1,336 Hits in 4.1 sec

Allocating Indivisible Items in Categorized Domains [article]

Erika Mackin, Lirong Xia
2015 arXiv   pre-print
We formulate a general class of allocation problems called categorized domain allocation problems (CDAPs), where indivisible items from multiple categories are allocated to agents without monetary transfer  ...  Then, we propose a natural extension of serial dictatorships called categorial sequential allocation mechanisms (CSAMs), which allocate the items in multiple rounds: in each round, the active agent chooses  ...  CATEGORIZED DOMAIN ALLOCATION PROBLEMS Definition 1 A categorized domain is composed of p ≥ 1 categories of indivisible items, denoted by {D 1 , . . . , D p }.  ... 
arXiv:1504.05932v1 fatcat:4424bj43qfb7nb3bcbektf3qea

Negotiation criteria for multiagent resource allocation

Karthik Iyer, Michael N. Huhns
2009 Knowledge engineering review (Print)  
Negotiation in a multiagent system is a topic of active interest for enabling the allocation of scarce resources among autonomous agents.  ...  This paper presents a discussion of the research on negotiation criteria, which puts in context the contributions to resource allocation from the fields of economics, mathematics, and multiagent systems  ...  Their detailed comments on each aspect of the paper helped us in presenting this material in a clear and succinct manner.  ... 
doi:10.1017/s0269888909000204 fatcat:wz64tq5l3vhyrl7mdmjjwgcsjm

Sequential Mechanisms for Multi-type Resource Allocation [article]

Sujoy Sikdar, Xiaoxi Guo, Haibin Wang, Lirong Xia, Yongzhi Cao
2021 arXiv   pre-print
Several resource allocation problems involve multiple types of resources, with a different agency being responsible for "locally" allocating the resources of each type, while a central planner wishes to  ...  provide a guarantee on the properties of the final allocation given agents' preferences.  ...  Sequential composition of voting rules in multi-issue domains. Erika Mackin and Lirong Xia. Allocating Indivisible Items in Categorized Domains.  ... 
arXiv:2101.12522v2 fatcat:gy74wyhkf5cf7h6yy4w44rp2jy

A Framework of Winner Determination Algorithms for Internet Auctions [chapter]

Juhnyoung Lee, Sang-goo Lee, Suekyung Lee
2003 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
This framework enables application programmers to specify buyer preferences, allocation rules and supplier offerings in a declarative manner, and solve the winner determination problems without having  ...  Auctions have become popular in conducting trade negotiations on the Internet.  ...  Several different dimensions of the goods in negotiation categorize these advanced auction formats [3] : • The number of different items in negotiation (e.g., a single or multiple line items), • The negotiable  ... 
doi:10.1007/3-540-45036-x_42 fatcat:edrrd6aowzc6beosbo5wpfliym

"And the Winner Is...": Dynamic Lotteries for Multi-group Fairness-Aware Recommendation [article]

Nasim Sonboli, Robin Burke, Nicholas Mattei, Farzad Eskandanian, Tian Gao
2020 arXiv   pre-print
Within this framework, we formulate lottery-based mechanisms for choosing between fairness concerns, and demonstrate their performance in two recommendation domains.  ...  In this paper, we explicitly represent the design decisions that enter into the trade-off between accuracy and fairness across multiply-defined and intersecting protected groups, supporting multiple fairness  ...  In allocation, the items within A are to be distributed or allocated to the set of agents in N .  ... 
arXiv:2009.02590v1 fatcat:corlq45g45fatewrthwuneacge

Deep Learning-powered Iterative Combinatorial Auctions [article]

Jakob Weissteiner, Sven Seuken
2019 arXiv   pre-print
Third, we present experimental evaluations in two medium-sized domains which show that even ICAs based on relatively small-sized DNNs lead to higher economic efficiency than ICAs based on kernelized SVRs  ...  Finally, we show that our DNN-powered ICA also scales well to very large CA domains.  ...  Introduction Combinatorial auctions (CAs) are used to allocate multiple heterogeneous items to bidders in domains where these items may be substitutes or complements.  ... 
arXiv:1907.05771v4 fatcat:phptdlvv7bhe5caljxitaji34m

Combinatorial Auctions via Machine Learning-based Preference Elicitation

Gianluca Brero, Benjamin Lubin, Sven Seuken
2018 Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence  
We validate PVM experimentally in several spectrum auction domains, and we show that it achieves high allocative efficiency even when only few values are elicited from the bidders.  ...  Combinatorial auctions (CAs) are used to allocate multiple items among bidders with complex valuations.  ...  Formal Model In a combinatorial auction (CA), there is a set of m indivisible items being auctioned off to n bidders.  ... 
doi:10.24963/ijcai.2018/18 dblp:conf/ijcai/BreroLS18 fatcat:hfyzp2ad7jcbbcxhwmrim5hbb4

Monotone-Value Neural Networks: Exploiting Preference Monotonicity in Combinatorial Assignment [article]

Jakob Weissteiner, Jakob Heiss, Julien Siems, Sven Seuken
2021 arXiv   pre-print
Because the bundle space grows exponentially in the number of items, preference elicitation is a key challenge in these domains, in particular because agents may view items as substitutes or complements  ...  We evaluate our MVNNs experimentally in spectrum auction domains.  ...  Introduction Many important economic problems involve the combinatorial assignment of multiple indivisible items to multiple agents.  ... 
arXiv:2109.15117v2 fatcat:fz44isf3uff4tpqngr7thl2aje

Deep Learning—Powered Iterative Combinatorial Auctions

Jakob Weissteiner, Sven Seuken
Third, we present experimental evaluations in two medium-sized domains which show that even ICAs based on relatively small-sized DNNs lead to higher economic efficiency than ICAs based on kernelized SVRs  ...  Finally, we show that our DNN-powered ICA also scales well to very large CA domains.  ...  Introduction Combinatorial auctions (CAs) are used to allocate multiple heterogeneous items to bidders in domains where these items may be substitutes or complements.  ... 
doi:10.1609/aaai.v34i02.5606 fatcat:t4xi6qmz7jdkrewvwn4r3pkzoi

On Fair Division under Heterogeneous Matroid Constraints [article]

Amitay Dror, Michal Feldman, Erel Segal-Halevi
2022 arXiv   pre-print
We study fair allocation of indivisible goods among additive agents with feasibility constraints.  ...  Previous algorithms for finding EF1 allocations are either restricted to agents with identical feasibility constraints, or allow free disposal of items.  ...  Below we focus on constraints in allocation of indivisible items. Capacity constraints.  ... 
arXiv:2010.07280v4 fatcat:zxbatsyl5rff3ioqlnlbm7gcd4

Walrasian Pricing in Multi-unit Auctions [article]

Simina Brânzei, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Peter Bro Miltersen, Yulong Zeng
2017 arXiv   pre-print
In this paper we design an optimal envy-free mechanism for multi-unit auctions with budgets.  ...  It is well known that Walrasian equilibria do not always exist in this model, however compelling relaxations such as (Walrasian) envy-free pricing do.  ...  Here we need to emphasize that in order for the mechanism to be well-defined, we need to assume that the domain D is discrete; in fact if the domain was R for example, the minimum envy-free price does  ... 
arXiv:1602.08719v6 fatcat:w3mkdxgwtbabbl5xemy34y5zkq

Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods: Improvement and Generalization [article]

Mohammad Ghodsi, MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi, Masoud Seddighin, Saeed Seddighin, Hadi Yami
2017 arXiv   pre-print
We study the problem of fair allocation for indivisible goods. We use the the maxmin share paradigm introduced by Budish as a measure for fairness.  ...  Finally, we present algorithms to find such allocations for additive, submodular, and XOS settings in polynomial time.  ...  Relation to other Fundamental Problems In this work, we study the allocation of indivisible items to maximize fairness.  ... 
arXiv:1704.00222v3 fatcat:wfadz42aebe6ji6lomgns3sfpy

Hybrid Consumption Paths in the Attribute Space: A Model and Application with Scanner Data

Sergi Jimenez-Martin, Antonio Ladron-de-Guevara
2008 Social Science Research Network  
can be explained in the model as particular linear cases.  ...  These results reveal the statistical superiority of the non-linear structure and confirm the gradual trend to seek variety as the level of familiarity with the purchased items increases.  ...  In section 5 an application of the model with indivisible goods and categorical attributes is presented.  ... 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.1107791 fatcat:kmt3slhczbcgxcglcoimyjsgby

Multi-Agent Resource Allocation (MARA) for modeling construction processes

Yang Liu, Yasser Mohamed
2008 2008 Winter Simulation Conference  
The decision to allocate these resources to entities usually has a significant impact on the schedule and cost of these operations.  ...  Multi-Agent Resource Allocation (MARA) is a field developing solutions to the problem of distributing a number of resources amongst multiple agents.  ...  Resources In the context of MARA, resources refer to the items waiting to be allocated. Resources can be categorized into two types: continuous and discrete.  ... 
doi:10.1109/wsc.2008.4736343 dblp:conf/wsc/LiuM08 fatcat:afapq75jzjfilc6hcyibxjestu

Fourier Analysis-based Iterative Combinatorial Auctions [article]

Jakob Weissteiner, Chris Wendler, Sven Seuken, Ben Lubin, Markus Püschel
2021 arXiv   pre-print
With this paper, we are the first to leverage Fourier analysis in CA design and lay the foundation for future work in this area.  ...  In this paper, we bring the power of Fourier analysis to the design of combinatorial auctions (CAs).  ...  Formal Model for ICAs We consider a CA with n bidders and m indivisible items. Let N = {1, . . . , n} and M = {1, . . . , m} denote the set of bidders and items, respectively.  ... 
arXiv:2009.10749v3 fatcat:b6mkv4l67vdf3mkuprk3z7anme
« Previous Showing results 1 — 15 out of 1,336 results