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Social Choice Theory as a Foundation for Multiagent Systems [chapter]

Ulle Endriss
2014 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
In support of this position, I review examples from three strands of research in social choice theory: fair division, voting, and judgment aggregation.  ...  The other two frameworks, voting and fair division, deal with one specific type of information to be aggregated, namely information on the preferences of the agents.  ...  Judgment Aggregation Preferences are not the only types of structures we may wish to aggregate in a multiagent system.  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-319-11584-9_1 fatcat:p6ozq4udqfgtrivq7bc3gxths4

Democratic legitimacy and proceduralist social epistemology

Fabienne Peter
2007 Politics, Philosophy and Economics  
I shall argue that it should be preferred over "Rational Epistemic Proceduralism", the conception of legitimacy that underlies the standard interpretation of epistemic democracy.  ...  In this paper, I shall first provide a taxonomy of conceptions of legitimacy that can be identified in contemporary democratic theory. The taxonomy covers both aggregative and deliberative democracy.  ...  Since this outcome cannot be guaranteed, it is typically demanded that the design of the trial process respects normative constraints related to procedural fairness.  ... 
doi:10.1177/1470594x07081303 fatcat:mjadlye4w5bnji6aozapip7laa

Preference Reasoning [chapter]

Francesca Rossi
2005 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
Moreover, we also want to be able to deal with scenarios where preferences are expressed by several agents, and preference aggregation is therefore needed to find the optimal outcomes.  ...  In some cases it could be more natural to express preferences in quantitative terms, while in other situations it could be better to use qualitative statements.  ...  Even if we are only interested in the most preferred outcomes of the aggregated preferences, it is still impossible to be fair.  ... 
doi:10.1007/11564751_3 fatcat:zbouaoy5u5fpxob23rpqrqsaie

User Fairness in Recommender Systems

Jurek Leonhardt, Avishek Anand, Megha Khosla
2018 Companion of the The Web Conference 2018 on The Web Conference 2018 - WWW '18  
We introduce the notion of user fairness which has been overlooked in literature so far and propose measures to quantify it.  ...  Our experiments on two diversification algorithms show that an increase in aggregate diversity results in increased disparity among the users.  ...  Though individual and aggregate diversity can be interpreted as improving fairness for users and items respectively, they do not explore other aspects of fairness like differential treatment of two users  ... 
doi:10.1145/3184558.3186949 dblp:conf/www/LeonhardtAK18 fatcat:qssk72hnzjfnbhzm66ugvw7fbe

Impossible by design? Fairness, strategy, and Arrow's impossibility theorem

Christopher McComb, Kosa Goucher-Lambert, Jonathan Cagan
2017 Design Science  
Unfortunately, Arrow's impossibility theorem indicates that there is no method for aggregating group preferences that will always satisfy a small number of 'fair' conditions.  ...  Based on the results, methods that should be used to aggregate group preference within a design team in practice were identified and recommended.  ...  If a rule cannot be manipulated via strategic voting it is called strategy-proof.  ... 
doi:10.1017/dsj.2017.1 fatcat:6kn264bw4rgvpoyawdbkxlugqe

Fair Optimization -- Methodological Foundations of Fairness in Network Resource Allocation

Wlodzimierz Ogryczak
2014 2014 IEEE 38th International Computer Software and Applications Conference Workshops  
However, the fair optimization concepts can effectively generate various fair and efficient resource allocation schemes.  ...  Alternative models of fair optimization are discussed showing that they generate all the classical fair solution concepts as special cases.  ...  supported by the National Science Centre (Poland) under grant 2011/01/B/ST7/02967 "Integer programming models for joint optimization of link capacity assignment, transmission scheduling, and routing in fair  ... 
doi:10.1109/compsacw.2014.11 dblp:conf/compsac/Ogryczak14 fatcat:xb66impuxfbtvia55z4r33fide

Egalitarian Equivalent Allocations: A New Concept of Economic Equity

Elisha A. Pazner, David Schmeidler
1978 Quarterly Journal of Economics  
An allocation is said to be fair if nobody prefers anybody else's bundle over his own.  ...  Since the fairness criterion does not possess this property and since there is also the question of whether an equity concept based on envy can be morally acceptable in the first place (see Rawls, 1971  ...  In a two-person economy with convex preferences, if the egalitarian-reference-bundle lies on the ray through the aggregate endowment, the corresponding PEEEA is fair.  ... 
doi:10.2307/1883182 fatcat:25solbj2jfeldagz5gjn3fjauy

Some Representation and Computational Issues in Social Choice [chapter]

Jérôme Lang
2005 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
Section 3 focuses on preference aggregation, Section 4 on vote, and Section 5 on fair division.  ...  aggregated preferences explicitly.  ... 
doi:10.1007/11518655_3 fatcat:7yk4ziiuajg2hafakyqhq64xsi

Equity, envy, and efficiency

Hal R Varian
1974 Journal of Economic Theory  
bundle is preferred by the examining coalition, the allocation cannot be c ' -fair.It is clear that the notion of c' -fairness implies the notion of c-fairness, and one would suspect that it is a strictly  ...  ,x ) is c-fair but is not in the (equal division) r-core for some replication r. Then we wish to show that eventually x cannot be c-fair.  ... 
doi:10.1016/0022-0531(74)90075-1 fatcat:lu4mdodmrjgozp3jzg7x4e7wem

An Off-line Evaluation of Users' Ranking Metrics in Group Recommendation

Silvia Rossi, Francesco Cervone, Francesco Barile
2017 Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Agents and Artificial Intelligence  
Performance seems not to be affected by the choice of ranking technique, except for some particular cases.  ...  This could be due to the averaging effect of the evaluation with respect to the single users' ratings, so a deeper analysis or specific dataset are necessary.  ...  Moreover, the simple aggregation of the individual preferences cannot always lead to a good result. Groups can be dynamic, and so the behavior of the various members in different situations.  ... 
doi:10.5220/0006200702520259 dblp:conf/icaart/RossiCB17 fatcat:7nltnymdpnbrtnicq26stvh2o4

Page 868 of Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law Vol. 35, Issue 6 [page]

2010 Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law  
These simulations indicate the aggregate level of support for governmental provision of health insur- ance that would be predicted, if, for instance (shown in the second bar), all people who had judged  ...  Of course, we cannot assess the likelihood that such changes would actually occur, and we recognize that large shifts in fairness beliefs without accompanying changes in, for example, egalitarian values  ... 

Population health. More than the sum of the parts?

D. D Reidpath
2005 Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health  
This preference would be an expression of a normative view about how health ought to be distributed in a fair society.  ...  A PREFERENCE FOR ONE POPULATION A person coming from either of the two populations cannot choose how long their life will be.  ...  Policy implications If populations can become units of interest in and of themselves, separate from the individual, then interventions can be targeted at characteristics of populations.  ... 
doi:10.1136/jech.2005.036046 pmid:16166363 pmcid:PMC1732914 fatcat:jtlhe3o3oja6xfkdqbuoxcp53m

Pareto Versus Welfare

Robert C. Hockett
2008 Social Science Research Network  
preferences alone -a position I label "strict" welfarism -and conclude that all social evaluation should in consequence be formulated along strictly welfarist lines.  ...  Many normatively oriented economists, legal academics and other policy analysts appear to be "welfarist" and Paretian to at least moderate degree: They deem positive responsiveness to individual preferences  ...  be exclusively "welfarist," per the received jargon: It cannot be, that is to say, what I shall more precisely call "strictly preference-regarding." 13 It must also, in short, be what I shall call "standard-regarding  ... 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.1309699 fatcat:3rpmgstxu5atbj4eslbpm46i6m

Preference-based English reverse auctions

Marie-Jo Bellosta, Sylvie Kornman, Daniel Vanderpooten
2011 Artificial Intelligence  
This leaves room for interesting preference models to be implemented within English reverse auction mechanisms.  ...  These properties, as well as properties of non-dominance and fair competition defined for multiple criteria auctions, impose restrictions on the preference relation.  ...  to b' cannot be accepted.  ... 
doi:10.1016/j.artint.2010.11.015 fatcat:cdlmr6v4yveixow47f2fwaegjm

Intention-based fairness preferences in two-player contests

Magnus Hoffmann, Martin Kolmar
2013 Economics Letters  
Abstract We analyze equilibria of two-player contests where players have intention-based preferences.  ...  We find that players invest more effort compared to the case with selfish preferences and are even willing to exert effort when the monetary value of the prize converges to zero.  ...  The dotted graph represents V , the dashed graph represents aggregate effort with selfish, and the bold graph aggregate effort with fairness preferences.  ... 
doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2013.04.038 fatcat:lkb222sq2rdyba5h6hjqh6cqxq
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