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Approximation Algorithms for Budget-Constrained Auctions [chapter]

Rahul Garg, Vijay Kumar, Vinayaka Pandit
2001 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
We show that the problem of maximizing revenue is such a setting is NP-hard, and present a factor-1.62 approximation algorithm for it.  ...  Each bidder is permitted to bid on all the items of his choice and specifies his budget constraint to the auctioneer, who must select bids to maximize the revenue while ensuring that no budget constraints  ...  Theorem 3 . 3 Our algorithm is a polynomial time factor-1+ √ 5 2 approximation algorithm for the budget-constrained auction problem. Proof.  ... 
doi:10.1007/3-540-44666-4_14 fatcat:x2unxnta2rcs3ho4bmrztlmrby

Multi-Unit Bayesian Auction with Demand or Budget Constraints

Xiaotie Deng, Paul W. Goldberg, Bo Tang, Jinshan Zhang
2014 Computational intelligence  
We also find a 1/2 approximation for the case when the buyers are budget constrained.  ...  Buyers have additive valuations for multiple items. The application we have in mind is that items are positions in an ad auction, and an item's value corresponds to its click-through rate.  ...  Approximate Mechanism for Budget Constraints In this section, we will present a 2-approximate mechanism for the position auction with budget constrained buyers.  ... 
doi:10.1111/coin.12056 fatcat:vjcc42n2znht3bi3ot3hxipszy

Optimal Bidding in Repeated Wireless Spectrum Auctions with Budget Constraints [article]

Mehrdad Khaledi, Alhussein Abouzeid
2016 arXiv   pre-print
In this paper, we study the bidding problem of a budget constrained operator in repeated secondary spectrum auctions.  ...  Finally, we present a fully distributed learning-based bidding algorithm which relies only on local information.  ...  Our goal is to characterize an optimal bidding strategy for a budget constrained SU in repeated secondary spectrum auctions.  ... 
arXiv:1608.07357v1 fatcat:436pttvjebfabeokfhnfqkzzdy

Optimizing budget constrained spend in search advertising

Chinmay Karande, Aranyak Mehta, Ramakrishnan Srikant
2013 Proceedings of the sixth ACM international conference on Web search and data mining - WSDM '13  
We present a system and algorithms for optimizing such budget constrained spend.  ...  Search engine ad auctions typically have a significant fraction of advertisers who are budget constrained, i.e., if allowed to participate in every auction that they bid on, they would spend more than  ...  Acknowledgments: We thank Anshul Kothari for his contributions to the algorithms and system design.  ... 
doi:10.1145/2433396.2433483 dblp:conf/wsdm/KarandeMS13 fatcat:66rxvetibvfrjjplzgd746o42i

A Bridge between Liquid and Social Welfare in Combinatorial Auctions with Submodular Bidders [article]

Dimitris Fotakis, Kyriakos Lotidis, Chara Podimata
2018 arXiv   pre-print
We study incentive compatible mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions where the bidders have submodular (or XOS) valuations and are budget-constrained.  ...  Our objective is to maximize the liquid welfare, a notion of efficiency for budget-constrained bidders introduced by Dobzinski and Paes Leme (2014).  ...  Acknowledgments We are thankful to Yiling Chen for her most valuable feedback in an initial draft of this work, as well as the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions.  ... 
arXiv:1809.01803v3 fatcat:l465sgouhjaffgbkrx5dsehwze

Budget constrained bidding in keyword auctions and online knapsack problems

Yunhong Zhou, Deeparnab Chakrabarty, Rajan Lukose
2008 Proceeding of the 17th international conference on World Wide Web - WWW '08  
We consider the budget-constrained bidding optimization problem for sponsored search auctions, and model it as an online (multiple-choice) knapsack problem.  ...  This translates back to fully automatic bidding strategies maximizing either profit or revenue for the budget-constrained advertiser.  ...  [5] studied the auctioneer revenue maximization with budget-constrained bidders, using a trade-off function Ψ (compare it to our threshold function) to grant queries to bidders, and the technique they  ... 
doi:10.1145/1367497.1367747 dblp:conf/www/ZhouCL08 fatcat:ov24fofo4fgwzphxyvdbcaxx5a

Budget Constrained Bidding in Keyword Auctions and Online Knapsack Problems [chapter]

Yunhong Zhou, Deeparnab Chakrabarty, Rajan Lukose
2008 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
We consider the budget-constrained bidding optimization problem for sponsored search auctions, and model it as an online (multiple-choice) knapsack problem.  ...  This translates back to fully automatic bidding strategies maximizing either profit or revenue for the budget-constrained advertiser.  ...  [5] studied the auctioneer revenue maximization with budget-constrained bidders, using a trade-off function Ψ (compare it to our threshold function) to grant queries to bidders, and the technique they  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-540-92185-1_63 fatcat:ykx7fgdus5aode6dvaaltznxgy

Envy-Free Allocations for Budgeted Bidders [chapter]

David Kempe, Ahuva Mu'alem, Mahyar Salek
2009 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
Envy-free prices for allocations have been studied extensively; here, we focus on the impact of budgets: beyond their willingness to pay for items, bidders are also constrained by their ability to pay,  ...  We present two polynomial-time algorithms for this problem, one which finds maximal prices supporting the given allocation (if such prices exist), and another which finds minimal prices.  ...  Acknowledgments We would like to thank Itai Ashlagi, Liad Blumrosen, Ron Lavi, John Ledyard, Debasis Mishra and Noam Nisan for helpful discussions and comments.  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-642-10841-9_53 fatcat:ckafhrvrvzfwveqe4sxwonboja

Throttling Equilibria in Auction Markets [article]

Xi Chen, Christian Kroer, Rachitesh Kumar
2021 arXiv   pre-print
Throttling is a popular method of budget management for online ad auctions in which the platform modulates the participation probability of an advertiser in order to smoothly spend her budget across many  ...  In this work, we investigate the setting in which all of the advertisers simultaneously employ throttling to manage their budgets, and we do so for both first-price and second-price auctions.  ...  Due to the large volume of these auctions, many advertisers are budget constrained: if they are allowed to participate in all the auctions they are interested in, they would end up spending more than their  ... 
arXiv:2107.10923v1 fatcat:ovojzjqzl5cjlkpi37dtgfyeie

Joint optimization of bid and budget allocation in sponsored search

Weinan Zhang, Ying Zhang, Bin Gao, Yong Yu, Xiaojie Yuan, Tie-Yan Liu
2012 Proceedings of the 18th ACM SIGKDD international conference on Knowledge discovery and data mining - KDD '12  
In this paper, we propose a novel algorithm to automatically address this issue.  ...  In particular, we model the problem as a constrained optimization problem, which maximizes the expected advertiser revenue subject to the constraints of the total budget of the advertiser and the ranges  ...  This will constrain the overall effectiveness for the advertiser to utilize his/her budget.  ... 
doi:10.1145/2339530.2339716 dblp:conf/kdd/ZhangZGYYL12 fatcat:324e3qgjojcu3p3a2biy3n6dfa

Budget smoothing for internet ad auctions

Denis Charles, Deeparnab Chakrabarty, Max Chickering, Nikhil R. Devanur, Lei Wang
2013 Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce  
In Internet ad auctions, search engines often throttle budget constrained advertisers so as to spread their spends across the specified time period.  ...  We show that regret-free budget smoothing policies always exist, and in the case of single slot auctions we can give a polynomial time smoothing algorithm.  ...  We created two budget levels, which we call Generous and Constraining. The Constraining budgets are half as much as the Generous budgets.  ... 
doi:10.1145/2482540.2482583 fatcat:5hbr44qmw5aq3k6isil3k266pm

Efficiency Guarantees in Auctions with Budgets [chapter]

Shahar Dobzinski, Renato Paes Leme
2014 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
While it is impossible to design Pareto-efficient auctions for multi-unit auctions where players have decreasing marginal values, we give a deterministic O(log n)-approximation for the liquid welfare in  ...  Moreover, we show that no truthful algorithm can guarantee an approximation factor better than 4/3 with respect to the liquid welfare, and provide a truthful auction that attains this bound in a special  ...  More generally, are there truthful algorithms that provides a good approximation for combinatorial auctions?  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-662-43948-7_33 fatcat:muiokh3hw5btxg2zbuxt3axv54

Efficiency Guarantees in Auctions with Budgets [article]

Shahar Dobzinski, Renato Paes Leme
2013 arXiv   pre-print
While it is impossible to design Pareto-efficient auctions for multi-unit auctions where players have decreasing marginal values, we give a deterministic O( n)-approximation for the liquid welfare in this  ...  Moreover, we show that no truthful algorithm can guarantee an approximation factor better than 4/3 with respect to the liquid welfare, and provide a truthful auction that attains this bound in a special  ...  More generally, are there truthful algorithms that provides a good approximation for combinatorial auctions?  ... 
arXiv:1304.7048v1 fatcat:wvjrzjbznzdrzfyaeeceso4f7q

Revenue Maximization and Ex-Post Budget Constraints [article]

Constantinos Daskalakis, Nikhil R. Devanur, S. Matthew Weinberg
2016 arXiv   pre-print
Our main technical contribution is a computationally efficient 3-approximation algorithm for the algorithmic problem that results by an application of their framework to this problem.  ...  We consider the problem of a revenue-maximizing seller with m items for sale to n additive bidders with hard budget constraints, assuming that the seller has some prior distribution over bidder values  ...  This assumption fails when bidders are budget constrained. 1 Auctions with budget constrained bidders are commonplace, and prominent examples of this are ad-auctions and auctions for government licensing  ... 
arXiv:1605.02054v1 fatcat:vwgaon6wrzg3nhoihpu7qgxp4i

Optimal Price Discrimination for Randomized Mechanisms

Shao-Heng Ko, Kamesh Munagala
2022 Proceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation  
We finally show that our positive results do not extend to this more general setting, particularly when the budget can bind in the optimal auction, and when the seller's mechanism allows for all-pay auctions  ...  In effect, our results show settings where even though the optimal auction is randomized over a possibly large menu, there is a market segmentation such that for each segment, the optimal auction is a  ...  As mentioned before, this is the standard model for studying budget constrained auctions in economics literature [13, 23] , and allows for all-pay auctions.  ... 
doi:10.1145/3490486.3538335 fatcat:t5m2uh4zx5fwdbwku6oognihhm
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