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Bayesian Mechanism Design with Efficiency, Privacy, and Approximate Truthfulness
[article]
2014
arXiv
pre-print
Preserved Fulltext
We give several classes of mechanisms (e.g., social welfare mechanisms and histogram mechanisms) that achieve both Bayesian differential privacy and persistent approximate truthfulness. ...
We also define a robust notion of approximate truthfulness for Bayesian mechanisms, which we call persistent approximate truthfulness. ...
Efficient Bayesian Mechanisms with Privacy and Persistent Approximate Truthfulness In this section, we present three classes of mechanisms that achieve both Bayesian differential privacy and persistent ...
arXiv:1411.6148v1
fatcat:hlfsiwoadraqfpgmvqwpacnllm
Bayesian Mechanism Design with Efficiency, Privacy, and Approximate Truthfulness
[chapter]
2012
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
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We give several classes of mechanisms (e.g., social welfare mechanisms and histogram mechanisms) that achieve both Bayesian differential privacy and persistent approximate truthfulness. ...
We also define a robust notion of approximate truthfulness for Bayesian mechanisms, which we call persistent approximate truthfulness. ...
Efficient Bayesian Mechanisms with Privacy and Persistent Approximate Truthfulness In this section, we present three classes of mechanisms that achieve both Bayesian differential privacy and persistent ...
doi:10.1007/978-3-642-35311-6_5
fatcat:ylagtiroifhrjgk2urhrgwlxum
Electronic Markets and Auctions (Dagstuhl Seminar 13461)
2014
Dagstuhl Reports
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Economics have been traditionally interested in markets in general and designing efficient markets mechanisms (such as auctions) in particular. ...
on algorithmic aspects of mechanism design. ...
We design and analyze deterministic truthful approximation mechanisms for multi-unit combinatorial auctions with only a constant number of distinct goods, each in arbitrary limited supply. ...
doi:10.4230/dagrep.3.11.58
dblp:journals/dagstuhl-reports/MansourMNV13
fatcat:yvkfyeeezrhhnhckygpqseqwx4
Mechanism Design in Large Games: Incentives and Privacy
2014
The American Economic Review
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Although our recommender mechanisms are designed to satisfy game-theoretic properties, our solution ends up satisfying a strong privacy property as well. ...
We study the problem of implementing equilibria of complete information games in settings of incomplete information, and address this problem using "recommender mechanisms." ...
truthful mechanisms. ...
doi:10.1257/aer.104.5.431
fatcat:kb6u2ozftvbmpjsdgimhguhope
Truthful Mechanisms for Agents that Value Privacy
[article]
2012
arXiv
pre-print
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We give three mechanisms that are truthful with respect to our modelling of privacy: for an election between two candidates, for a discrete version of the facility location problem, and for a general social ...
In these mechanisms, privacy is treated separately from the truthfulness; it is not incorporated in players' utility functions (and doing so has been shown to lead to non-truthfulness in some cases). ...
We also thank Moshe Babaioff and Dave Xiao for helpful discussions and comments. ...
arXiv:1111.5472v2
fatcat:ziuxjlfpxjchnd2fmfq46o7x24
Mechanism design in large games
2014
Proceedings of the 5th conference on Innovations in theoretical computer science - ITCS '14
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Although our recommender mechanisms are designed to satisfy game-theoretic properties, our solution ends up satisfying a strong privacy property as well. ...
We study the problem of implementing equilibria of complete information games in settings of incomplete information, and address this problem using "recommender mechanisms." ...
truthful mechanisms. ...
doi:10.1145/2554797.2554834
dblp:conf/innovations/KearnsPRU14
fatcat:ovhhjletqzethgvop7jge6k7ha
Differentially private and strategy-proof spectrum auction with approximate revenue maximization
2015
2015 IEEE Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM)
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In this paper, we study the design of privacy-preserving auction mechanisms: we first propose a differentially private auction mechanism which can achieve strategy-proofness and a near optimal expected ...
To tackle its high computational complexity, we also propose an approximate differentially PrivAte, Strategy-proof, and polynomially tractable Spectrum (PASS) auction mechanism that can achieve a suboptimal ...
Leung and Lui [21] studied differentially private and approximately truthful mechanisms in Bayesian setting. Nissim et al. ...
doi:10.1109/infocom.2015.7218463
dblp:conf/infocom/ZhuS15
fatcat:25lxa3j53vg3zmasaiz5aglfgq
Truthful mechanisms for agents that value privacy
2013
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce - EC '13
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We give three mechanisms that are truthful with respect to our modelling of privacy: for an election between two candidates, for a discrete version of the facility location problem, and for a general social ...
In these mechanisms, privacy is treated separately from the truthfulness; it is not incorporated in players' utility functions (and doing so has been shown to lead to non-truthfulness in some cases). ...
We also thank Moshe Babaioff, Kobbi Nissim, and Dave Xiao for helpful discussions and comments. ...
doi:10.1145/2492002.2482549
dblp:conf/sigecom/ChenCKMV13
fatcat:t77e6dl3zna6nc6u36eb3x53uu
Truthful Mechanisms for Agents That Value Privacy
2016
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
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A copy of this work was available on the public web and has been preserved in the Wayback Machine. The capture dates from 2020; you can also visit the original URL.
The file type is application/pdf.
We give three mechanisms that are truthful with respect to our modelling of privacy: for an election between two candidates, for a discrete version of the facility location problem, and for a general social ...
In these mechanisms, privacy is treated separately from the truthfulness; it is not incorporated in players' utility functions (and doing so has been shown to lead to non-truthfulness in some cases). ...
We also thank Moshe Babaioff, Kobbi Nissim, and Dave Xiao for helpful discussions and comments. ...
doi:10.1145/2892555
fatcat:3qk37kancbfkhgi7hkt3biy2ba
Truthful mechanisms for agents that value privacy
2013
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Preserved Fulltext
A copy of this work was available on the public web and has been preserved in the Wayback Machine. The capture dates from 2016; you can also visit the original URL.
The file type is application/pdf.
We give three mechanisms that are truthful with respect to our modelling of privacy: for an election between two candidates, for a discrete version of the facility location problem, and for a general social ...
In these mechanisms, privacy is treated separately from the truthfulness; it is not incorporated in players' utility functions (and doing so has been shown to lead to non-truthfulness in some cases). ...
We also thank Moshe Babaioff, Kobbi Nissim, and Dave Xiao for helpful discussions and comments. ...
doi:10.1145/2482540.2482549
fatcat:qruaeokn6zh5hnzveseldxxytm
Exact Inference with Approximate Computation for Differentially Private Data via Perturbations
[article]
2019
arXiv
pre-print
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A cleverly designed inferential procedure exploits the alignment between the statistical tradeoff of privacy versus efficiency, and the computational tradeoff of approximation versus exactness, so that ...
Differential privacy protects individuals' confidential information by subjecting data summaries to probabilistic perturbation mechanisms, carefully designed to minimize undue sacrifice of statistical ...
But the efficiency-privacy tradeoff as a statistical consideration is interweaved with the approximation-exactness tradeoff as a computational consideration, a sentiment that is shared by explorations ...
arXiv:1909.12237v2
fatcat:6gvm2i6iy5dzhkxssrie4d5jqm
The Exponential Mechanism for Social Welfare: Private, Truthful, and Nearly Optimal
[article]
2012
arXiv
pre-print
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To our knowledge, this is the first general tool for designing mechanisms that are both truthful and differentially private. ...
In this paper we show that for any mechanism design problem with the objective of maximizing social welfare, the exponential mechanism can be implemented as a truthful mechanism while still preserving ...
Acknowledgement The authors would like to thank Aaron Roth for many useful comments and helpful discussions. ...
arXiv:1204.1255v2
fatcat:qioqki7biventgjphppuygwkky
A Comprehensive Survey of Incentive Mechanism for Federated Learning
[article]
2021
arXiv
pre-print
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Thus, it is quite crucial to inspire more participants to contribute their valuable resources with some payments for federated learning. ...
Federated learning utilizes various resources provided by participants to collaboratively train a global model, which potentially address the data privacy issue of machine learning. ...
They also employ truth discovery algorithm and TEEs to boost the accuracy of prediction and protect the model privacy. ...
arXiv:2106.15406v1
fatcat:7v7adaw5wnbldhykma6mhgpnty
The Exponential Mechanism for Social Welfare: Private, Truthful, and Nearly Optimal
2012
2012 IEEE 53rd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Preserved Fulltext
A copy of this work was available on the public web and has been preserved in the Wayback Machine. The capture dates from 2012; you can also visit the original URL.
The file type is application/pdf.
To our knowledge, this is the first general tool for designing mechanisms that are both truthful and differentially private. ...
In this paper, we show that for any mechanism design problem, the exponential mechanism can be implemented as a truthful mechanism while still preserving differential privacy, if the objective is to maximize ...
Acknowledgement The authors would like to thank Aaron Roth for many useful comments and helpful discussions. ...
doi:10.1109/focs.2012.36
dblp:conf/focs/HuangK12
fatcat:dtz6q64hf5d6nog2e4tpgvco7y
Privacy-aware Sensing-quality based Budget Feasible Incentive Mechanism for Crowdsourcing Fingerprint Collection
2020
IEEE Access
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Hence, an auction-based incentive mechanism is proposed to achieve the truthfulness of users' costs, which is truthful, individually rational, computationally efficient and budget feasible. ...
Simulation results show that our proposed schemes outperform the baseline schemes and the experiment with real-world data is carried out to evaluate the performance of our proposed basic incentive mechanism ...
misreport their costs, and theoretically analyzed to prove its truthfulness, individual rationality, computational efficiency, and budget feasibility. ...
doi:10.1109/access.2020.2974909
fatcat:6b5bgwkrwbfjbl66pzfst2w4qa
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