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Small Coalitions Cannot Manipulate Voting [chapter]

Edith Elkind, Helger Lipmaa
2005 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
of manipulating voters (rather than a single voter).  ...  : we use one-way functions to close a security loophole that allowed voting officials to exert disproportionate influence on the outcome and show that our hardness results hold against a large fraction  ...  While from information-theoretic perspective no solution is possible, computational considerations come to rescue: one can try to discourage potential manipulators by making manipulation infeasible.  ... 
doi:10.1007/11507840_25 fatcat:3rms5rjidfcx7nmfesdfgbv7su

A Survey on Blockchain: A Game Theoretical Perspective

Ziyao Liu, Nguyen Cong Luong, Wenbo Wang, Dusit Niyato, Ping Wang, Ying-Chang Liang, Dong In Kim
2019 IEEE Access  
This survey aims to fill the gap between a large number of studies on blockchain networks, where game theory emerges as an analytical tool, and the lack of a comprehensive survey on the game theoretical  ...  Additionally, we discuss the advantages and disadvantages of these selected game theoretical models and solutions.  ...  Currently, few existing survey on blockchains perceives the organization and applications of blockchains from the game theoretic perspective.  ... 
doi:10.1109/access.2019.2909924 fatcat:a5gl7yexnffp5fjsnsw26gnjmi

False name manipulations in weighted voting games: splitting, merging and annexation [article]

Haris Aziz, Mike Paterson
2009 arXiv   pre-print
We examine the computational complexity of false-name manipulation in weighted voting games which are an important class of coalitional voting games.  ...  Weighted voting games have received increased interest in the multiagent community due to their compact representation and ability to model coalitional formation scenarios.  ...  There is scope to analyse such false-name manipulations with respect to other cooperative game-theoretic solutions.  ... 
arXiv:0905.3348v1 fatcat:r47gkgojvzc4bnscrv3av5jfge

False-Name Manipulations in Weighted Voting Games

H. Aziz, Y. Bachrach, E. Elkind, M. Paterson
2011 The Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research  
In such games, each player has a weight, and a coalition of players wins the game if its total weight meets or exceeds a given quota.  ...  Weighted voting is a classic model of cooperation among agents in decision-making domains.  ...  However, this situation is very different from the game-theoretic perspective, as it involves coordinated actions by several would-be manipulators who then have to decide how to split the (increased) total  ... 
doi:10.1613/jair.3166 fatcat:2byyesnzsndtncmcavjfcbvmoy

In Praise of Manipulation

Keith Dowding, Martin Van Hees
2006 Social Science Research Network  
Many theorists believe that the manipulation of voting procedures is a serious problem.  ...  We argue that (sincere or insincere) manipulation may indeed lead to non-transparency of the decision making process, but that, from a democratic perspective, such non-transparency is often a virtue rather  ...  Taking a dynamic perspective and making use of simulations, he shows that manipulation of some well-known voting rules lead to a sequence of outcomes that yields a higher average utility than the sequence  ... 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.1077759 fatcat:bnc7egakeveqvc72sb3kgype4q

Is computational complexity a barrier to manipulation?

Toby Walsh
2011 Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence  
a manipulation (for example, if votes are restricted to be single peaked then some of the complexity barriers fall away).  ...  Fortunately, it has been shown that it is NP-hard to compute how to manipulate a number of different voting rules. However, NP-hardness only bounds the worst-case complexity.  ...  with weighted votes by a coalition of agents.  ... 
doi:10.1007/s10472-011-9255-9 fatcat:cytm4p5qyfablfpt4kl5cjd2km

Is Computational Complexity a Barrier to Manipulation? [chapter]

Toby Walsh
2010 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
a manipulation (for example, if votes are restricted to be single peaked then some of the complexity barriers fall away).  ...  Fortunately, it has been shown that it is NP-hard to compute how to manipulate a number of different voting rules. However, NP-hardness only bounds the worst-case complexity.  ...  with weighted votes by a coalition of agents.  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-642-14977-1_1 fatcat:wbplfpxyyzb57lxl5oquafpymi

On Coalitional Manipulation for Multiwinner Elections: Shortlisting

Robert Bredereck, Andrzej Kaczmarczyk, Rolf Niedermeier
2017 Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence  
Shortlisting of candidates—selecting a group of "best" candidates—is a special case of multiwinner elections.  ...  We provide the first in-depth study of the computational complexity of strategic voting for shortlisting based on the most natural and simple voting rule in this scenario, l-Bloc (every voter approves  ...  Beyond the above, further research on manipulators behavior directing towards game-theoretic aspects seems promising as well.  ... 
doi:10.24963/ijcai.2017/123 dblp:conf/ijcai/BredereckKN17 fatcat:jtrgm6wo3jattplwi5z4kqehee

Parliamentary Voting Procedures: Agenda Control, Manipulation, and Uncertainty

Robert Bredereck, Jiehua Chen, Rolf Niedermeier, Toby Walsh
2017 The Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research  
the Manipulation problem, or whether there is a suitable ordering of the agenda, the Agenda Control problem, takes polynomial time.  ...  We obtain the following results for both voting procedures: On the one hand, deciding whether one can make a specific alternative win by reporting insincere preferences by the fewest number of voters,  ...  More-over, it would be natural to also adopt a more game-theoretic view on the strategic voting scenarios we considered.  ... 
doi:10.1613/jair.5407 fatcat:vhgpgjtz2fadljfeeua3k7hsf4

Using Mechanism Design to Prevent False-Name Manipulations

Vincent Conitzer, Makoto Yokoo
2010 The AI Magazine  
However, it seems unlikely that the phenomenon of false-name manipulation will disappear anytime soon.  ...  even in such settings, so that we are back in a more typical mechanism design context.  ...  Here, we consider some elements of cooperative game theory, also known as coalitional game theory.  ... 
doi:10.1609/aimag.v31i4.2315 fatcat:ui63kipscjaabjfa7zz3kquxua

Voting systems and strategic manipulation: An experimental study

Anna Bassi
2014 Journal of Theoretical Politics  
Plurality rule leads voters to play in a more sophisticated manner, but not necessarily insincerely, displaying the lowest levels of manipulation.  ...  The opposite holds for the Borda count games, where players are the least sophisticated but the most insincere. Approval voting shows intermediate levels of strategic behavior.  ...  The game-theoretic perspective adopted here may lead to the possibility of self-reinforcing strategic voting.  ... 
doi:10.1177/0951629813514300 fatcat:lftzl6v7vbechdqg2lv7vujk5i

"Reverse Gerrymandering": Manipulation in Multi-Group Decision Making

Omer Lev, Yoad Lewenberg
District-based manipulation, or gerrymandering, is usually taken to refer to agents who are in fixed location, and an external division is imposed upon them.  ...  However, in many real-world setting, there is an external, fixed division – an organizational chart of a company, or markets for a particular product.  ...  However, while in hedonic games agents care for the success of their coalition, in our model they are concerned with the overall outcomes of every coalition in the game.  ... 
doi:10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33012069 fatcat:peuelyqrzvapbnqcmy3mu5rlwq

Control in the Presence of Manipulators: Cooperative and Competitive Cases [article]

Zack Fitzsimmons, Edith Hemaspaandra, Lane A. Hemaspaandra
2017 arXiv   pre-print
Yet for a Borda-voting case we show that such clashes raise the complexity unless NP = coNP.  ...  We prove that for approval and plurality elections, the complexity of even competitive clashes between a controller and manipulators falls far below those high bounds, even as low as polynomial time.  ...  In manipulation, some nonmanipulative voters and a coalition of manipulative voters vote under some election system, and the manipulative voters seek to make a given candidate win.  ... 
arXiv:1308.0544v3 fatcat:suczwx3wcbcohlgjhv3ma63wja

Social Ranking Manipulability for the CP-Majority, Banzhaf and Lexicographic Excellence Solutions

Tahar Allouche, Bruno Escoffier, Stefano Moretti, Meltem Öztürk
2020 Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence  
Then, we analyze the computational complexity of manipulation, and complete our theoretical results with simulations in order to analyse the manipulation frequencies and to assess the effects of manipulations  ...  We investigate the issue of manipulability for social ranking rules, where the goal is to rank individuals given the ranking of coalitions formed by them and each individual prefers to reach the highest  ...  of some domain restrictions, study of coalitional manipulation or of simultaneous manipulation (game theoretical issues).  ... 
doi:10.24963/ijcai.2020/3 dblp:conf/ijcai/AlloucheEMO20 fatcat:bvos6lrls5ejtg6i7puldax4ii

Parliamentary Voting Procedures: Agenda Control, Manipulation, and Uncertainty [article]

Robert Bredereck and Jiehua Chen and Rolf Niedermeier and Toby Walsh
2015 arXiv   pre-print
While finding successful manipulations or agenda controls is tractable for both procedures, our real-world experimental results indicate that most elections cannot be manipulated by a few voters and agenda  ...  We study computational problems for two popular parliamentary voting procedures: the amendment procedure and the successive procedure.  ...  It would be natural to also adopt a more game-theoretic view on the strategic voting scenarios we considered.  ... 
arXiv:1509.02424v1 fatcat:pwij4nj5rffdzovkpwg54qs72u
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