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In this paper the epsilon-Berge-Zhukovskii equilibrium is introduced and characterized by using a generative relation. ... Berge equilibrium in the sense of Zhukovskii (Berge-Zhukovskii) is an alternate solution concept in non-cooperative game theory that formalizes cooperation in a noncooperative setting. ... Existence theorems and characterizations for BZ equilibrium can be found in [1, 20, 2, 18] and  . ...arXiv:1405.0355v1 fatcat:qmmhcpfrtrhu7idxwoyx4uaski
u p m ðs à ÀR m ; s R m Þ holds for each given m 2 M, any p m 2 P m and s R m 2 S R m . Characterization and Detection of -Berge-Zhukovskii Equilibria PLOS ONE | ... In this paper, the -Berge-Zhukovskii equilibrium is introduced and characterized by using a generative relation. ... Proposition 2 All -Berge-Zhukovskii equilibria are -Berge-Zhukovskii non-dominated strategies and all -Berge-Zhukovskii non-dominated strategies are -Berge-Zhukovskii equilibria: BZN ¼ BZ : Proof 2 First ...doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0131983 pmid:26177217 pmcid:PMC4503462 fatcat:pws73lkujfd7nmcpejavdgersu
Moreover, it is shown that every Berge equilibrium is also a unilateral support equilibrium and we provide an example in which there is no Berge equilibrium, while the set of unilateral support equilibria ... Finally, the relation between the set of unilateral support equilibria and the set of Nash equilibria is explored. ... This was first explored by Abolo and Kostreva (1996) , who studied the existence of Berge equilibria which are also Nash equilibria. ...doi:10.2139/ssrn.3150237 fatcat:wyidox7om5dxxcwxmy7o3guuwe
We define here more general transformations of games that lead to a correspondence with Berge and Nash equilibria and characterize all such transformations. ... Berge and Nash equilibria by permutation of the utility functions. ... Acknowledgments The authors would like to thank Tarik Tazdaït for his advice and support, Vladimir Mazalov, Vladislav Zhukovskii and Arkady Kryazhimskiy for their helpful comments and suggestions. ...doi:10.1142/s0219198914500091 fatcat:maiwlcbglfflfgnxcmznnpan4q
The review includes the games within the scope of the conceptions of Nash, Berge, threats and counter-threats equilibria. A notion of the vector guarantee of the game is presented. ... For these games the existence of a perfect equilibrium is proved and the set of equilibrium payoffs and strategies are characterised. ...
Finally, we discuss the relationship between Nash and Berge notions, analyse the rationale of individuals playing in a situational perspective, and establish an operational approach describing under which ... We then define non-cooperative Berge equilibrium, discuss what it means to play in this fashion, and analyse why individuals may choose to do so. ... However, this is not always the case, and therefore an interesting avenue of future research may be to define the classes of games for which Berge equilibrium is Paretooptimal and always Pareto-dominated ...doi:10.1017/s026626711400042x fatcat:7dpedu3rxvgebbarzmyhelhuaq
. • Minimal altruism is used to refine the set of Nash equilibria in normal form games. • Three independent existence proofs are provided for this new refinement concept. • An in-depth sensitivity analysis ... is conducted and expository examples are given. ... Walter Trockel for helpful comments and discussions. ...doi:10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2013.10.003 fatcat:dy25crl5drdhhkorwflg3kgocy