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AN EMPIRICAL STATIONARY EQUILIBRIUM SEARCH MODEL OF THE HOUSING MARKET*
2012
International Economic Review
posting prices and bargaining, and the availability of an exogenous advertising technology that induces endogenous matching. ...
The model is rich and incorporates many of its unique features: buyers' and sellers' simultaneous search behavior, heterogeneity in their motivation to trade, transaction costs, a trading mechanism with ...
When a buyer picks an ad, she observes the home's features its posting price and a component of her buyer-home match value. ...
doi:10.1111/j.1468-2354.2011.00677.x
fatcat:arzdrevbbbhcfhf6pw4dpepc6e
Information Matters: A Theoretical Comparison of Some Cross-Border Trade Barriers
2016
Social Science Research Network
First, consider the optimal strategy for a buyer with home seller i, home price, p ih , home match value, ε i , and the expectation that all other sellers set a foreign price, p * f : Lemma 1. ...
In particular, we illustrate how our measure for cross-border trade, T , could be used as the basis for an estimation approach. ...
seller i, given home price, p ih , home match, ε i , and the expectation that all other sellers set a foreign price, p * f . ...
doi:10.2139/ssrn.2765462
fatcat:rybybqnt75ghtecmlvi3mkqalq
Information matters: A theoretical comparison of some cross-border trade barriers
2016
Information Economics and Policy
First, consider the optimal strategy for a buyer with home seller i, home price, p ih , home match value, ε i , and the expectation that all other sellers set a foreign price, p * f : Lemma 1. ...
In particular, we illustrate how our measure for cross-border trade, T , could be used as the basis for an estimation approach. ...
seller i, given home price, p ih , home match, ε i , and the expectation that all other sellers set a foreign price, p * f . ...
doi:10.1016/j.infoecopol.2016.10.002
fatcat:5lnspax5srfrxiqjhx4icl3poq
The Beveridge Curve in the Housing Market
2020
Regional Economic Development Research
model is able to take into account the main distinctive features of the housing market, thus generating an upward sloping Beveridge curve. ...
As opposed to a recent criticism (according to which a model à la Pissarides inherently generates a downward sloping Beveridge curve), this short theoretical paper shows that a baseline search-and-matching ...
In the search model developed by Ortego-Marti and Gabrovski [12] , when sellers post more vacancies in the market, they make it easier for buyers to find a home. ...
doi:10.37256/redr.11202071
fatcat:3k5uwf6zgfbvpe6ad6jsi2w2by
Why Do Sellers Hold Out in the Housing Market? An Option-Based Explanation
2012
Real estate economics (Print)
., a higher implied gain from a future sale, likely exceeds its immediate trade benefit and an owner is better off waiting for market conditions to improve. ...
In the residential housing market, home owners are reluctant to sell in a declining market. ...
I am grateful to Jonathan Berk, Thomas Davidoff, Robert Edelstein, Isil Erol, Dwight Jaffee, Dogan Tirtiroglu, Johan Walden and Nancy Wallace for helpful discussions. ...
doi:10.1111/j.1540-6229.2012.00345.x
fatcat:676ggmybvraxlnrwgoygae5fhy
THE HOME SELLING PROBLEM: THEORY AND EVIDENCE
2015
International Economic Review
The optimal selling strategy consists of an initial list price with subsequent weekly decisions on how much to adjust the list price until the home is sold or withdrawn from the market. ...
The solution also yields a sequence of reservation prices that determine whether the homeowner should accept bids from potential buyers who arrive stochastically over time with an expected arrival rate ...
Here a match is defined as a buyer who makes an offer on the home. ...
doi:10.1111/iere.12111
fatcat:l64n5jkq3rgavoeomgycjereby
The Home Selling Problem: Theory and Evidence
2013
Social Science Research Network
The optimal selling strategy consists of an initial list price with subsequent weekly decisions on how much to adjust the list price until the home is sold or withdrawn from the market. ...
The solution also yields a sequence of reservation prices that determine whether the homeowner should accept bids from potential buyers who arrive stochastically over time with an expected arrival rate ...
Here a match is defined as a buyer who makes an offer on the home. ...
doi:10.2139/ssrn.2209103
fatcat:hyhmovftjjguvauq7yqhucdmnq
Cream Skimming and Information Design in Matching Markets
2018
Social Science Research Network
The platform designs what buyer information the sellers observe before deciding to form a match. ...
Short-lived buyers arrive to a platform over time and randomly match with sellers. The sellers stay at the platform and sequentially decide whether to accept incoming requests. ...
(Optimality) For all y and every type-y seller, σ (·, y) is an optimal strategy given the request rate β A and an information policy λ. ...
doi:10.2139/ssrn.3178328
fatcat:rloi4z6b4rab5lio5tn66fm52e
An equilibrium analysis of trading across multiple double auction marketplaces using fictitious play
2016
Electronic Commerce Research and Applications
Then, for perfectly complementary goods, only buyers with high values bid in multiple marketplaces and buyers with low values enter no marketplaces. ...
We do this for different trading environments (isolated, single-home, multi-home and hybrid) and different types of goods (independent, substitutable and complementary). ...
They show that, in the case of one buyer and one seller, an equilibrium solution exists where the offers of the buyer and the seller are monotonic in the respective reservation prices (types). ...
doi:10.1016/j.elerap.2016.04.002
fatcat:cg3pa66opfatlocct4vk3x37pa
Platform Competition Under Asymmetric Information
2011
Social Science Research Network
We thank two anonymous referees for comments and suggestions that substantially improved the paper. We also thank ...
That is, for any buyer θ and seller c matched on the platform, the incumbent's optimal strategy is to specify a quantity below the quantity that maximizes the joint gains from trade of this particular ...
For example, the buyer can represent a user of a new operating system while the seller can represent a developer of an application for this new system. ...
doi:10.2139/ssrn.1758831
fatcat:vgsamsanozevrksqwegvgwhtlq
Platform Competition under Asymmetric Information
2013
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
We thank two anonymous referees for comments and suggestions that substantially improved the paper. We also thank ...
That is, for any buyer θ and seller c matched on the platform, the incumbent's optimal strategy is to specify a quantity below the quantity that maximizes the joint gains from trade of this particular ...
For example, the buyer can represent a user of a new operating system while the seller can represent a developer of an application for this new system. ...
doi:10.1257/mic.5.3.22
fatcat:jmgl5asdczeprkz3yuzqj7pani
Can Tightness in the Housing Market Help Predict Subsequent Home Price Appreciation? Evidence from the U.S. and the Netherlands
2012
Social Science Research Network
Individual records are used to construct a quarterly home price index, an index that measures seller's bargaining power, and (quality adjusted) home sale probabilities. ...
Theoretical insights from a stylized search-and-matching model illustrate that such indicators can be associated with subsequent home price appreciation. ...
Home Sells in Less than Two Weeks ...
doi:10.2139/ssrn.2139057
fatcat:qcsdnmluorguvenodrp7hni2xe
Information externalities and intermediaries in frictional search markets
2014
Canadian Journal of Economics
In frictional matching markets with heterogeneous buyers and sellers, sellers incur discrete showing costs to show goods to buyers who incur discrete inspection costs to assess the suitability of the goods ...
non-existence problem of the equilibrium with trade as r approaches zero are well known (e.g. ...
Each seller has one house for sale, and each buyer wants to buy one house. Buyers and sellers in the market are matched according to a random matching technology. ...
doi:10.1111/caje.12114
fatcat:t2duolfzlrcqjgorafyjzag3ne
On the Friedman Rule in Search Models with Divisible Money
2003
Contributions in Macroeconomics
Buyers cannot obtain the full return that an additional unit of money provides to the match, which makes the purchasing power of money inefficiently low in equilibrium. ...
Consequently, even though the Friedman rule maximizes the purchasing power of money, it fails to generate the first-best allocation of resources unless buyers have all the bargaining power. ...
There is an exogenous risk of a breakdown of the negotiation each time an o er has been rejected. This breakdown risk di ers for sellers and buyers. ...
doi:10.2202/1534-6005.1121
fatcat:mgpxpsrqijfthhjagcxvly3g3i
Intelligent clearinghouse: electronic marketplace with computer-mediated negotiation supports
1996
Proceedings of HICSS-29: 29th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences
The intelligent clearinghouse addresses dynamic markets where buyers and sellers are willing to change their utilities as market evolves or when more information become available to them. ...
We developed a prototype Virtual Property Agency to study the usefulness of such approach. ...
Pre-negotiation • Home Listing Home listing is an interface for home sellers to post listings. ...
doi:10.1109/hicss.1996.493193
dblp:conf/hicss/YenLB96
fatcat:yv344i7tnjcadl4drxfaqnid2q
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