Filters








26 Hits in 7.8 sec

An Asymptotically Optimal VCG Redistribution Mechanism for the Public Project Problem

Mingyu Guo
2019 Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence  
We study the classic public project problem, where a group of agents need to decide whether or not to build a non-excludable public project.  ...  We focus on efficient, strategy-proof, and weakly budget-balanced mechanisms (VCG redistribution mechanisms).  ...  In other words, we have identified an asymptotically optimal weakly budget-balanced mechanism for the public project problem, and the resulting optimal mechanism is efficient and strategy-proof.  ... 
doi:10.24963/ijcai.2019/45 dblp:conf/ijcai/Guo19 fatcat:fovfmvyvdfgdvhddff73c7q5ka

Redistribution of VCG Payments in Public Project Problems [chapter]

Victor Naroditskiy, Mingyu Guo, Lachlan Dufton, Maria Polukarov, Nicholas R. Jennings
2012 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
Redistribution of VCG payments has been mostly studied in the context of resource allocation. This paper focuses on another fundamental model-the public project problem.  ...  Furthermore, the upper bound is confirmed on the case with 3 agents, for which we derive an optimal redistribution function.  ...  Thus, if this bound on the ratio is tight, then an optimal mechanism for the public project problem will have a loss of social welfare approaching zero with additional agents.  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-642-35311-6_24 fatcat:bepqcckm7bbczad4ceuppuiudy

Competitive VCG Redistribution Mechanism for Public Project Problem [chapter]

Mingyu Guo
2016 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
In Naroditskiy et al. 2012, it was conjectured that competitive VCG redistribution mechanisms exist for the public project problem, and one competitive mechanism was proposed for the case of three agents  ...  This paper focuses on another fundamental model -the public project problem.  ...  [9] also studied redistribution for the public project problem.  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-319-44832-9_17 fatcat:2i4f5erk55b57onwtz7jgfl3qe

Concordance among holdouts

Scott Duke Kominers, E. Glen Weyl
2011 Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce - EC '11  
In these procedures, the prospective buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the group of sellers, and the sellers use an efficient collective choice mechanism to decide as a group whether to accept  ...  Each seller retains the option to receive, in the event of sale, her share of the offer (without making any additional payments) in exchange for not influencing the collective decision.  ...  For example, Mailath and Postelwaite characterized the optimal mechanism for public goods en route to their impossibility result (Theorem 1).18 Proposed approaches include secret purchases (Kelly, 2006  ... 
doi:10.1145/1993574.1993607 dblp:conf/sigecom/KominersW11 fatcat:u3nyb74b4fbtvdvb7vc44dplfq

Concordance Among Holdouts

Scott Duke Kominers, E. Glen Weyl
2011 Social Science Research Network  
In these procedures, the prospective buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the group of sellers, and the sellers use an efficient collective choice mechanism to decide as a group whether to accept  ...  Each seller retains the option to receive, in the event of sale, her share of the offer (without making any additional payments) in exchange for not influencing the collective decision.  ...  For example, Mailath and Postelwaite characterized the optimal mechanism for public goods en route to their impossibility result (Theorem 1).18 Proposed approaches include secret purchases (Kelly, 2006  ... 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.1591466 fatcat:3xa5knhfybafzlaaok3ceakxwe

Efficiency and Budget Balance [chapter]

Swaprava Nath, Tuomas Sandholm
2016 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
We also use an optimization-based approach-in the spirit of automated mechanism design-to provide a lower bound on the minimum achievable inefficiency of any randomized mechanism.  ...  We give a tight lower bound for an interesting class of strategyproof, budgetbalanced, randomized mechanisms.  ...  zero (in public goods settings, the VCG mechanisms leads to too much money being collected from the agents).  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-662-54110-4_26 fatcat:aig7bsqrb5etpjy6w4s4agteuu

Optimization-friendly generic mechanisms without money [article]

Mark Braverman
2021 arXiv   pre-print
The goal of this paper is to develop a generic framework for converting modern optimization algorithms into mechanisms where inputs come from self-interested agents.  ...  The framework is sufficiently general to be combined with any optimization algorithm that is based on local search. We outline an agenda for studying the algorithm's properties and its applications.  ...  I gratefully acknowledge the many comments that helped shape this paper from Itai Ashlagi, Antonio Molina Lovett, Aviad Rubinshtein, Matt Weinberg, and the detailed comments from Sahil Singla.  ... 
arXiv:2106.07752v1 fatcat:cit3kuf6jzhidphr7b5iepszwa

Efficiency and Budget Balance in General Quasi-linear Domains [article]

Swaprava Nath, Tuomas Sandholm
2017 arXiv   pre-print
We also use an optimization-based approach---in the spirit of automated mechanism design---to provide a lower bound on the minimum achievable inefficiency of any randomized mechanism.  ...  We give a tight lower bound for an interesting class of strategyproof, budget-balanced, randomized mechanisms.  ...  Hence, for deterministic mechanisms with unrestricted valuations, the bound on inefficiency with no budget imbalance (presented in Section 3) is asymptotically optimal for this joint optimization problem  ... 
arXiv:1610.01443v4 fatcat:lmaylr4fune47pkinloducfibq

Efficient sequential assignment with incomplete information

Alex Gershkov, Benny Moldovanu
2010 Games and Economic Behavior  
We also propose redistribution mechanisms that 1) implement e¢ cient allocation 2) satisfy individual rationality 3) never run a budget de...cit 4) may run a budget surplus that vanishes asymptotically  ...  These results yield upper/lower bounds on e¢ ciency for large classes of distributions of agents' characteristics or of distributions of inter-arrival times for which explicit solutions cannot be obtained  ...  See Puterman (2005) for solution approaches to such problems by an uniformization procedure, and for conditions guaranteeing that optimal policies are deterministic and Markovian. 15 e B( ) acts here  ... 
doi:10.1016/j.geb.2009.06.005 fatcat:57xhpailxjcbbkgr6co534cpn4

Economic Modeling in Networking: A Primer

Randall A. Berry
2011 Foundations and Trends® in Networking  
First, the economics of networks has a significant effect on the adoption and creation of network innovations, and second, and perhaps more importantly, engineered networks serve as the platform for many  ...  This monograph aims to provide engineering students who have a basic training in economic modeling and game theory an understanding of where and when game theoretic models are employed, the assumptions  ...  We would also like thank the editor-in-chief of this series, Tony Ephremides, and the publisher, James Finlay, for inviting us to prepare a manuscript on this topic, and for their encouragement (and patience  ... 
doi:10.1561/1300000011 fatcat:j43rw66c6jc5xf6uosswuvcwxu

Redistribution in Public Project Problems via Neural Networks [article]

Guanhua Wang, Wuli Zuo, Mingyu Guo
2022 pre-print
We focus on the VCG redistribution mechanisms for the classic public project problem, where a group of agents needs to decide whether or not to build a non-excludable public project.  ...  We show that for the public project problem, the previously proposed neural networks, which led to optimal/near-optimal mechanisms for multi-unit auctions with unit demand, perform abysmally for the public  ...  FORMAL MODEL DESCRIPTION For the public project problem, VCG redistribution mechanisms have the following form [21] : • Build the public project if and only if 𝑖 𝜃 𝑖 ≥ 1. • If the decision is to build  ... 
doi:10.1145/3486622.3493922 arXiv:2203.05778v1 fatcat:qslvqyw5gzduvkndj2nr4gztte

Foundations of mechanism design: A tutorial Part 2-Advanced concepts and results

Dinesh Garg, Y. Narahari, Sujit Gujar
2008 Sadhana (Bangalore)  
Mechanism design, an important tool in microeconomics, has recently found widespread applications in modeling and solving decentralized design problems in many branches of engineering, notably computer  ...  In the first part of this tutorial on mechanism design [1], we looked into the key notions and classical results in mechanism design theory.  ...  The second author would like to acknowledge the support he has received from the Homi Bhabha Fellowships Council, Mumbai and from the Office of Naval Research, Washington, D.C.  ... 
doi:10.1007/s12046-008-0009-2 fatcat:a76wijyqvnacvmpn5vmlrxbpcy

A Systematic Literature Review on Pricing Strategies in the Sharing Economy

Meijian Yang, Enjun Xia
2021 Sustainability  
As an emerging business model, the sharing economy has gained a large amount of academic attention; the pricing problem in the sharing economy has also been widely investigated.  ...  The proposed research directions and corresponding approaches can be references for future research.  ...  the pricing problem can be transformed into an optimization problem under constraints of limited parking lots, charging scheduling, and so on [40] [41] [42] . d.  ... 
doi:10.3390/su13179762 fatcat:ureklrl5ojhlbnzeh2ijmqnzca

Abstracts of Working Papers in Economics

2003 Abstracts of Working Papers in Economics  
We argue that this arises as an optimal political strategy in situations where politicians cannot commit to policies.  ...  An introductory section provides some background for the case by discussing the tension between intellectual property rights and antitrust law and by describing the role of patents in the semiconductor  ...  optimization problems.  ... 
doi:10.1017/s0951007900005994 fatcat:ggowvkgpdzcidl4ovpcwobr2ye

Abstracts of Working Papers in Economics

1998 Abstracts of Working Papers in Economics  
AB This paper assumes that the underlying asset prices are lognormally distributed, and derives necessary and sufficient conditions for the valuation of options using a Black-Scholes type methodology.  ...  Using data for 20 Western economies, Poland and Yugoslavia (1980-1990) we estimate a translog stochastic frontier and make inference about individual efficiencies.  ...  AB In this paper we establish necessary and sufficient conditions for the simultaneous existence of an optimal income tax mechanism and an optimal vector of public goods.  ... 
doi:10.1017/s0951007900003995 fatcat:siqha7fymfbdfnz2vr74tl4oai
« Previous Showing results 1 — 15 out of 26 results