Filters








3,564 Hits in 3.6 sec

Budget Feasible Procurement Auctions

Nima Anari, Gagan Goel, Afshin Nikzad
2018 Operations Research  
A buyer with a fixed budget wants to procure, from a set of available workers, a budget feasible subset that maximizes her utility: Any worker has a private reservation price and provides a publicly known  ...  Budget Feasibility: The sum of the payments made to the sellers should not exceed B, i.e., 2. Individual rationality: A winner i ∈ S is paid at least c i . 3.  ...  The budget feasible mechanism design framework could be used to procure workers.  ... 
doi:10.1287/opre.2017.1693 fatcat:2jze4wzncnbnbndyssbsl3xkfa

Budget-feasible Procurement Mechanisms in Two-sided Markets

Weiwei Wu, Xiang Liu, Minming Li
2018 Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence  
Buyers could claim their budgets, not necessarily the true ones. The goal is to seek budget-feasible mechanisms that ensure sellers are rewarded enough payment and buyers' budgets are not exceeded.  ...  This paper considers the mechanism design problem in two-sided markets where multiple strategic buyers come with budgets to procure as much value of items as possible from the strategic sellers.  ...  Note that the problem above falls into the field of budgetfeasible procurement mechanism design, in which the first budget-feasible truthful mechanism in single-buyer procurement auctions is developed  ... 
doi:10.24963/ijcai.2018/76 dblp:conf/ijcai/WuLL18 fatcat:eimusg7sonaphcdqme3nyuhhbm

A dynamic auction for multi-object procurement under a hard budget constraint

Ludwig Ensthaler, Thomas Giebe
2014 Research Policy  
We present a new dynamic auction for procurement problems where payments are bounded by a hard budget constraint and money does not enter the procurer's objective function. JEL D21, D44, D45, D82.  ...  Discussion Paper No. 310 A dynamic auction for multiobject procurement under a hard budget constraint A dynamic auction for multi-object procurement under a hard budget constraint * introduction A budget-constrained  ...  Suppose b i ∈ [0, discussion Obviously, the auction observes the hard budget constraint.  ... 
doi:10.1016/j.respol.2013.06.011 fatcat:sdlligiuejaspa7l6p2u3hojk4

A Dynamic Auction for Multi-Object Procurement Under a Hard Budget Constraint

Ludwig Ensthaler, Thomas Giebe
2012 Social Science Research Network  
We present a new dynamic auction for procurement problems where payments are bounded by a hard budget constraint and money does not enter the procurer's objective function. JEL D21, D44, D45, D82.  ...  Discussion Paper No. 310 A dynamic auction for multiobject procurement under a hard budget constraint A dynamic auction for multi-object procurement under a hard budget constraint * introduction A budget-constrained  ...  Suppose b i ∈ [0, discussion Obviously, the auction observes the hard budget constraint.  ... 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.1564704 fatcat:44pc5seh3rgjdmdhik2kvfiq6i

Optimal Auctions via the Multiplicative Weight Method [article]

Anand Bhalgat, Sreenivas Gollapudi, Kamesh Munagala
2013 arXiv   pre-print
Scenarios with such functions include (a) auctions with "quitting rights", (b) cost to borrow money beyond budget, (c) a seller's and buyers' risk aversion.  ...  We use this framework to design computationally efficient optimal auctions that satisfy ex-post Individual Rationality in the presence of constraints such as (hard, private) budgets and envy-freeness.  ...  Singer [32] and Chen et al [4] show constant factor approximations to the welfare of procurement auctions subject to a budget constraint (what they term budget feasible mechanisms).  ... 
arXiv:1211.1699v3 fatcat:22s7e4upnrakvpe2ta6h5lb4we

Incentive-compatible, budget-balanced, yet highly efficient auctions for supply chain formation

Moshe Babaioff, William E. Walsh
2005 Decision Support Systems  
Our auctions produce higher efficiency for a broader class of supply chains than any other incentive compatible, individually rational, and budget-balanced auction we are aware of.  ...  To resolve this problem we introduce auctions that explicitly discard profitable trades, thus giving up perfect efficiency to maintain budget balance, incentive compatibility and individual rationality  ...  We denote by V (S{A }) the sum of valuations of all agents in procurement set S{A }, so V (S{A }) = ∑ i∈S{A } v i .  ... 
doi:10.1016/j.dss.2004.08.008 fatcat:sethwb4iizalnapbkcmisj2sje

Incentive-compatible, budget-balanced, yet highly efficient auctions for supply chain formation

Moshe Babaioff, William E. Walsh
2003 Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce - EC '03  
Our auctions produce higher efficiency for a broader class of supply chains than any other incentive compatible, individually rational, and budget-balanced auction we are aware of.  ...  To resolve this problem we introduce auctions that explicitly discard profitable trades, thus giving up perfect efficiency to maintain budget balance, incentive compatibility and individual rationality  ...  We denote by V (S{A }) the sum of valuations of all agents in procurement set S{A }, so V (S{A }) = ∑ i∈S{A } v i .  ... 
doi:10.1145/779928.779937 dblp:conf/sigecom/BabaioffW03 fatcat:th4mutug3ff3jbddhvewutbe4u

Optimal auctions via the multiplicative weight method

Anand Bhalgat, Sreenivas Gollapudi, Kamesh Munagala
2013 Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce - EC '13  
Scenarios with such functions include (a) auctions with "quitting rights", (b) cost to borrow money beyond budget, (c) a seller's and buyers' risk aversion.  ...  We use this framework to design computationally efficient optimal auctions that satisfy ex-post Individual Rationality in the presence of constraints such as (hard, private) budgets and envy-freeness.  ...  results in [32, 4] show constant factor approximations to the welfare of procurement auctions subject to a budget constraint (what they term budget feasible mechanisms); and the results in [6] considers  ... 
doi:10.1145/2492002.2482547 dblp:conf/sigecom/BhalgatGM13 fatcat:4ex4qfqk7ndhjk7msgnvfmgwrm

Deterministic Budget-Feasible Clock Auctions [article]

Eric Balkanski, Pranav Garimidi, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Daniel Schoepflin, Xizhi Tan
2021 arXiv   pre-print
We revisit the well-studied problem of budget-feasible procurement, where a buyer with a strict budget constraint seeks to acquire services from a group of strategic providers (the sellers).  ...  During the last decade, several strategyproof budget-feasible procurement auctions have been proposed, aiming to maximize the value of the buyer, while eliciting each seller's true cost for providing their  ...  Thus, in total, the first phase of the auction terminates in O(n 2 log n) time.  ... 
arXiv:2107.09239v2 fatcat:cwavdqxib5f5phhpsntmwobzje

How to Allocate Research (and Other) Subsidies

Ludwig Ensthaler, Thomas Giebe
2011 Social Science Research Network  
A budget-constrained buyer wants to purchase items from a shortlisted set. Items are differentiated by observable quality and sellers have private reserve prices for their items.  ...  The mechanism is ex-post budget feasible.  ...  Interim budget-feasible. However, we can use AGV-budget-balancing (see, e.g., Börgers and Norman, 2009 ) to get a mechanism which is ex-post budget-feasible.  ... 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.1776361 fatcat:qhu55i3y35avlk6adbcahcmcjm

Budget Feasible Mechanisms on Matroids [chapter]

Stefano Leonardi, Gianpiero Monaco, Piotr Sankowski, Qiang Zhang
2017 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
Motivated by many practical applications, in this paper we study budget feasible mechanisms where the goal is to procure independent sets from matroids.  ...  The goal is to design an incentive compatible (truthful) budget feasible mechanism which procures an independent set of the matroid under the given budget that yields the largest value possible to the  ...  Introduction Procurement auctions (a.k.a. reverse auctions), often carried out by governments or private companies, deal with the scenarios where a buyer would like to purchase objects from a set of sellers  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-319-59250-3_30 fatcat:wfjap2nnp5dzpddxzgodhlje7q

Budget Feasible Mechanisms on Matroids

Stefano Leonardi, Gianpiero Monaco, Piotr Sankowski, Qiang Zhang
2020 Algorithmica  
AbstractMotivated by many practical applications, in this paper we study budget feasible mechanisms with the goal of procuring an independent set of a matroid.  ...  The goal is to design an incentive compatible budget feasible mechanism which procures an independent set of the matroid of largest possible value.  ...  Introduction Procurement auctions (a.k.a. reverse auctions) are executed by governments or private companies to purchase commodities and services from providers.  ... 
doi:10.1007/s00453-020-00781-9 fatcat:bk3ha6pdlzbenm22kdae6tcj4u

Iterative Dutch combinatorial auctions

Shantanu Biswas, Y. Narahari
2005 Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence  
We use the set packing and set covering formulations to suggest novel iterative Dutch auction algorithms for combinatorial auction problems.  ...  The combinatorial auction problem can be modeled as a weighted set packing problem. Similarly the reverse combinatorial auction can be modeled as a weighted set covering problem.  ...  The buyer has a procurement budget. But this total budget cannot be divided linearly into budget for each item because of the complementarities involved.  ... 
doi:10.1007/s10472-005-4687-8 fatcat:emwf3gu2yjeuhoebmd5uez4mzm

Budget Feasible Mechanisms [article]

Yaron Singer
2013 arXiv   pre-print
We focus on the case of procurement auctions in which sellers have private costs, and the auctioneer aims to maximize a utility function on subsets of items, under the constraint that the sum of the payments  ...  We explore the space of budget feasible mechanisms in other domains and give a characterization under more restricted conditions.  ...  More recently procurement auctions have been studied under the nonutilitarian framework of frugality [8] , [3] , [15] , [11] , [26] -essentially, payment optimization in reverse auctions.  ... 
arXiv:1002.2334v2 fatcat:j76ggte66ff2hfjjoqmhjtw6c4

Budget Feasible Mechanisms

Yaron Singer
2010 2010 IEEE 51st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science  
We focus on the case of procurement auctions in which sellers have private costs, and the auctioneer aims to maximize a utility function on subsets of items, under the constraint that the sum of the payments  ...  We explore the space of budget feasible mechanisms in other domains and give a characterization under more restricted conditions.  ...  More recently procurement auctions have been studied under the nonutilitarian framework of frugality [8] , [3] , [15] , [11] , [26] -essentially, payment optimization in reverse auctions.  ... 
doi:10.1109/focs.2010.78 dblp:conf/focs/Singer10 fatcat:ervzisvknzbxdbvqm7ba34thd4
« Previous Showing results 1 — 15 out of 3,564 results