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Page 3209 of Mathematical Reviews Vol. , Issue 85g [page]

1985 Mathematical Reviews  
We define an approximate factor structure and show that this weaker restriction is sufficient for Ross’s result.  ...  Moulin [same journal 47 (1979), no. 6, 1337-1351; MR 80i:90013] has shown that in general all finite extensive form games have a unique solution in this sense.  ... 

Optimal bounds for the no-show paradox via SAT solving

Felix Brandt, Christian Geist, Dominik Peters
2017 Mathematical Social Sciences  
Moreover, the SAT solver is able to construct a Condorcet-consistent voting rule that satisfies participation as well as a number of other desirable properties for up to 11 voters, proving the optimality  ...  of the above bound.  ...  Part of this work was conducted while Dominik Peters visited TUM, supported by the COST Action IC1205 on Computational Social Choice.  ... 
doi:10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.09.003 fatcat:vd7wnehlkrd73jikkoxudg7kfe

Optimal Bounds for the No-Show Paradox via SAT Solving [article]

Felix Brandt, Christian Geist, Dominik Peters
2016 arXiv   pre-print
Moreover, the SAT solver is able to construct a Condorcet-consistent voting rule that satisfies participation as well as a number of other desirable properties for up to 11 voters, proving the optimality  ...  of the above bound.  ...  Part of this work was conducted while Dominik Peters visited TUM, supported by the COST Action IC1205 on Computational Social Choice.  ... 
arXiv:1602.08063v1 fatcat:wei2xrwswvcb5gehxif7phk6be

Condorcet Consistency and the strong no show paradoxes

Laura Kasper, Hans Peters, Dries Vermeulen
2019 Mathematical Social Sciences  
We consider voting correspondences that are, besides Condorcet Consistent, immune against the two strong no show paradoxes.  ...  We establish the voting correspondence satisfying Condorcet Consistency and the Top Property, which is maximal in the following strong sense: it is the union of all smaller voting correspondences with  ...  See also Jimeno et al (2009 ), Brandt et al (2017 , and Núñez and Sanver (2017) for extensions and strengthenings of the results in Moulin (1988) on the (weak) no show paradox; and Felsenthal and  ... 
doi:10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2019.03.002 fatcat:dnjrynnqonhfvlqd6msj74gtpm

Scoring rules and social choice properties: some characterizations

Bonifacio Llamazares, Teresa Peña
2014 Theory and Decision  
Although some properties have been analyzed extensively, there are other properties that have not been studied for all scoring rules.  ...  In many voting systems, voters' preferences on a set of candidates are represented by linear orderings.  ...  Acknowledgements The authors are grateful to the coordinating editor and an anonymous referee for valuable suggestions and comments.  ... 
doi:10.1007/s11238-014-9429-0 fatcat:i3kn4vsi2jge5h3yvbcse3q3d4

The voter who wasn?t there: Referenda, representation and abstention

Paulo P. C�rte-Real, Paulo T. Pereira
2004 Social Choice and Welfare  
We analyze single binary-choice voting rules and identify the presence of the No-Show paradox in this simple setting, as a consequence of specific turnout or quorum conditions that are included in actual  ...  The main purpose of our paper is, however, to provide a tool for referendum design: rather than imposing arbitrary restrictions on the preference domain of non-voters, we recommend instead that a conscious  ...  Insert Fig 1 here The No-Show Paradox arises when an agent is better off abstaining than voting for his preferred choice.  ... 
doi:10.1007/s00355-003-0219-9 fatcat:ggfxrw6wgvhpbj6kwzechdyjii

One-way monotonicity as a form of strategy-proofness

M. Remzi Sanver, William S. Zwicker
2009 International Journal of Game Theory  
Suppose that a vote consists of a linear ranking of alternatives, and that in a certain profile some single pivotal voter v is able to change the outcome of an election from s alone to t alone, by changing  ...  One-way monotonicity holds for all sensible voting rules -those for which the election outcome is determined by the numerical value of a function called a sensible virtue.  ...  Moulin [1988a,b] shows that every Condorcet extension is subject to the no-show paradox.  ... 
doi:10.1007/s00182-009-0170-9 fatcat:4jf36wvj4ffjfbofdc3uxaxrsy

Page 1508 of Mathematical Reviews Vol. , Issue 2003B [page]

2003 Mathematical Reviews  
Finance 12 (2002), no. 1, 23-43. Summary: “Value at risk (VaR) is an industrial standard for monitoring financial risk in an investment portfolio.  ...  We essentially show that expiry date payments are the only payments that need perturbing (if at all). For previous periods, the P&L discovery map, is the one relevant for wealth transfers.  ... 

Revisiting the connection between the no-show paradox and monotonicity

Matías Núñez, M. Remzi Sanver
2017 Mathematical Social Sciences  
We investigate the relation between monotonicity and the no-show paradox in voting rules.  ...  Although the literature has established their logical independence, we show, by presenting logical dependency results, that the two conditions are closer than a general logical independency result would  ...  Moulin [1988, 1991] defines participation as the vanishing of the no-show paradox introduced by Fishburn and Brams [1983] : a social choice rule exhibits the no-show paradox when the vote casted by  ... 
doi:10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2017.02.003 fatcat:4lnwskecenetjjeryeei5qwt7e

Revisiting the Connection between the No-Show Paradox and Monotonicity

Matias Nuuez, M. Remzi Sanver
2016 Social Science Research Network  
We investigate the relation between monotonicity and the no-show paradox in voting rules.  ...  Although the literature has established their logical independence, we show, by presenting logical dependency results, that the two conditions are closer than a general logical independency result would  ...  Moulin [1988, 1991] defines participation as the vanishing of the no-show paradox introduced by Fishburn and Brams [1983] : a social choice rule exhibits the no-show paradox when the vote casted by  ... 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.2734224 fatcat:42yhau5tazf7bjskrdtw4wjbve

Publisher's note

2017 Mathematical Social Sciences  
We investigate the relation between monotonicity and the no-show paradox in voting rules.  ...  Although the literature has established their logical independence, we show, by presenting logical dependency results, that the two conditions are closer than a general logical independency result would  ...  Moulin [1988, 1991] defines participation as the vanishing of the no-show paradox introduced by Fishburn and Brams [1983] : a social choice rule exhibits the no-show paradox when the vote casted by  ... 
doi:10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2017.01.002 fatcat:dugvvpq2vjcnlo4gzxipqvdz3y

A Smoothed Impossibility Theorem on Condorcet Criterion and Participation [article]

Lirong Xia
2021 arXiv   pre-print
In 1988, Moulin proved an insightful and surprising impossibility theorem that reveals a fundamental incompatibility between two commonly-studied axioms of voting: no resolute voting rule (which outputs  ...  In this paper, we prove an extension of this impossibility theorem using smoothed analysis: for any fixed m≥ 4 and any voting rule r, under mild conditions, the smoothed likelihood for both Condorcet Criterion  ...  An immediate open question is to close the gap between the n −3 rate proved in the theorem and the best known rate of n −0.5 of existing voting rules. The problem appears challenging even under IC.  ... 
arXiv:2107.06435v1 fatcat:tbppniadf5aytkyeei2tfgtrwq

Strategic Abstention based on Preference Extensions: Positive Results and Computer-Generated Impossibilities

Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt, Christian Geist, Johannes Hofbauer
2019 The Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research  
A common flaw of some voting rules, known as the no-show paradox, is that agents may obtain a more preferred outcome by abstaining from an election.  ...  First, we show that, whenever there are at least five alternatives and seven agents, every Pareto-optimal majoritarian voting rule suffers from the no-show paradox with respect to Fishburn's extension.  ...  Acknowledgments The authors thank Christian Stricker and the anonymous reviewers for helpful comments.  ... 
doi:10.1613/jair.1.11876 fatcat:wijh53hfsfbz7cskzmyaau2eci

Page 1597 of Mathematical Reviews Vol. , Issue 2000b [page]

2000 Mathematical Reviews  
Part 2 begins with showing that natural constraints on electoral systems turn out to be inconsistent—these are so- called voting and electoral paradoxes.  ...  Moulin [Public Choice 35 (1980), no. 4, 437-455] to describe smaller classes of solutions.)  ... 

Welfare Maximization Entices Participation

Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt, Johannes Hofbauer
2019 Games and Economic Behavior  
This stands in contrast to Moulin's well-known no-show paradox (J. of Econ. Theory, 45, 53-64, 1988), which shows that no deterministic voting rule can satisfy both properties simultaneously.  ...  As a corollary, we obtain a characterization of an attractive randomized voting rule that satisfies Condorcet-consistency and entices participation.  ...  We are grateful to an anonymous editor and two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments.  ... 
doi:10.1016/j.geb.2019.02.008 fatcat:f7ltvwrj35dxzjh4mzcg7fta4a
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