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Allocating Indivisible Goods to Strategic Agents: Pure Nash Equilibria and Fairness
[article]
2021
arXiv
pre-print
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We consider the problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible goods to a set of strategic agents with additive valuation functions. ...
Our main goal is to explore whether there exist mechanisms that have pure Nash equilibria for every instance and, at the same time, provide fairness guarantees for the allocations that correspond to these ...
In this work we studied the problem of fair allocating a set of indivisible goods, to a set of strategic agents. ...
arXiv:2109.08644v1
fatcat:fysxan22ajeavgqfmnvz4jiu6m
Nash Social Welfare Approximation for Strategic Agents
[article]
2017
arXiv
pre-print
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Moreover, all the Nash equilibria of the Trading Post mechanism are pure for all concave utilities and satisfy an important notion of fairness known as proportionality. ...
At the center of this literature lies the question of whether there exist fair mechanisms despite strategic behavior of the agents. ...
strategic behavior can result in the mechanism computing market equilibria with respect to preferences having li le to do with reality, leading to unfair allocations. ...
arXiv:1607.01569v3
fatcat:66b7bafrirflvjyikrtryq3ifu
Online Fair Division: analysing a Food Bank problem
[article]
2015
arXiv
pre-print
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We study an online model of fair division designed to capture features of a real world charity problem. ...
We consider two simple mechanisms for this model in which agents simply declare what items they like. ...
We will consider a subset of pure Nash equilibria by supposing a small utility cost to liking (or taking delivery of) an item. We call these simple pure Nash equilibria. ...
arXiv:1502.07571v2
fatcat:yhxn662khfbchnblxspgybqulu
Pure Nash Equilibria in Online Fair Division
2017
Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
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We consider a fair division setting in which items arrive one by one and are allocated to agents via two existing mechanisms: LIKE and BALANCED LIKE. ...
We then focus on pure Nash equilibria of these two mechanisms. Our second main result is that computing a pure Nash equilibrium is tractable for LIKE and intractable for BALANCED LIKE. ...
Toby Walsh acknowledges support from the European Research Council, as well as the Asian Office of Aerospace Research and Development. ...
doi:10.24963/ijcai.2017/7
dblp:conf/ijcai/AleksandrovW17
fatcat:fa33itl6rnbghpuiy47mm6xk4y
Fair Division (Dagstuhl Seminar 16232)
2016
Dagstuhl Reports
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This report documents the program and the outcomes of Dagstuhl Seminar 16232 "Fair Division". ...
The seminar was composed of technical sessions with regular talks, and discussion sessions distributed over the full week. ...
), and Simon William Mackenzie (UNSW -Sydney, AU) ...
doi:10.4230/dagrep.6.6.10
dblp:journals/dagstuhl-reports/AumannLP16
fatcat:gvfx4ec77rcupbxkzyq7vdoz74
Equilibria Under the Probabilistic Serial Rule
[article]
2015
arXiv
pre-print
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The probabilistic serial (PS) rule is a prominent randomized rule for assigning indivisible goods to agents. ...
Although it is well known for its good fairness and welfare properties, it is not strategyproof. In view of this, we address several fundamental questions regarding equilibria under PS. ...
We then prove that a pure Nash equilibrium (PNE) is guaranteed to exist for any number of agents and houses and any utilities. ...
arXiv:1502.04888v2
fatcat:anzbmwyiyfdebgs7qqv7uwg2vm
Equilibria in Sequential Allocation
[article]
2017
arXiv
pre-print
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Sequential allocation is a simple mechanism for sharing multiple indivisible items. We study strategic behavior in sequential allocation. ...
In particular, we consider Nash dynamics, as well as the computation and Pareto optimality of pure equilibria, and Stackelberg strategies. ...
(PS) random assignment mechanism for fair division of indivisible goods [1] . ...
arXiv:1705.09444v1
fatcat:uyjxrbzwxjaolou6xyat4fro34
Equilibria in Sequential Allocation
[chapter]
2017
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
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Sequential allocation is a simple mechanism for sharing multiple indivisible items. We study strategic behavior in sequential allocation. ...
In particular, we consider Nash dynamics, as well as the computation and Pareto optimality of pure equilibria, and Stackelberg strategies. ...
(PS) random assignment mechanism for fair division of indivisible goods [1] . ...
doi:10.1007/978-3-319-67504-6_19
fatcat:g3r7bvviwngsfky73yrizdvpnu
Algorithmic Fair Allocation of Indivisible Items: A Survey and New Questions
[article]
2022
arXiv
pre-print
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The theory of algorithmic fair allocation is within the center of multi-agent systems and economics in the last decade due to its industrial and social importance. ...
At a high level, the problem is to assign a set of items that are either goods or chores to a set of agents so that every agent is happy with what she obtains. ...
For example, Amanatidis et al. [2021b] proved that in the Round-Robin algorithm, the allocations induced by pure Nash equilibria are always EF1 (regarding the true values). ...
arXiv:2202.08713v1
fatcat:kovxtvlrkngt3fgamxbxkax2aa
Fairness in multi-agent systems
2008
Knowledge engineering review (Print)
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We have already briefly outlined that the main decisions humans make due to fairness are () to punish others that are perceived as behaving in an unfair way, and/or () to refrain from interacting with ...
Once we have established a clear view on human fairness and how it leads to better solutions for various problems, we may start looking at human-inspired computational fairness models. ...
.³ Here, we briefly discuss approaches aimed at allocating indivisable goods. ...
doi:10.1017/s026988890800132x
fatcat:vqzqexwtivcqdemodbay4aukki
Social Welfare in One-Sided Matching Mechanisms
[chapter]
2016
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
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We consider both ordinal mechanisms, where agents submit preference lists over the items, and cardinal mechanisms, where agents may submit numerical values for the items being allocated. ...
We study the Price of Anarchy of mechanisms for the wellknown problem of one-sided matching, or house allocation, with respect to the social welfare objective. ...
Since we are interested in mechanisms with good properties, it is natural to consider those mechanisms that have pure Nash equilibria. Proof. Assume n = k 2 for some k ∈ N. ...
doi:10.1007/978-3-319-46882-2_3
fatcat:fjm5kut5off5xcrqbau2sujy2m
Public Goods Games in Directed Networks
[article]
2021
arXiv
pre-print
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Public goods games in undirected networks are generally known to have pure Nash equilibria, which are easy to find. ...
In contrast, we prove that, in directed networks, a broad range of public goods games have intractable equilibrium problems: The existence of pure Nash equilibria is NP-hard to decide, and mixed Nash equilibria ...
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The authors would like to thank Xi Chen and two anonymous EC reviewers for their very helpful feedback.This research was supported by NSF grants CCF-1763970 AF and CCF-1910700 AF, and a ...
arXiv:2106.00718v2
fatcat:irkfj4iw6jaqlhxdypukukdavm
Social Welfare in One-Sided Matching Mechanisms
[article]
2016
arXiv
pre-print
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We consider both ordinal mechanisms, where agents submit preference lists over the items, and cardinal mechanisms, where agents may submit numerical values for the items being allocated. ...
We study the Price of Anarchy of mechanisms for the well-known problem of one-sided matching, or house allocation, with respect to the social welfare objective. ...
obtain good social welfare. ...
arXiv:1502.03849v2
fatcat:d2bjhm6gb5hvlbjxer2cmsrzbe
A Free and Fair Economy: A Game of Justice and Inclusion
[article]
2021
arXiv
pre-print
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We show that elementary principles of distributive justice guarantee that a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium exists in a finite economy where agents freely (and non-cooperatively) choose their inputs and ...
Keywords: Market justice; Social justice; Inclusion; Ethics; Discrimination; Self-enforcing contracts; Fairness in non-cooperative games; Pure strategy Nash equilibrium; Efficiency. ...
We can observe that in the free and fair economy described by Table 1 , there are two pure strategy Nash equilibria, which are (a 2 , b 2 ) and (a 2 , b 3 ). ...
arXiv:2107.12870v1
fatcat:6f4xw2nhcja2vfqqzwhahb4cim
Agent Reasoning in Negotiation
[chapter]
2010
Advances in Group Decision and Negotiation
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Such agent models promise to contribute to our understanding of human information processing in negotiation. Additionally, they could be used for decision support of human decision makers. ...
Most crucially, the computational research aims to have the models implemented in autonomous processes, called agents, that are able to incorporate realistic factors of negotiation (e.g. argumentation, ...
Maudet 2005) address a categorization problem of the agents utility functions under which the social optimal allocation of a set of indivisible resources (binary issues) is achievable. ...
doi:10.1007/978-90-481-9097-3_26
fatcat:y2ulmzex55c3vhcaw6ojwikzwa
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