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Competitive VCG Redistribution Mechanism for Public Project Problem [chapter]

Mingyu Guo
<span title="">2016</span> <i title="Springer International Publishing"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/2w3awgokqne6te4nvlofavy5a4" style="color: black;">Lecture Notes in Computer Science</a> </i> &nbsp;
In Naroditskiy et al. 2012, it was conjectured that competitive VCG redistribution mechanisms exist for the public project problem, and one competitive mechanism was proposed for the case of three agents  ...  This paper focuses on another fundamental model -the public project problem.  ...  Unfortunately, the Cavallo mechanism is not competitive for the public project problem, because it never redistributes anything.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-44832-9_17">doi:10.1007/978-3-319-44832-9_17</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/2i4f5erk55b57onwtz7jgfl3qe">fatcat:2i4f5erk55b57onwtz7jgfl3qe</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20190225060829/http://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/5ea3/9398a3ba164fdabafcab0e2bd2cbe3224928.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/5e/a3/5ea39398a3ba164fdabafcab0e2bd2cbe3224928.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-44832-9_17"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="external alternate icon"></i> springer.com </button> </a>

Budget-Balanced and Nearly Efficient Randomized Mechanisms: Public Goods and beyond [chapter]

Mingyu Guo, Victor Naroditskiy, Vincent Conitzer, Amy Greenwald, Nicholas R. Jennings
<span title="">2011</span> <i title="Springer Berlin Heidelberg"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/2w3awgokqne6te4nvlofavy5a4" style="color: black;">Lecture Notes in Computer Science</a> </i> &nbsp;
Based on this idea, we propose two classes of public good mechanisms and derive optimal ones within each class: Faltings' mechanism is optimal in one of the classes.  ...  We then move on to general mechanism design settings, where we prove guarantees on the social welfare achieved by Faltings' mechanism.  ...  The VCG mechanism is exactly 1 ncompetitive for the public project problem.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-25510-6_14">doi:10.1007/978-3-642-25510-6_14</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/tkls2ybfdve6zi5at4rgwrunxi">fatcat:tkls2ybfdve6zi5at4rgwrunxi</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20170921210947/https://users.cs.duke.edu/~conitzer/budgetbalanceWINE11.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/02/b8/02b8979f6f23ae6bb087f499457839cbef65307c.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-25510-6_14"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="external alternate icon"></i> springer.com </button> </a>

An Asymptotically Optimal VCG Redistribution Mechanism for the Public Project Problem

Mingyu Guo
<span title="">2019</span> <i title="International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/vfwwmrihanevtjbbkti2kc3nke" style="color: black;">Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence</a> </i> &nbsp;
We study the classic public project problem, where a group of agents need to decide whether or not to build a non-excludable public project.  ...  We focus on efficient, strategy-proof, and weakly budget-balanced mechanisms (VCG redistribution mechanisms).  ...  Formal Model Description For the public project problem, anonymous 2 VCG redistribution mechanisms have the following form [Naroditskiy et al., 2012] : • Build the public project if and only if θ i ≥  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2019/45">doi:10.24963/ijcai.2019/45</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://dblp.org/rec/conf/ijcai/Guo19.html">dblp:conf/ijcai/Guo19</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/fovfmvyvdfgdvhddff73c7q5ka">fatcat:fovfmvyvdfgdvhddff73c7q5ka</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20200305145735/https://www.ijcai.org/Proceedings/2019/0045.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/e4/08/e408a56b82e185cca44f9513e46868e745020e39.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2019/45"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="external alternate icon"></i> Publisher / doi.org </button> </a>

A Convex Optimization Framework for Almost Budget Balanced Allocation of a Divisible Good

Anil Kumar Chorppath, Srikrishna Bhashyam, Rajesh Sundaresan
<span title="">2011</span> <i title="Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/sv6lf6p3jrf4vbz5puthqdqmae" style="color: black;">IEEE Transactions on Automation Science and Engineering</a> </i> &nbsp;
Simulation results show significant improvements of our proposed method over the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism without rebates.  ...  In the special case of indivisible goods, the mechanisms in this paper fall back to those proposed by Moulin, by Guo and Conitzer, and by Gujar and Narahari, without any need for randomization.  ...  Yang and Hajek [16] proposed a VCG-Kelly mechanism by combining the one-dimensional bid idea of Kelly with the VCG mechanism for the network rate allocation problem.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1109/tase.2010.2102351">doi:10.1109/tase.2010.2102351</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/hdternr7gjhhtav2gljflepxie">fatcat:hdternr7gjhhtav2gljflepxie</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20170923011004/http://mediatum.ub.tum.de/doc/1185862/document.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/19/9b/199be229e4c3c86756d70fe4901bc2770c17b947.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1109/tase.2010.2102351"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="external alternate icon"></i> ieee.com </button> </a>

Optimization-friendly generic mechanisms without money [article]

Mark Braverman
<span title="2021-06-14">2021</span> <i > arXiv </i> &nbsp; <span class="release-stage" >pre-print</span>
Interestingly, not all HZ competitive equilibria come from VCG prices.  ...  The goal of this paper is to develop a generic framework for converting modern optimization algorithms into mechanisms where inputs come from self-interested agents.  ...  A closely related issue -which for example limits the utility of the VCG mechanism in the context of public projects -is that the amount of revenue raised by VCG is highly unstable in the inputs.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2106.07752v1">arXiv:2106.07752v1</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/cit3kuf6jzhidphr7b5iepszwa">fatcat:cit3kuf6jzhidphr7b5iepszwa</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20210617015449/https://arxiv.org/pdf/2106.07752v1.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/23/71/23710ae57e6aee456205bd4b39f3fcf5b1f2b49b.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2106.07752v1" title="arxiv.org access"> <button class="ui compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="file alternate outline icon"></i> arxiv.org </button> </a>

Concordance among holdouts

Scott Duke Kominers, E. Glen Weyl
<span title="">2011</span> <i title="ACM Press"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/7ljisdx4yfhzbmhados4oxci6y" style="color: black;">Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce - EC &#39;11</a> </i> &nbsp;
Holdout problems prevent decentralized aggregation of complementary goods, but the coercion required to overcome holdout may encourage abuse and violate fairness standards.  ...  In these procedures, the prospective buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the group of sellers, and the sellers use an efficient collective choice mechanism to decide as a group whether to accept  ...  VI Example Concordance Procedures VI.A VCG Concordance In Section III.C, we illustrated how a standard implementation of VCG can redistribute seller resources unfairly.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1145/1993574.1993607">doi:10.1145/1993574.1993607</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://dblp.org/rec/conf/sigecom/KominersW11.html">dblp:conf/sigecom/KominersW11</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/u3nyb74b4fbtvdvb7vc44dplfq">fatcat:u3nyb74b4fbtvdvb7vc44dplfq</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20160327195305/http://scottkom.com:80/articles/Kominers_Weyl_Concordance_among_Holdouts.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/e7/56/e756e912e25334a6acd35db219ddf469533215ca.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1145/1993574.1993607"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="external alternate icon"></i> acm.org </button> </a>

Concordance Among Holdouts

Scott Duke Kominers, E. Glen Weyl
<span title="">2011</span> <i title="Elsevier BV"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/tol7woxlqjeg5bmzadeg6qrg3e" style="color: black;">Social Science Research Network</a> </i> &nbsp;
Holdout problems prevent decentralized aggregation of complementary goods, but the coercion required to overcome holdout may encourage abuse and violate fairness standards.  ...  In these procedures, the prospective buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the group of sellers, and the sellers use an efficient collective choice mechanism to decide as a group whether to accept  ...  VI Example Concordance Procedures VI.A VCG Concordance In Section III.C, we illustrated how a standard implementation of VCG can redistribute seller resources unfairly.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1591466">doi:10.2139/ssrn.1591466</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/3xa5knhfybafzlaaok3ceakxwe">fatcat:3xa5knhfybafzlaaok3ceakxwe</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20160327195305/http://scottkom.com:80/articles/Kominers_Weyl_Concordance_among_Holdouts.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/e7/56/e756e912e25334a6acd35db219ddf469533215ca.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1591466"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="external alternate icon"></i> ssrn.com </button> </a>

M-DPOP: Faithful Distributed Implementation of Efficient Social Choice Problems

A. Petcu, B. Faltings, D. C. Parkes
<span title="2008-07-31">2008</span> <i title="AI Access Foundation"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/4ax4efcwajcgvidb6hcg6mwx4a" style="color: black;">The Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research</a> </i> &nbsp;
To achieve faithfulness, we carefully integrate the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism with the DPOP algorithm, such that each agent is only asked to perform computation, report information, and send  ...  On unstructured problems, we observe a sensitivity of M-DPOP to the density of the problem, and we show that reusability decreases from almost 100% for very sparse problems to around 20% for highly connected  ...  The authors would like to thank Wei Xue for valuable feedback on several parts of the paper. We thank Jeffrey Shneidman for his feedback on an early version of this paper.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1613/jair.2500">doi:10.1613/jair.2500</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/m6zr6zg3s5fevhvhcfwjkyq2lm">fatcat:m6zr6zg3s5fevhvhcfwjkyq2lm</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20190502204542/https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/3122491/parkes_m-dpop.pdf;jsessionid=691E33347FC4292178BD12AC6EE3C90E?sequence=2" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/c7/5b/c75b3da96ce24eae99771f85fdac3423507c346f.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1613/jair.2500"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="unlock alternate icon" style="background-color: #fb971f;"></i> Publisher / doi.org </button> </a>

MDPOP

Adrian Petcu, Boi Faltings, David C. Parkes
<span title="">2006</span> <i title="ACM Press"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/4v2roxq5mjauje36xbyymkvn2u" style="color: black;">Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - AAMAS &#39;06</a> </i> &nbsp;
To achieve faithfulness, we carefully integrate the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism with the DPOP algorithm, such that each agent is only asked to perform computation, report information, and send  ...  On unstructured problems, we observe a sensitivity of M-DPOP to the density of the problem, and we show that reusability decreases from almost 100% for very sparse problems to around 20% for highly connected  ...  The authors would like to thank Wei Xue for valuable feedback on several parts of the paper. We thank Jeffrey Shneidman for his feedback on an early version of this paper.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1145/1160633.1160895">doi:10.1145/1160633.1160895</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://dblp.org/rec/conf/atal/PetcuFP06.html">dblp:conf/atal/PetcuFP06</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/ytfsm7viq5efrm6jkyr3mzroha">fatcat:ytfsm7viq5efrm6jkyr3mzroha</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20111021052058/http://jair.org/media/2500/live-2500-3967-jair.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/c6/6a/c66a2574ad9c1b90faf69988f3286f05f28ade65.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1145/1160633.1160895"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="external alternate icon"></i> acm.org </button> </a>

Technological practices in the European auto industry: exploring cases from Belgium, Germany and Portugal

Antonio Brandao Moniz, Bettina-Johanna Krings, Geert Van Hootegem, Rik Huys
<span title="">2002</span> <i title="Inderscience Publishers"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/n3qx2araprdujl445xc4l4liui" style="color: black;">International Journal of Automotive Technology and Management</a> </i> &nbsp;
It was underlined some evidencies of the different alternatives in terms of technological practices for the same sector.  ...  Much of the litterature try to disseminate an idea of a single (and optimum) organisational model for the same type of product.  ...  The individual is much often than ever subject to the mechanisms for evaluation of his work.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1504/ijatm.2002.000058">doi:10.1504/ijatm.2002.000058</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/3ydrpmcgxjh6dhsjpxn57xwjfi">fatcat:3ydrpmcgxjh6dhsjpxn57xwjfi</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20171111072853/https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/12014439.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/c9/69/c969fc69303973774c2d74bc3a918327a637295d.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1504/ijatm.2002.000058"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="external alternate icon"></i> Publisher / doi.org </button> </a>

Yootopia!

Daniel M. Reeves, Bethany M. Soule, Tejaswi Kasturi
<span title="2007-01-01">2007</span> <i title="Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/qmd5qfilljaolhd3ytcqblcmda" style="color: black;">ACM SIGecom Exchanges</a> </i> &nbsp;
The nascent Yootopia Project at Yahoo! Research brings together three related research agendas: mechanisms for group decision making, prediction, and payment infrastructure.  ...  We present an array of currency-agnostic decision mechanisms for small groups, describing new and existing mechanisms for (1) choosing among a short list of options, (2) choosing among an effectively innumerable  ...  We define a space of mechanisms for this problem that satisfy BB, IR, and (with a minor caveat noted below) EFF.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1145/1228621.1228623">doi:10.1145/1228621.1228623</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/hskdicvsybavncz3avkssidece">fatcat:hskdicvsybavncz3avkssidece</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20170829005630/http://www.sigecom.org/exchanges/volume_6/6.2-Reeves.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/69/d6/69d608f6866acdb5d17ef5b9aaa0c9ddd2334636.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1145/1228621.1228623"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="external alternate icon"></i> acm.org </button> </a>

Economic Modeling in Networking: A Primer

Randall A. Berry
<span title="">2011</span> <i title="Now Publishers"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/pfwocfezwzgb3bkrptuptv7ica" style="color: black;">Foundations and Trends® in Networking</a> </i> &nbsp;
In recent years, engineers have been increasingly called upon to have basic skills in economic modeling and game theory at their disposal for two related reasons.  ...  First, the economics of networks has a significant effect on the adoption and creation of network innovations, and second, and perhaps more importantly, engineered networks serve as the platform for many  ...  We would also like thank the editor-in-chief of this series, Tony Ephremides, and the publisher, James Finlay, for inviting us to prepare a manuscript on this topic, and for their encouragement (and patience  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1561/1300000011">doi:10.1561/1300000011</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/j43rw66c6jc5xf6uosswuvcwxu">fatcat:j43rw66c6jc5xf6uosswuvcwxu</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20150929074829/http://web.stanford.edu/~rjohari/pdf/BerJoh13Economic.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/23/9e/239ed52e9ce53e0f6f61f9cfde63cf22bea94883.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1561/1300000011"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="external alternate icon"></i> Publisher / doi.org </button> </a>

Efficiency and Budget Balance in General Quasi-linear Domains [article]

Swaprava Nath, Tuomas Sandholm
<span title="2017-03-07">2017</span> <i > arXiv </i> &nbsp; <span class="release-stage" >pre-print</span>
We give a tight lower bound for an interesting class of strategyproof, budget-balanced, randomized mechanisms.  ...  For deterministic mechanisms, we show that a strategyproof and budget-balanced mechanism must have a sink agent whose valuation function is ignored in selecting an alternative, and she is compensated with  ...  We prove this for a set of alternatives A = {0, 1}. Consider this setting as that of a public project.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/1610.01443v4">arXiv:1610.01443v4</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/lmaylr4fune47pkinloducfibq">fatcat:lmaylr4fune47pkinloducfibq</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20191021152900/https://arxiv.org/pdf/1610.01443v4.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/1c/a9/1ca9345af85e294bab270852388b49805b3fbe33.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/1610.01443v4" title="arxiv.org access"> <button class="ui compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="file alternate outline icon"></i> arxiv.org </button> </a>

Dissolving the Segmentation of Shared Mobility Markets: A Unified Theoretical Framework and Four Examples [article]

Xiaotong Guo, Hongmou Zhang, Peyman Noursalehi, Jinhua Zhao
<span title="2022-04-07">2022</span> <i > arXiv </i> &nbsp; <span class="release-stage" >pre-print</span>
For each proposed market, detailed mechanisms are introduced and feasibility for market realization is also discussed.  ...  for trips to be matched, and thus higher efficiency.  ...  ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The authors thank the Singapore-MIT Alliance for Research and Technology (SMART) Centre for their financial support of this project, and thank Nicholas S.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2204.03616v1">arXiv:2204.03616v1</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/wxb6jgn6d5dc7ehl2fg4pkjedi">fatcat:wxb6jgn6d5dc7ehl2fg4pkjedi</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20220608170531/https://arxiv.org/pdf/2204.03616v1.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/05/3b/053b402a5a807c933047fd32354b8882cd4f743d.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2204.03616v1" title="arxiv.org access"> <button class="ui compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="file alternate outline icon"></i> arxiv.org </button> </a>

A Strategy-Proof Combinatorial Heterogeneous Channel Auction Framework in Noncooperative Wireless Networks

Zhenzhe Zheng, Fan Wu, Guihai Chen
<span title="2015-06-01">2015</span> <i title="Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/m6d55yg2wncgnomdnlvb6ofsmq" style="color: black;">IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing</a> </i> &nbsp;
coMbinatorial Auction mechaniSms for HEterogeneous channel Redistribution.  ...  SMASHER-AP is a strategy-proof, approximately efficient combinatorial auction mechanism for indivisible channel redistribution.  ...  Auction mechaniSms for HEterogeneous channel Redistribution.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1109/tmc.2014.2343624">doi:10.1109/tmc.2014.2343624</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/xgso6kuiarfhzfikecs6ukscm4">fatcat:xgso6kuiarfhzfikecs6ukscm4</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20170808204913/http://www.cs.sjtu.edu.cn/~fwu/res/Paper/ZWC14TMC-SMASHER.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/9f/aa/9faa0e71663efef1043168a80babde64423595ce.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1109/tmc.2014.2343624"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="external alternate icon"></i> ieee.com </button> </a>
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