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Board Involvement, Director Expertise and Executive Incentives 1 Xiaojing Meng, NYU Stern We have benefited from discussions with

Jie Tian, Ramji Balakrishnan, Tim Baldenius, Pingyang Gao, Ilan Guttman, Christian Hofmann, Haresh Sapra, Hao Xue
2016 unpublished
We find that the level of director expertise determines whether board involvement is beneficial for the firm but director expertise does not always improve executive incentives.  ...  Abstract Boards of directors have become more involved in monitoring and advising top management. We investigate how board involvement affects executive incentives in a project investment setting.  ...  We find that the level of director expertise determines whether board involvement is beneficial for the firm but director expertise does not always improve executive incentives.  ... 
fatcat:k2xicvpmf5divacstumpn23glu

Board Long-Term Orientation, Earnings Management, Disclosure and Risk

Hernan Herrera-Echeverry, Jerry Haar, Daniel Velasquez-Gaviria, Siddharth Upadhyay
2020 Engineering Economics  
We conclude that board independence, board expertise and board audit committee activity increase long-term firm orientation.  ...  We find that boards with these characteristics are prone to the implementation of executives' long-term incentives, suggesting that a long-term orientation is beneficial not only to increase firms' transparency  ...  Boards with (a) audit committee (b) higher independence, (c) expertise (d) and compliance are more likely to adopt executives' long-term incentives policies.  ... 
doi:10.5755/j01.ee.31.4.24253 fatcat:bdjgqb7qjbe33fy3kos6bquzoa

Industry Expertise of Independent Directors and Board Monitoring

Cong Wang, Fei Xie, Min Zhu
2015 Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis  
In addition, a greater representation of independent directors with industry expertise on a firm's compensation committee reduces chief executive officer (CEO) excess compensation, and a greater presence  ...  AbstractWe examine whether the industry expertise of independent directors affects board monitoring effectiveness.  ...  More effective board monitoring enabled by independent director industry expertise may be a substitute for CEO incentive compensation, and, at the same time, corporate boards with strong monitors may demand  ... 
doi:10.1017/s0022109015000459 fatcat:bccbevouy5hwdcqzuyp457vdh4

Industry Expertise of Independent Directors and Board Monitoring

Cong Wang, Fei Xie, Min Zhu
2013 Social Science Research Network  
In addition, a greater representation of independent directors with industry expertise on a firm's compensation committee reduces chief executive officer (CEO) excess compensation, and a greater presence  ...  We examine whether the industry expertise of independent directors affects board monitoring effectiveness.  ...  More effective board monitoring enabled by independent director industry expertise may be a substitute for CEO incentive compensation, and, at the same time, corporate boards with strong monitors may demand  ... 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.2230911 fatcat:fupherjvgvg3ndtexbfmazpbxe

The Effect of Auditor Expertise on Executive Compensation

Sudarshan Jayaraman, Todd T. Milbourn
2012 Social Science Research Network  
Our results are robust to a rigorous treatment of endogeneity and suggest that firms consider the financial misreporting effects of equity-based incentives and trade off these costs with the benefits of  ...  However, in contrast, equity-based compensation of all other non-CEO and non-CFO executives is unaffected by whether or not their firms are audited by an industry expert.  ...  For example, on one hand, the association between executive compensation and auditor expertise is likely to be stronger in more effective boards as these boards are the ones more likely to choose expert  ... 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.1955488 fatcat:72dpzzvjtzaazedbimkwswkmt4

Target Director Turnover in Acquisitions: A Conceptual Framework

Yong Li, Ruth V. Aguilera
2008 Corporate governance: An International Review  
that new board.  ...  that new board.  ...  While carrying out the monitoring and advisory roles depends on the incentives and expertise of directors as individuals, performing the social role is dependent upon directors' social capital derived  ... 
doi:10.1111/j.1467-8683.2008.00705.x fatcat:e65zphvycjehrk2bcv4zwywhve

Impact of Board Incentives and Board Interlocks on Audit Fees

Elham Chenari
2020 Iranian journal of accounting, auditing & finance  
This study aims to examine how board incentives and board interlocks affect audit fees.  ...  Using multiple linear regression with panel data, this research shows a significant relationship between the board incentives and future audit fees.  ...  Introduction To manage and organize daily company operations, guidance and leadership are transferred from board to president and from the president to the chief executive officer.  ... 
doi:10.22067/ijaaf.2020.39434 doaj:3af91d5eb5aa49c897a9e1fe03d27d84 fatcat:om57qqxljfavrjtco7nrvoqqza

Audit Research Summaries

Editorial Office
2016 Maandblad Voor Accountancy en Bedrijfseconomie  
Rose, and I. S. Suh. 2011. The effects of disclosure type and audit committee expertise on Chief Audit Executives' tolerance for financial misstatements.  ...  In addition, we identify a num- Title: The effects of disclosure type and audit committee expertise on Chief Audit Executives' tolerance for financial misstatements.  ...  Citation Findings: Findings were consistent with stock-option incentives being associated with lower financial reporting quality.  ... 
doi:10.5117/mab.90.31325 fatcat:l257b5dbjnapxpxypiategejmy

How (Not) to Pay Non-executive Directors

Alexander Dilger
2012 Social Science Research Network  
Performance pay, at least as usually understand, is no good idea for non-executive directors. They have to supervise and control or in some situations even to fire and replace the executive managers.  ...  This means that their performance as supervisors is totally different from the performance of the supervised executive managers and even the company at large.  ...  To keep the expertise of former executives it is better to hire and pay them as consultants than as non-executive directors.  ... 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.2541032 fatcat:hraw5wezvnakvo7ynzmiefmoza

Corporate Governance and Bank Risk-taking

Abhishek Srivastav, Jens Hagendorff
2015 Corporate governance: An International Review  
Research Findings/Insights: We highlight a number of key governance devices and how these shape bank risk-taking: the effectiveness of bank boards, the structure of CEO compensation, and the risk management  ...  systems and practices employed by banks.  ...  The authors are indebted to Chris Florackis (the Associate Editor) as well as to two anonymous referees for very helpful comments and suggestions. This article is protected by copyright.  ... 
doi:10.1111/corg.12133 fatcat:oe5daroh4bdczf5wirr5xpe3dm

Upper-echelon executive human capital and compensation: Generalist vs specialist skills

Sudip Datta, Mai Iskandar-Datta
2014 Strategic Management Journal  
Our results are robust to post-hiring years, firm sizes, board characteristics, and CFO's insider/outsider status.  ...  We contribute at the confluence of upper-echelon compensation, executive human capital, resource-based view, and assortative matching literatures.  ...  ACKNOWLEDGMENTS We are grateful to Constance Helfat (editor), Donald Hambrick (Penn State), and two anonymous reviewers for their insightful guidance and encouragement.  ... 
doi:10.1002/smj.2267 fatcat:nqyrcxrth5hhlfb3rkufymrc6y

CHANGE IN GOVERNANCE IN NON-PROFIT BOARD OF DIRECTORS AS A KEY TO EFFECTIVE PERFORMANCE

Nataliia Kostiuchenko
2019 Herald UNU. International Economic Relations And World Economy  
It provides an analysis of scientific publications concentrating on the question of a change in governance, analyzing the types of motivations, incentives and expertise of the future board members as factors  ...  It was revealed that expertise, experience and social relations are the most desired capabilities in NPO board members.  ...  It provides a review of non-profit literature by studying a change in governance, non-profit board members' incentives and expertise and how these factors influence organizational performance.  ... 
doi:10.32782/2413-9971/2019-28-31 fatcat:betrnqdouberxp3lauikrbb4pq

Are incentives without expertise sufficient? Evidence from fortune 500 firms

Emilie R. Feldman, Cynthia A. Montgomery
2013 Strategic Management Journal  
associated with firm value, an effect that becomes larger as the number of such directors on a board increases.  ...  Agency theory predicts that the right incentives will align agents' interests with those of principals.  ...  This has been demonstrated in the execution of corporate strategies (Westphal and Frederickson, 2001; Kroll et al., 2008; McDonald et al., 2008) , professional expertise (Agrawal and Knoeber, 2001) ,  ... 
doi:10.1002/smj.2211 fatcat:xbq3ltlvzjfsniiv4y6kganrt4

How Independent, Competent and Incentivized Should Non-executive Directors Be? An Empirical Investigation of Good Governance Codes

Alessandro Zattoni, Francesca Cuomo
2010 British Journal of Management  
governance scholars and board best practices.  ...  and incentives are not considered a governance issue to be regulated in detail; (iii) agency theory and the search for appropriate board demography tend to dominate the recommendations of governance literature  ...  Acknowledgements The authors gratefully acknowledge the helpful comments of Silke Machold, Stuart Farquhar, the editor, and three anonymous reviewers on earlier versions of the manuscript.  ... 
doi:10.1111/j.1467-8551.2009.00669.x fatcat:etih2xtfdrc67a6ifc7daigxju

CFO role and CFO compensation: An empirical analysis of their implications

Ariela Caglio, Andrea Dossi, Wim A. Van der Stede
2018 Journal of Accounting and Public Policy  
. | 3 | members of the senior executive team, are involved in strategy and operations as business partners of the CEO, and also often sit on the board. 2 At the same time, due to their specialized expertise  ...  We find that CFO financial expertise is positively associated with financial reporting quality, while a CFO's pay long-term incentive intensity and a CFO's incentive compensation proximity with the CEO  ...  Specifically, we find that CFO financial expertise is positively associated with financial reporting quality, while CFO pay's long-term incentive intensity and CFO pay's incentive compensation proximity  ... 
doi:10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2018.07.002 fatcat:2ti26qj7pvaz7ncm72zjbn4try
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