner Among Trading Mechanisms for the Internet Economy [chapter]

R. Müller
2001 Lectures in E-Commerce  
We show how multi-item auction mechanisms can benefit from a synthesis of microeconomic and mathematical optimization models.  ...  Our analysis starts with simple single-item auctions, as we can see them in many B2C markets. We then look at the more complex auction designs, which are necessary for B2B markets.  ...  He is program leader of the e-organisation research unit of the International Institute of Infonomics.  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-7091-6213-2_6 fatcat:hbbyu7szlber7lpff3acpkpxia

HEMS: a home energy market simulator

Andrea Monacchi, Sergii Zhevzhyk, Wilfried Elmenreich
2014 Computer Science - Research and Development  
The uncertainty and the distributed nature of generation and consumption demand for optimal allocation of energy resources, which, in the absence of sufficient control reserve for power generation, can  ...  be achieved using demand-response.  ...  The continuous-time double auction (CDA) is a discriminative price double-auction, meaning that the market can clear offers each time a transaction is possible.  ... 
doi:10.1007/s00450-014-0291-7 fatcat:djv3yjoehbe2fl7hosmaxjaibi

Chapter 8 Strategic analysis of auctions [chapter]

Robert Wilson
1992 Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications  
Auctions also implement directly the demand submission procedures used in Walrasian models of markets.  ...  Auctions have been used for millennia, and remain the simplest and most familiar means of price determination for multilateral trading without intermediary 'market makers' such as brokers and specialists  ...  Double Auctions In a static double auction, both the sellers and the buyers submit supply and demand schedules. A clearing price is then selected that equates supply and demand at that price.  ... 
doi:10.1016/s1574-0005(05)80011-6 fatcat:uhty7nnefvgsdkyoto4swwl7j4

Managing Multi-Modal Sensor Networks Using Price Theory

Phani Chavali, Arye Nehorai
2012 IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing  
We model this interaction as a double sided market, with both consumers and producers, and propose an iterative double auction mechanism for computing the equilibrium of such a market.  ...  The resources and the data are priced by looking to balance global supply and demand, with the SN required to purchase resources for producing the data, and the SM required to purchase data to accomplish  ...  These types of auctions are called double auctions (DA). It was shown that DAs are much more efficient than several one-sided auctions [40] .  ... 
doi:10.1109/tsp.2012.2203127 fatcat:p5signyd7fbenonp4dfpyhfrxu

A Comprehensive Survey on Auction Mechanism Design for Cloud/Edge Resource Management and Pricing

Nafiseh Sharghivand, Farnaz Derakhshan, Nazli Siasi
2021 IEEE Access  
For each aspect, existing studies are summarized along with their saliencies and drawbacks.  ...  Next, various auction mechanisms in cloud computing are reviewed based upon the following aspects: (1) direction of bids-forward, reverse, and two-sided auctions, (2) the heterogeneity of resources-combinatorial  ...  (CT): Implies that the auction mechanism clears the market by finding allocation and pricing of commodities within a tractable computation time.  ... 
doi:10.1109/access.2021.3110914 fatcat:kxuk4olotfcqhkowkzkqv3ns54

eMediator: A Next Generation Electronic Commerce Server

Tuomas Sandholm
2002 Computational intelligence  
First, its con gurable auction house includes a variety of generalized combinatorial auctions, price setting mechanism, novel bid types, mobile agents, and user support for choosing an auction type.  ...  Each of the three components is based on di erent t ypes of game theoretic equilibrium analysis, and also required development of new algorithms and GUI designs to make it feasible.  ...  In double auctions, both supply and demand curves are separately aggregated, and any one of the points were supply meets demand is chosen.  ... 
doi:10.1111/1467-8640.t01-1-00209 fatcat:42cwji4svjcw5lqh6i4njs5unq

An Investigation Report on Auction Mechanism Design [article]

Jinzhong Niu, Simon Parsons
2009 arXiv   pre-print
Auctions also provide a very valuable testing-ground for economic theory, and they play an important role in computer-based control systems.  ...  Auctions are markets with strict regulations governing the information available to traders in the market and the possible actions they can take.  ...  not hold in continuous auctions or may involve incredible computational complexity.  ... 
arXiv:0904.1258v2 fatcat:pf3crtvfl5cnpecmn3f5tirv7i

eMediator

Tuomas Sandholm
2000 Proceedings of the fourth international conference on Autonomous agents - AGENTS '00  
First, its con gurable auction house includes a variety of generalized combinatorial auctions, price setting mechanism, novel bid types, mobile agents, and user support for choosing an auction type.  ...  Each of the three components is based on di erent t ypes of game theoretic equilibrium analysis, and also required development of new algorithms and GUI designs to make it feasible.  ...  In double auctions, both supply and demand curves are separately aggregated, and any one of the points were supply meets demand is chosen.  ... 
doi:10.1145/336595.337522 dblp:conf/agents/Sandholm00 fatcat:ulcrmdvw5zbo7dcjygrtrdrh44

Formally Verified Trades in Financial Markets [article]

Suneel Sarswat, Abhishek Kr Singh
2020 arXiv   pre-print
Finally, we use this framework to verify properties of two important classes of double sided auction mechanisms.  ...  To verify these properties of trades, we first formally define these notions in a theorem prover and then develop many important results about matching demand and supply.  ...  Raja and Mohit Garg for many useful suggestions and discussions that has improved this work.  ... 
arXiv:2007.10805v1 fatcat:kc53oo7wxvbhnoyfy6rkzrbtwi
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