Filters








87 Hits in 5.2 sec

Better Strategyproof Mechanisms without Payments or Prior --- An Analytic Approach [article]

Yun Kuen Cheung
<span title="2017-04-12">2017</span> <i > arXiv </i> &nbsp; <span class="release-stage" >pre-print</span>
For the case with two items: (1) We provide a set of sufficient conditions for strategyproofness. (2) We use an analytic approach to derive strategyproof mechanisms which are more competitive than all  ...  We revisit the problem of designing strategyproof mechanisms for allocating divisible items among two agents who have linear utilities, where payments are disallowed and there is no prior information on  ...  In contrast to most of the prior work, we take on an analytic approach for the problem.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/1604.05243v2">arXiv:1604.05243v2</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/pxgbknxw5vdrlnm6tuepdn45lq">fatcat:pxgbknxw5vdrlnm6tuepdn45lq</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20200829122735/https://arxiv.org/pdf/1604.05243v2.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/de/19/de194f850154bb7f8e48a671b4118b8ad6e46619.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/1604.05243v2" title="arxiv.org access"> <button class="ui compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="file alternate outline icon"></i> arxiv.org </button> </a>

Efficiency and Budget Balance in General Quasi-linear Domains [article]

Swaprava Nath, Tuomas Sandholm
<span title="2017-03-07">2017</span> <i > arXiv </i> &nbsp; <span class="release-stage" >pre-print</span>
We also use an optimization-based approach---in the spirit of automated mechanism design---to provide a lower bound on the minimum achievable inefficiency of any randomized mechanism.  ...  We give a tight lower bound for an interesting class of strategyproof, budget-balanced, randomized mechanisms.  ...  We used an automated mechanism design approach for two agents and showed analytically that an optimal randomized mechanism offers further reduction in the inefficiency.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/1610.01443v4">arXiv:1610.01443v4</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/lmaylr4fune47pkinloducfibq">fatcat:lmaylr4fune47pkinloducfibq</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20191021152900/https://arxiv.org/pdf/1610.01443v4.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/1c/a9/1ca9345af85e294bab270852388b49805b3fbe33.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/1610.01443v4" title="arxiv.org access"> <button class="ui compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="file alternate outline icon"></i> arxiv.org </button> </a>

On Learnable Mechanism Design [chapter]

David C. Parkes
<span title="">2004</span> <i title="Springer New York"> Collectives and the Design of Complex Systems </i> &nbsp;
The VCG payments require that the mechanism computes an alternative solution without each player in attendance, while the VCG-WLU payments require that the mechanism computes an alternative solution with  ...  ¦ © 2 q oG 6 ¦ i h B ¦ u h 2G¦ v h 2G¦ v h p 2 W oG (SP) Strategyproofness is a useful property because agents can play their equilibrium strategy without game-theoretic modeling or counterspeculation  ...  In comparison, the theory of COIN suggests that a better choice than VCG payments for a mechanism in which agents are bounded-rational, and adjusting towards an equilibrium, is to set: is the ex ante average  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-8909-3_3">doi:10.1007/978-1-4419-8909-3_3</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/zvztbyd5v5as3m2277rgicxjjm">fatcat:zvztbyd5v5as3m2277rgicxjjm</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20170812054837/https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/4039782/Parkes_Learnable.pdf?sequence=1" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/9e/55/9e5567e4f3961172b7e4aaaabf383a0defffd341.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-8909-3_3"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="external alternate icon"></i> springer.com </button> </a>

Mix and match: A strategyproof mechanism for multi-hospital kidney exchange

Itai Ashlagi, Felix Fischer, Ian A. Kash, Ariel D. Procaccia
<span title="">2015</span> <i title="Elsevier BV"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/gjdubbzq4zd3bgbmuwnb2p7neq" style="color: black;">Games and Economic Behavior</a> </i> &nbsp;
We establish lower bounds $ We have benefited from valuable discussions with Moshe on the welfare loss of strategyproof mechanisms, both deterministic and randomized, and propose a randomized mechanism  ...  We study mechanisms for twoway exchanges that are strategyproof, i.e., make it a dominant strategy for hospitals to report all their incompatible pairs.  ...  In this paper we take a prior-free approach to the nonexistence of efficient and strategyproof mechanisms and relax efficiency rather than strategyproofness.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.05.008">doi:10.1016/j.geb.2013.05.008</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/uvhq5rchirfnbnhpiu47pyp6xq">fatcat:uvhq5rchirfnbnhpiu47pyp6xq</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20180721210006/http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/131324/7/131324.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/db/4b/db4be94493bf564c17f29625d4adf8b9ae6fd663.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.05.008"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="external alternate icon"></i> elsevier.com </button> </a>

PreferenceNet: Encoding Human Preferences in Auction Design with Deep Learning [article]

Neehar Peri, Michael J. Curry, Samuel Dooley, John P. Dickerson
<span title="2021-10-17">2021</span> <i > arXiv </i> &nbsp; <span class="release-stage" >pre-print</span>
In addition to maximizing revenue, auction mechanisms may also seek to encourage socially desirable constraints such as allocation fairness or diversity.  ...  In this paper, we propose PreferenceNet, an extension of existing neural-network-based auction mechanisms to encode constraints using (potentially human-provided) exemplars of desirable allocations.  ...  Due to the apparent difficulty of analytically designing strategyproof, revenue maximizing auctions, recent methods instead approximate optimal auctions using machine learning approaches [13, 10, 19,  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2106.03215v2">arXiv:2106.03215v2</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/seo5phdbkfa5hapevphwnh6nem">fatcat:seo5phdbkfa5hapevphwnh6nem</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211021175316/https://arxiv.org/pdf/2106.03215v2.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/db/21/db21cfe518d345eb124d378b5c7cb5fcc42d6498.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2106.03215v2" title="arxiv.org access"> <button class="ui compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="file alternate outline icon"></i> arxiv.org </button> </a>

Partial Strategyproofness: Relaxing Strategyproofness for the Random Assignment Problem [article]

Timo Mennle, Sven Seuken
<span title="2020-08-02">2020</span> <i > arXiv </i> &nbsp; <span class="release-stage" >pre-print</span>
We demonstrate that partial strategyproofness is axiomatically motivated and yields a parametric measure for "how strategyproof" an assignment mechanism is.  ...  We present partial strategyproofness, a new, relaxed notion of strategyproofness for studying the incentive properties of non-strategyproof assignment mechanisms.  ...  When the exact values of r and ε are not available, upper or lower bounds may present a useful second best (e.g., see (Abächerli, 2017) for an analytical lower bound on the degree of strategyproofness  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/1401.3675v6">arXiv:1401.3675v6</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/yrsrgpocfbhrdjckax26aonk4q">fatcat:yrsrgpocfbhrdjckax26aonk4q</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20200807174807/https://arxiv.org/pdf/1401.3675v6.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/1401.3675v6" title="arxiv.org access"> <button class="ui compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="file alternate outline icon"></i> arxiv.org </button> </a>

Self-correcting sampling-based dynamic multi-unit auctions

Florin Constantin, David C. Parkes
<span title="">2009</span> <i title="ACM Press"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/7ljisdx4yfhzbmhados4oxci6y" style="color: black;">Proceedings of the tenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce - EC &#39;09</a> </i> &nbsp;
But this mechanism requires an optimal (or ǫ-optimal) decision policy, which is not computationally feasible in this domain.  ...  In the absence of computational methods to compute optimal policies, or analytic characterizations of optimal polices, it seems necessary to adopt a heuristic approach.  ...  Conclusions We presented the first application of stochastic optimization to dynamic, incentive-compatible multi-unit auctions with patient bidders that demand multiple units of an item.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1145/1566374.1566387">doi:10.1145/1566374.1566387</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://dblp.org/rec/conf/sigecom/ConstantinP09.html">dblp:conf/sigecom/ConstantinP09</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/2oyf2gnmaraptpvz7adyqk4bvm">fatcat:2oyf2gnmaraptpvz7adyqk4bvm</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20170922072027/http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~sandholm/cs15-892F09/BonnDMD.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/4e/c4/4ec4c15ab9bf93323569a095dae324d56ad98b4d.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1145/1566374.1566387"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="external alternate icon"></i> acm.org </button> </a>

Display Advertising Auctions with Arbitrage

Ruggiero Cavallo, R. Preston Mcafee, Sergei Vassilvitskii
<span title="2015-06-23">2015</span> <i title="Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/zebu4reo3zdsfmr5epthx6xxpm" style="color: black;">ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation</a> </i> &nbsp;
But at the same time many publishers demand payment independent of click.  ...  This paper examines the incentives of advertisers and arbitragers and contributes an efficient mechanism with truthful bidding by the advertisers and truthful reporting of click predictions by arbitragers  ...  Therefore in this case truthfulness is not optimal and so the mechanism is not strategyproof.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1145/2668033">doi:10.1145/2668033</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/5kdo7rlruvad5d77m7jiloihta">fatcat:5kdo7rlruvad5d77m7jiloihta</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20170809015210/http://www.mcafee.cc/Papers/PDF/Arbitrage.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/4a/65/4a658ef8862cca7c4bee71385d3e10190627303f.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1145/2668033"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="external alternate icon"></i> acm.org </button> </a>

Long-term causal effects of economic mechanisms on agent incentives [article]

Panos Toulis, David C. Parkes
<span title="2014-09-18">2014</span> <i > arXiv </i> &nbsp; <span class="release-stage" >pre-print</span>
One objective in mechanism design is to design a strategyproof process so that no agent will have an incentive to misreport its type.  ...  However, typical analyses of the incentives properties of mechanisms operate under strong, usually untestable assumptions. Empirical, data-oriented approaches are, at best, under-developed.  ...  This appeals to the divergence between distributions over payments (or payoffs) in an incentive-aligned mechanism and distributions over payments (or payoffs) in another candidate design, with the view  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/1408.3783v2">arXiv:1408.3783v2</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/nhppm35qmvd37m7fy4wgc2b4ty">fatcat:nhppm35qmvd37m7fy4wgc2b4ty</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20200912162600/https://arxiv.org/pdf/1408.3783v2.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/5d/49/5d4940b28528320ff57823d579ff4337f54bda73.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/1408.3783v2" title="arxiv.org access"> <button class="ui compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="file alternate outline icon"></i> arxiv.org </button> </a>

Computing Bayes-Nash Equilibria in Combinatorial Auctions with Continuous Value and Action Spaces

Vitor Bosshard, Benedikt Bünz, Benjamin Lubin, Sven Seuken
<span title="">2017</span> <i title="International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/vfwwmrihanevtjbbkti2kc3nke" style="color: black;">Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence</a> </i> &nbsp;
However, finding Bayes-Nash equilibria (BNEs) of CAs analytically is tedious, and prior algorithmic work has only considered limited solution concepts (e.g. restricted action spaces).  ...  Our algorithm is the first to find an accurate BNE in a CA of this size.  ...  For these reasons, many CAs conducted in practice do not use VCG but other mechanisms, like coreselecting payment rules [Day and Milgrom, 2008] . However, these rules are not strategyproof.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2017/18">doi:10.24963/ijcai.2017/18</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://dblp.org/rec/conf/ijcai/BosshardBLS17.html">dblp:conf/ijcai/BosshardBLS17</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/o6qcpfhu6vepvge5rtpcz6t5ki">fatcat:o6qcpfhu6vepvge5rtpcz6t5ki</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20180720154936/https://www.ijcai.org/proceedings/2017/0018.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/3e/55/3e555e7d5de977dd0387f6abe15fccc584e20020.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2017/18"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="external alternate icon"></i> Publisher / doi.org </button> </a>

Using Repeated Games to Design Incentive-Based Routing Systems

M. Afergan
<span title="">2006</span> <i title="IEEE"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/2n2fyi4qgfa53mwrtarkk6ysnm" style="color: black;">Proceedings IEEE INFOCOM 2006. 25TH IEEE International Conference on Computer Communications</a> </i> &nbsp;
We view the exchange of pricing information at an interconnect as a repeated game between the relevant players. For example, multiple ISPs competing for the business of a CDN.  ...  In the repeated game, the subsequent periods provide the players with a means of obtaining a higher price without any explicit collusion, side-payments, or constructs of any sort. 4 While we consider  ...  , and thus the FPSS implementation, obtains its strategyproof property through a carefully selected payment to each node.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1109/infocom.2006.61">doi:10.1109/infocom.2006.61</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://dblp.org/rec/conf/infocom/Afergan06.html">dblp:conf/infocom/Afergan06</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/r2j3w5uoonghbm6ettauedssuy">fatcat:r2j3w5uoonghbm6ettauedssuy</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20100702112704/http://spanish.akamai.com:80/enes/dl/technical_publications/rrouting_infocom06.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/a5/4f/a54f3fdd502d489b4b19f724ccceab548ed586a6.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1109/infocom.2006.61"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="external alternate icon"></i> ieee.com </button> </a>

Better redistribution with inefficient allocation in multi-unit auctions

Mingyu Guo, Vincent Conitzer
<span title="">2014</span> <i title="Elsevier BV"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/weoplee4x5anpi62cco5v4higa" style="color: black;">Artificial Intelligence</a> </i> &nbsp;
For the problem of allocating one or more items among a group of competing agents, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is strategyproof and efficient.  ...  It turns out that by allocating inefficiently, more payment can sometimes be redistributed, so that the net effect is an increase in the sum of the agents' utilities.  ...  Given a strategy-proof allocation mechanism, we can use the following approach to attempt to increase the agents' utilities while maintaining strategyproofness: redistribute (pay) to each agent an amount  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2014.07.006">doi:10.1016/j.artint.2014.07.006</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/nur7q64wfbfxdken3utjq3h5cq">fatcat:nur7q64wfbfxdken3utjq3h5cq</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20170829205654/https://users.cs.duke.edu/~conitzer/betterAIJ14.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/c1/c1/c1c18cb4b297c7001af8d9cb48fddc73b7bf71cd.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2014.07.006"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="external alternate icon"></i> elsevier.com </button> </a>

Better redistribution with inefficient allocation in multi-unit auctions with unit demand

Mingyu Guo, Vincent Conitzer
<span title="">2008</span> <i title="ACM Press"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/7ljisdx4yfhzbmhados4oxci6y" style="color: black;">Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce - EC &#39;08</a> </i> &nbsp;
We show or conjecture that these mechanisms are optimal among various classes of mechanisms. * Conitzer is supported by an Alfred P. Sloan Research Fellowship.  ...  We propose an optimization model for simultaneously finding an allocation mechanism and a payment redistribution rule which together are optimal, given that the allocation mechanism is required to be either  ...  So in this sense, the VCG mechanism is not linear in the bids, but this is not the type of linearity that is used in the definition. the VCG mechanism, the payment from an agent is always less than or  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1145/1386790.1386825">doi:10.1145/1386790.1386825</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://dblp.org/rec/conf/sigecom/GuoC08.html">dblp:conf/sigecom/GuoC08</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/atam6h42rbbvbndt65bxu6c6c4">fatcat:atam6h42rbbvbndt65bxu6c6c4</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20120629153443/http://www.cs.duke.edu/~conitzer/inefficientEC08.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/6c/ee/6ceebb6f450911b1c138fc34e0c893d4b6a2147d.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1145/1386790.1386825"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="external alternate icon"></i> acm.org </button> </a>

Mechanism Design for Wireless Powered Spatial Crowdsourcing Networks

Yutao Jiao, Ping Wang, Dusit Niyato, Bin Lin, Dong In Kim
<span title="">2019</span> <i title="Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/fmebo7gm4vhg7ljs3x2bbrazk4" style="color: black;">IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology</a> </i> &nbsp;
To address this issue, we present three strategyproof deployment mechanisms for the spatial crowdsourcing platform to place a mobile base station, e.g., vehicle or robot, which is responsible for transferring  ...  For a more general case with only the historical location data available, we propose a deep learning based strategyproof deployment mechanism to maximize the spatial crowdsourcing platform's utility.  ...  Inspired by these works, we propose mobile BS deployment mechanisms for the SC system, which can achieve high utility while guaranteeing the strategyproofness without any money or reward transfer.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1109/tvt.2019.2952926">doi:10.1109/tvt.2019.2952926</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/ainlclut7ffj5hktbqxg5hs6fa">fatcat:ainlclut7ffj5hktbqxg5hs6fa</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20200331000852/https://arxiv.org/pdf/2003.12228v1.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download [not primary version]" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <span style="color: #f43e3e;">&#10033;</span> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1109/tvt.2019.2952926"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="external alternate icon"></i> ieee.com </button> </a>

Auctions, Bidding and Exchange Design [chapter]

Jayant Kalagnanam, David C. Parkes
<span title="">2004</span> <i title="Springer US"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/eu7t5yl3jbh5piucndzcckjubu" style="color: black;">International Series in Operations Research and Management Science</a> </i> &nbsp;
of direct mechanisms. ignorance of computational considerations The analytic approach ignores the strategic, valuation, communication, and implementation complexity of mechanisms.  ...  The standard approach to mechanism design first makes assumptions about the behavior of agents, and about the information available to agents, and then formulates the design problem as an analytic optimization  ...  Indeed, Al Roth, an economist involved in the design of real-world markets such as those used in the medical resident matching program has recently advocated an "economics as engineering" approach [Rot02  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-7953-5_5">doi:10.1007/978-1-4020-7953-5_5</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/g55sdree2zgpdd7j6ifjkfqz3q">fatcat:g55sdree2zgpdd7j6ifjkfqz3q</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20170815171351/https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/4045845/Kalagnanam_Auctions.pdf?sequence=2" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/a2/c4/a2c44d62d80d5717916e53a4c9bf42163f8e1fc3.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-7953-5_5"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="external alternate icon"></i> springer.com </button> </a>
&laquo; Previous Showing results 1 &mdash; 15 out of 87 results