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Bayesian Mechanism Design with Efficiency, Privacy, and Approximate Truthfulness [article]

Samantha Leung, Edward Lui
2014 arXiv   pre-print
We give several classes of mechanisms (e.g., social welfare mechanisms and histogram mechanisms) that achieve both Bayesian differential privacy and persistent approximate truthfulness.  ...  We also define a robust notion of approximate truthfulness for Bayesian mechanisms, which we call persistent approximate truthfulness.  ...  Efficient Bayesian Mechanisms with Privacy and Persistent Approximate Truthfulness In this section, we present three classes of mechanisms that achieve both Bayesian differential privacy and persistent  ... 
arXiv:1411.6148v1 fatcat:hlfsiwoadraqfpgmvqwpacnllm

Bayesian Mechanism Design with Efficiency, Privacy, and Approximate Truthfulness [chapter]

Samantha Leung, Edward Lui
2012 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
We give several classes of mechanisms (e.g., social welfare mechanisms and histogram mechanisms) that achieve both Bayesian differential privacy and persistent approximate truthfulness.  ...  We also define a robust notion of approximate truthfulness for Bayesian mechanisms, which we call persistent approximate truthfulness.  ...  Efficient Bayesian Mechanisms with Privacy and Persistent Approximate Truthfulness In this section, we present three classes of mechanisms that achieve both Bayesian differential privacy and persistent  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-642-35311-6_5 fatcat:ylagtiroifhrjgk2urhrgwlxum

Electronic Markets and Auctions (Dagstuhl Seminar 13461)

Yishay Mansour, Benny Moldovanu, Noam Nisan, Berthold Vöcking, Marc Herbstritt
2014 Dagstuhl Reports  
Economics have been traditionally interested in markets in general and designing efficient markets mechanisms (such as auctions) in particular.  ...  on algorithmic aspects of mechanism design.  ...  We design and analyze deterministic truthful approximation mechanisms for multi-unit combinatorial auctions with only a constant number of distinct goods, each in arbitrary limited supply.  ... 
doi:10.4230/dagrep.3.11.58 dblp:journals/dagstuhl-reports/MansourMNV13 fatcat:yvkfyeeezrhhnhckygpqseqwx4

Mechanism Design in Large Games: Incentives and Privacy

Michael Kearns, Mallesh M. Pai, Aaron Roth, Jonathan Ullman
2014 The American Economic Review  
Although our recommender mechanisms are designed to satisfy game-theoretic properties, our solution ends up satisfying a strong privacy property as well.  ...  We study the problem of implementing equilibria of complete information games in settings of incomplete information, and address this problem using "recommender mechanisms."  ...  truthful mechanisms.  ... 
doi:10.1257/aer.104.5.431 fatcat:kb6u2ozftvbmpjsdgimhguhope

Truthful Mechanisms for Agents that Value Privacy [article]

Yiling Chen, Stephen Chong, Ian A. Kash, Tal Moran, Salil Vadhan
2012 arXiv   pre-print
We give three mechanisms that are truthful with respect to our modelling of privacy: for an election between two candidates, for a discrete version of the facility location problem, and for a general social  ...  In these mechanisms, privacy is treated separately from the truthfulness; it is not incorporated in players' utility functions (and doing so has been shown to lead to non-truthfulness in some cases).  ...  We also thank Moshe Babaioff and Dave Xiao for helpful discussions and comments.  ... 
arXiv:1111.5472v2 fatcat:ziuxjlfpxjchnd2fmfq46o7x24

Mechanism design in large games

Michael Kearns, Mallesh Pai, Aaron Roth, Jonathan Ullman
2014 Proceedings of the 5th conference on Innovations in theoretical computer science - ITCS '14  
Although our recommender mechanisms are designed to satisfy game-theoretic properties, our solution ends up satisfying a strong privacy property as well.  ...  We study the problem of implementing equilibria of complete information games in settings of incomplete information, and address this problem using "recommender mechanisms."  ...  truthful mechanisms.  ... 
doi:10.1145/2554797.2554834 dblp:conf/innovations/KearnsPRU14 fatcat:ovhhjletqzethgvop7jge6k7ha

Differentially private and strategy-proof spectrum auction with approximate revenue maximization

Ruihao Zhu, Kang G. Shin
2015 2015 IEEE Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM)  
In this paper, we study the design of privacy-preserving auction mechanisms: we first propose a differentially private auction mechanism which can achieve strategy-proofness and a near optimal expected  ...  To tackle its high computational complexity, we also propose an approximate differentially PrivAte, Strategy-proof, and polynomially tractable Spectrum (PASS) auction mechanism that can achieve a suboptimal  ...  Leung and Lui [21] studied differentially private and approximately truthful mechanisms in Bayesian setting. Nissim et al.  ... 
doi:10.1109/infocom.2015.7218463 dblp:conf/infocom/ZhuS15 fatcat:25lxa3j53vg3zmasaiz5aglfgq

Truthful mechanisms for agents that value privacy

Yiling Chen, Stephen Chong, Ian A. Kash, Tal Moran, Salil Vadhan
2013 Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce - EC '13  
We give three mechanisms that are truthful with respect to our modelling of privacy: for an election between two candidates, for a discrete version of the facility location problem, and for a general social  ...  In these mechanisms, privacy is treated separately from the truthfulness; it is not incorporated in players' utility functions (and doing so has been shown to lead to non-truthfulness in some cases).  ...  We also thank Moshe Babaioff, Kobbi Nissim, and Dave Xiao for helpful discussions and comments.  ... 
doi:10.1145/2492002.2482549 dblp:conf/sigecom/ChenCKMV13 fatcat:t77e6dl3zna6nc6u36eb3x53uu

Truthful Mechanisms for Agents That Value Privacy

Yiling Chen, Stephen Chong, Ian A. Kash, Tal Moran, Salil Vadhan
2016 ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation  
We give three mechanisms that are truthful with respect to our modelling of privacy: for an election between two candidates, for a discrete version of the facility location problem, and for a general social  ...  In these mechanisms, privacy is treated separately from the truthfulness; it is not incorporated in players' utility functions (and doing so has been shown to lead to non-truthfulness in some cases).  ...  We also thank Moshe Babaioff, Kobbi Nissim, and Dave Xiao for helpful discussions and comments.  ... 
doi:10.1145/2892555 fatcat:3qk37kancbfkhgi7hkt3biy2ba

Truthful mechanisms for agents that value privacy

Yiling Chen, Stephen Chong, Ian A. Kash, Tal Moran, Salil Vadhan
2013 Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce  
We give three mechanisms that are truthful with respect to our modelling of privacy: for an election between two candidates, for a discrete version of the facility location problem, and for a general social  ...  In these mechanisms, privacy is treated separately from the truthfulness; it is not incorporated in players' utility functions (and doing so has been shown to lead to non-truthfulness in some cases).  ...  We also thank Moshe Babaioff, Kobbi Nissim, and Dave Xiao for helpful discussions and comments.  ... 
doi:10.1145/2482540.2482549 fatcat:qruaeokn6zh5hnzveseldxxytm

Exact Inference with Approximate Computation for Differentially Private Data via Perturbations [article]

Ruobin Gong
2019 arXiv   pre-print
A cleverly designed inferential procedure exploits the alignment between the statistical tradeoff of privacy versus efficiency, and the computational tradeoff of approximation versus exactness, so that  ...  Differential privacy protects individuals' confidential information by subjecting data summaries to probabilistic perturbation mechanisms, carefully designed to minimize undue sacrifice of statistical  ...  But the efficiency-privacy tradeoff as a statistical consideration is interweaved with the approximation-exactness tradeoff as a computational consideration, a sentiment that is shared by explorations  ... 
arXiv:1909.12237v2 fatcat:6gvm2i6iy5dzhkxssrie4d5jqm

The Exponential Mechanism for Social Welfare: Private, Truthful, and Nearly Optimal [article]

Zhiyi Huang, Sampath Kannan
2012 arXiv   pre-print
To our knowledge, this is the first general tool for designing mechanisms that are both truthful and differentially private.  ...  In this paper we show that for any mechanism design problem with the objective of maximizing social welfare, the exponential mechanism can be implemented as a truthful mechanism while still preserving  ...  Acknowledgement The authors would like to thank Aaron Roth for many useful comments and helpful discussions.  ... 
arXiv:1204.1255v2 fatcat:qioqki7biventgjphppuygwkky

A Comprehensive Survey of Incentive Mechanism for Federated Learning [article]

Rongfei Zeng, Chao Zeng, Xingwei Wang, Bo Li, Xiaowen Chu
2021 arXiv   pre-print
Thus, it is quite crucial to inspire more participants to contribute their valuable resources with some payments for federated learning.  ...  Federated learning utilizes various resources provided by participants to collaboratively train a global model, which potentially address the data privacy issue of machine learning.  ...  They also employ truth discovery algorithm and TEEs to boost the accuracy of prediction and protect the model privacy.  ... 
arXiv:2106.15406v1 fatcat:7v7adaw5wnbldhykma6mhgpnty

The Exponential Mechanism for Social Welfare: Private, Truthful, and Nearly Optimal

Zhiyi Huang, Sampath Kannan
2012 2012 IEEE 53rd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science  
To our knowledge, this is the first general tool for designing mechanisms that are both truthful and differentially private.  ...  In this paper, we show that for any mechanism design problem, the exponential mechanism can be implemented as a truthful mechanism while still preserving differential privacy, if the objective is to maximize  ...  Acknowledgement The authors would like to thank Aaron Roth for many useful comments and helpful discussions.  ... 
doi:10.1109/focs.2012.36 dblp:conf/focs/HuangK12 fatcat:dtz6q64hf5d6nog2e4tpgvco7y

Privacy-aware Sensing-quality based Budget Feasible Incentive Mechanism for Crowdsourcing Fingerprint Collection

Wei Li, Cheng Zhang, Yoshiaki Tanaka
2020 IEEE Access  
Hence, an auction-based incentive mechanism is proposed to achieve the truthfulness of users' costs, which is truthful, individually rational, computationally efficient and budget feasible.  ...  Simulation results show that our proposed schemes outperform the baseline schemes and the experiment with real-world data is carried out to evaluate the performance of our proposed basic incentive mechanism  ...  misreport their costs, and theoretically analyzed to prove its truthfulness, individual rationality, computational efficiency, and budget feasibility.  ... 
doi:10.1109/access.2020.2974909 fatcat:6b5bgwkrwbfjbl66pzfst2w4qa
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