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Collusive dominant-strategy truthfulness

Jing Chen, Silvio Micali
2012 Journal of Economic Theory  
Our mechanism bypasses classic impossibility results (such as those of Green and Laffont, and of Schummer) by providing the players with a richer set of strategies, making it dominant for every coalition  ...  We show that collusion and wrong beliefs may cause a dramatic efficiency loss in the Vickrey mechanism for auctioning a single good in limited supply.  ...  In a sense, our collusive dominant-strategy truthfulness tries to harmonize the cooperative and the non-cooperative settings.  ... 
doi:10.1016/j.jet.2012.01.021 fatcat:gmvee3dkvfhepem2wa3dwmo4oa

Collusion, efficiency, and dominant strategies

Alan Deckelbaum, Silvio Micali
2017 Games and Economic Behavior  
For unrestricted combinatorial auctions, the possibility of guaranteeing efficiency in collusion-resilient dominant strategies has remained open.  ...  In this paper, we (a) generalize the notion of a collusion-resilient dominant-strategy mechanism by allowing for arbitrary strategy spaces, (b) construct such a mechanism for multi-unit auctions which  ...  It is also useful to construct practical mechanisms that, like M for multi-unit auctions, guarantee such resilience in dominant strategies for practical applications.  ... 
doi:10.1016/j.geb.2016.03.008 fatcat:rw3q3wcwhnf5hpbjkgii2tgjji

Collusion-Resistant Reputation Mechanism for Multi-Agents Systems

Babak Khosravifar, Jamal Bentahara, Mahsa Alishahi, Maziar Gomrokchi
2011 Procedia Computer Science  
We provide theoretical analysis of the game and discuss the pure and mixed strategy Nash equilibrium along with best response analysis to identify conditions under which the players adopt truthful dominant  ...  strategies.  ...  as the dominant strategy.  ... 
doi:10.1016/j.procs.2011.07.025 fatcat:a7gscb5zjjg4tigmprqmdwighm

Truthful opinions from the crowds

Radu Jurca, Boi Faltings
2008 ACM SIGecom Exchanges  
The mechanism scales the payments (monetary or in kind) to the reporters such that (i) the expected reward is greater than the cost of reporting, and (ii) honest reporting becomes the optimal strategy.  ...  Finally, when honest reporting cannot be neither the dominant strategy, nor the unique Nash Equilibrium, collusion resistance can emerge if honesty is the Paretooptimal Nash equilibrium.  ...  When dominant truth-telling is not possible, the second most preferable option is to have honest reporting as the unique Nash Equilibrium.  ... 
doi:10.1145/1399589.1399592 fatcat:77ph62mrlbdhnib6gjlkqayczm

Collusion as an Informed Principal Problem

Lucia Quesada
2005 Social Science Research Network  
First, if collusion occurs after the agents accept or reject the principal's offer; the dominant-strategy implementation of the optimal contract without collusion is collusion proof.  ...  We also assume that the collusion offer includes a punishment strategy, to be used whenever the other agent rejects the side contract.  ...  She just needs to offer the dominant-strategy implementation.  ... 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.802925 fatcat:qbos4bjdw5gp3nm5df6u6zvyua

Collusion in Second-Price Auctions under Minimax Regret Criterion

Greys Sošić
2009 Production and operations management  
While truth-telling is not a dominant strategy for Random k, it is a minimax regret equilibrium.  ...  We are proposing an efficient distribution of collusive profit for second-price sealed bid auctions in such environment.  ...  , but for which truth-telling is not a dominant strategy.  ... 
doi:10.1111/j.1937-5956.2007.tb00273.x fatcat:olqrn2idvzcdpftycq7bivdnxy

The pivotal mechanism revisited: some evidence on group manipulation

Francesco Feri, Anita Gantner, Wolfgang Höchtl, Rupert Sausgruber
2012 Experimental Economics  
Even though all agents' preferences are common knowledge and there exists a simple symmetric collusive strategy for one subgroup, we find little evidence for tacit collusion.  ...  Only when explicit communication is allowed, collusion is established.  ...  with a dominant strategy of the non-collusive game for both Beta and Delta.  ... 
doi:10.1007/s10683-012-9331-y fatcat:wmodupow6zaahnrmrp6gabhyeu

Collusion-resistant, incentive-compatible feedback payments

Radu Jurca, Boi Faltings
2007 Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce - EC '07  
In this paper we investigate incentive-compatible payment mechanisms that are also resistant to collusion: groups of agents cannot collude on a lying strategy without suffering monetary losses.  ...  Self-interested agents report the truth only when explicit rewards offset the potential gains obtained from lying.  ...  There, honest reporting is the dominant strategy, so that each colluder reports the truth regardless of the reports of the other colluders.  ... 
doi:10.1145/1250910.1250940 dblp:conf/sigecom/JurcaF07 fatcat:jjetkyhajjeilgvnj7c2n2pdx4

On the cost-ineffectiveness of redundancy in commercial P2P computing

Matthew Yurkewych, Brian N. Levine, Arnold L. Rosenberg
2005 Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Computer and communications security - CCS '05  
Under the assumption that clients are motivated solely by the desire to maximize expected profit, we prove that, within this framework, redundancy is cost effective only when collusion among clients, including  ...  The expected profit of the truth-telling strategy satisfies: E[truth] ≥ α(R − C) + (1 − α) · £ (1 − e −k )(R − C) + e −k (−P − C)¤ The expected profit of the cheating strategy satisfies: 2 · E[cheat] ≤  ...  To this end, we introduce the notion of domination. We say that the team Tj dominates a poll if 1 2 Proof.  ... 
doi:10.1145/1102120.1102157 dblp:conf/ccs/YurkewychLR05 fatcat:ki2svfirmbaujnifzxt62q4tom

Groves Mechanism vs. Profit Sharing for Corporate Budgeting – An Experimental Analysis with Preplay Communication

Markus C. Arnold, Eva Ponick, Heike Y. Schenk-Mathes
2008 The European Accounting Review  
Under the Groves mechanism, however, it leads to stable collusion strategies of the participants, and thus increases compensation costs.  ...  Under this class of evaluation measures, truth-telling always represents the dominant strategy equilibrium.  ...  Simultaneously, truth-telling is the dominant strategy for manager j, i.e. ∂C j ∂ P j = 0 for P j = P j .  ... 
doi:10.1080/09638180701819980 fatcat:xjod6uqotvehpnxla5bi74qdgi

Mechanisms for Making Crowds Truthful

R. Jurca, B. Faltings
2009 The Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research  
We consider schemes for obtaining truthful reports on a common but hidden signal from large groups of rational, self-interested agents.  ...  In this paper we extend existing methods for designing incentive-compatible rewards by also considering collusion.  ...  When more than half of the agents collude, (i.e., N col > N/2), no incentive-compatible payment mechanism can make truth-telling the dominant strategy for the colluders. Proof.  ... 
doi:10.1613/jair.2621 fatcat:tdz4cpqtabdx7ahillmpcpdlum

Breaking bidder collusion in large-scale spectrum auctions

Xia Zhou, Haitao Zheng
2010 Proceedings of the eleventh ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking and computing - MobiHoc '10  
In particular, collusion group of small size plays a dominant role since it is easy to form and hard to be detected.  ...  Unlike existing solutions, Athena enables spectrum reuse across bidders, achieves soft collusion resistance against any form of collusive bidding strategy, maintains provable revenue guarantee, and does  ...  Truthful auctions ensure that no bidder, individually, can improve its utility by bidding other than its true valuation. Thus a rational strategy is to bid its true valuation.  ... 
doi:10.1145/1860093.1860110 dblp:conf/mobihoc/ZhouZ10 fatcat:erutrquldfgc7lyqnucwcbjijq

Medical education: monopoly or oligopoly?

2014 Journal of Biomedical Research  
to their particular strategies.  ...  In a non-collusive oligopoly, there is competition on both price and product, but the institutions are so close to each other that their strategies are almost fully informed by how their rivals might react  ... 
doi:10.7555/jbr.28.20130189 pmid:24474967 pmcid:PMC3904178 fatcat:4avhzhpeqzaafcdm3edhycrxem

Mechanism Design with Collusion and Correlation

Jean-Jacques Laffont, David Martimort
2000 Econometrica  
strategy if budget balance is not a concern.  ...  The optimal weakly collusion-proof mechanism calls for distortions away from first-best efficiency obtained without collusion.  ...  Instead, (21) and (22) show that the optimal weakly collusion-proof contract is such that the dominant strategy incentive constraints of a 0 agent are always strictly satisfied.  ... 
doi:10.1111/1468-0262.00111 fatcat:tph3mzzhirfc3gzi4hml4i2pfq

A new approach to auctions and resilient mechanism design

Jing Chen, Silvio Micali
2009 Proceedings of the 41st annual ACM symposium on Symposium on theory of computing - STOC '09  
A normal-form mechanism is said to be dominant-strategy truthful (DST for short) if, for every player i, announcing his own true type is a dominant strategy.  ...  A stronger notion, solely depending on the players' rationality (rather than their beliefs), is that of a dominant-strategy equilibrium.  ...  guarantees that P holds at each possible equilibrium of the game (C, M ), if some players believe that the equilibrium ultimately played out is σ while others believe that it is τ , then the profile of strategies  ... 
doi:10.1145/1536414.1536484 dblp:conf/stoc/ChenM09 fatcat:4bxy6hsw75ee5c3phgx6x4cyda
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