Filters








28 Hits in 3.3 sec

ASSURE: RTL Locking Against an Untrusted Foundry [article]

Christian Pilato, Animesh Basak Chowdhury, Donatella Sciuto, Siddharth Garg, Ramesh Karri
2021 arXiv   pre-print
We propose ASSURE to protect hardware IP modules operating on the register-transfer level (RTL) description.  ...  (ii) it obfuscates the semantics of an IC before logic synthesis; (iii) it does not require modifications to EDA flows. We perform a cost and security assessment of ASSURE.  ...  ACKNOWLEDMENTS The authors would like to thank Benjamin Tan (NYU) and Jitendra Bhandari (NYU) for their support in implementing locking attacks.  ... 
arXiv:2010.05344v2 fatcat:rpowfmswkng53djes4tmp4bosa

Fortifying RTL Locking Against Oracle-Less (Untrusted Foundry) and Oracle-Guided Attacks

Nimisha Limaye, Animesh B. Chowdhury, Christian Pilato, Mohammed T. M. Nabeel, Ozgur Sinanoglu, Siddharth Garg, Ramesh Karri
2021 2021 58th ACM/IEEE Design Automation Conference (DAC)  
State-of-the-art RTL locking protects against the untrusted foundry assuming no access to working chip (oracle). However, it does not protect against oracle-based attacks.  ...  In this work, we propose to fortify RTL locking to protect against all untrusted entities in the supply chain, including foundry for oracle-less attacks, and test facility and end users for oracle-guided  ...  RTL IP Design RTL Locking Logic Synthesis Locked TABLE I: Comparison with prior work Attack Untrusted foundry Untrusted end user TAO [10] SMT [12] ASSURE [11] SAT [7] This work -ICs.  ... 
doi:10.1109/dac18074.2021.9586314 fatcat:lvudkil7gnf4dpshxoiafy2mbu

TAO: Techniques for Algorithm-Level Obfuscation during High-Level Synthesis

Christian Pilato, Francesco Regazzoni, Ramesh Karri, Siddharth Garg
2018 2018 55th ACM/ESDA/IEEE Design Automation Conference (DAC)  
Existing techniques to protect against IP theft aim to hide the IC's functionality, but focus on manipulating the HDL descriptions.  ...  Garg is supported in part by an NSF CAREER Award (A#: 1553419). S. Garg and R. Karri are both with the NYU Center for Cybersecurity (cyber.nyu.edu) and supported in part by Boeing Corp.  ...  Several techniques have been proposed to thwart reverse engineering of an IC at an untrusted foundry.  ... 
doi:10.1109/dac.2018.8465830 fatcat:l2lcr5yhorcfraxabwqbrd3clu

High-level design methods for hardware security

Christian Pilato, Donatella Sciuto, Benjamin Tan, Siddharth Garg, Ramesh Karri
2022 Proceedings of the 59th ACM/IEEE Design Automation Conference  
BACKGROUND 2.1 Threat Model In this work, we aim at protecting the hardware intellectual property (IP) against an untrusted foundry.  ...  HOW TO RAISE THE ABSTRACTION LEVEL FOR HARDWARE IP PROTECTION To protect the hardware IP against an untrusted foundry, we propose a framework that allows the designers to combine several system-level protection  ... 
doi:10.1145/3489517.3530635 fatcat:cmzq3qod5naejgmqdvsnsbsq6u

Hardware Trojans

K. Xiao, D. Forte, Y. Jin, R. Karri, S. Bhunia, M. Tehranipoor
2016 ACM Transactions on Design Automation of Electronic Systems  
., malicious modifications or inclusions made by untrusted third parties) pose major security concerns, especially for those integrated circuits (ICs) and systems used in critical applications and cyber  ...  An untrusted foundry performs (higher-cost) FEOL manufacturing, then ships wafers to a trusted foundry for (lower-cost) BEOL fabrication.  ...  I Comprehensive Attack Models Model Description 3PIP Vendor SoC Developer Foundry A Untrusted 3PIP vendor Untrusted Trusted Trusted B Untrusted foundry Trusted Trusted Untrusted C Untrusted  ... 
doi:10.1145/2906147 fatcat:24ffmzsrnbgkrkjq3ooztg4fbe

ATPG-Guided Fault Injection Attacks on Logic Locking [article]

Ayush Jain, Tanjidur Rahman, Ujjwal Guin
2020 arXiv   pre-print
The proposed attack is generic and can be extended to break any logic locked circuits.  ...  Over the past decade, different attacks have been proposed to break logic locking, simultaneously motivating researchers to develop more secure countermeasures.  ...  The attacker is assumed to be an untrusted foundry or a reverse engineer having access to the following: • The attacker has access to the locked netlist of a circuit.  ... 
arXiv:2007.10512v1 fatcat:qhkn25jacfamfiqdp4uda3abyu

Advances in Logic Locking: Past, Present, and Prospects [article]

Hadi Mardani Kamali, Kimia Zamiri Azar, Farimah Farahmandi, Mark M. Tehranipoor
2022 IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive  
Logic locking primarily helps the designer to protect the IPs against reverse engineering, IP piracy, overproduction, and unauthorized activation.  ...  metrics to assess the efficacy, impact of locking in different levels of abstraction, threat model definition, resiliency against physical attacks, tampering, and the application of machine learning.  ...  In [137] , RTL locking is combined with a scan-based logic locking to thwart threats induced by both untrusted foundry and malicious users.  ... 
dblp:journals/iacr/KamaliAFT22 fatcat:qnskge42g5emrlasquo7yugdv4

Chip-to-Chip Authentication Method Based on SRAM PUF and Public Key Cryptography

Ioannis Karageorgos, Mehmet M. Isgenc, Samuel Pagliarini, Larry Pileggi
2019 Journal of Hardware and Systems Security  
In today's globalized integrated circuit (IC) ecosystem, untrusted foundries are often procured to build critical systems since they offer state-of-the-art silicon with the best performance available.  ...  Split-Chip is a dual-IC approach that leverages the performance of an untrusted IC and combines it with the guaranties of a trusted IC.  ...  In particular, IARPA's TIC program was a catalyst for research into split manufacturing [7] , an approach where a single IC is built by both an untrusted and a trusted foundry.  ... 
doi:10.1007/s41635-019-00080-y fatcat:spa3vp3q2zhjpfnk3qirks2x24

Hardware Security in IoT Devices with Emphasis on Hardware Trojans

Simranjeet Sidhu, Bassam J. Mohd, Thaier Hayajneh
2019 Journal of Sensor and Actuator Networks  
A deeper understanding of hardware Trojans (HTs) and protection against them is of utmost importance right now as they are the prime threat to the hardware.  ...  These devices must be protected against sophisticated attacks, especially if the groundwork for the attacks is already laid in devices during design or manufacturing process, such as with HTs.  ...  ., transistors and low-metal layers, are fabricated in an untrusted foundry using an advanced process. The untrusted foundry then ships wafers to a trusted foundry.  ... 
doi:10.3390/jsan8030042 fatcat:zuzw6sf2hzgdfiz65p2joz2g6a

AFIA: ATPG-Guided Fault Injection Attack on Secure Logic Locking [article]

Yadi Zhong, Ujjwal Guin
2022 arXiv   pre-print
Logic locking has emerged as an obfuscation technique to protect outsourced chip designs, where the circuit netlist is locked and can only be functional once a secure key is programmed.  ...  However, Boolean Satisfiability-based attacks have shown to break logic locking, simultaneously motivating researchers to develop more secure countermeasures.  ...  An untrusted foundry can be treated as an adversary as logic locking is proposed to protect designs from untrusted manufacturing.  ... 
arXiv:2206.04754v1 fatcat:63rqfcyhrfcyfnz3f2bkoa25ey

System-level protection and hardware Trojan detection using weighted voting

Hany A.M. Amin, Yousra Alkabani, Gamal M.I. Selim
2014 Journal of Advanced Research  
The method works by gradually building trust in suspected IP cores by comparing the outputs of different untrusted implementations of the same IP core.  ...  Newgard and Hoffman [21] introduce a tightly cou- pled dual-processor lock-step configuration implemented inside an FPGA -an implementation of replication and voting at the macro-level.  ...  untrusted because an attacker may replace Trojan logic for original ones or inject a Trojan into chip silicon mask.  ... 
doi:10.1016/j.jare.2013.11.008 pmid:25685518 pmcid:PMC4294753 fatcat:bphwiutomvh57bbgbeh5sjhv6e

Introduction to Hardware Security

Yier Jin
2015 Electronics  
Besides the RTL code trust validation, the proof-carrying based information assurance schemes were later adapted to support gate level circuit netlists, an effort largely expanding the application scope  ...  Once the protected portion is loaded into an enclave its code/data is measured and is protected against all external software access.  ... 
doi:10.3390/electronics4040763 fatcat:njdmrvdogzc73mp4yun6rpnun4

A Survey and Perspective on Artificial Intelligence for Security-Aware Electronic Design Automation [article]

David Selasi Koblah, Rabin Yu Acharya, Daniel Capecci, Olivia P. Dizon-Paradis, Shahin Tajik, Fatemeh Ganji, Damon L. Woodard, Domenic Forte
2022 arXiv   pre-print
The latter is designed to verify that no BISA cell is tampered with by an untrusted foundry. The possible failure of the BIST circuitry allows inserted Trojans to be detected.  ...  The authors of [43] convert RTL code into control and data flow graph (CDFG) form, apply locking by superimposing an authentication FSM, and then return to RTL.  ... 
arXiv:2204.09579v2 fatcat:tebjzerhfvaepbwmka7ipiccxy

Vertical IP Protection of the Next-Generation Devices: Quo Vadis?

Shubham Rai, Siddharth Garg, Christian Pilato, Vladimir Herdt, Elmira Moussavi, Dominik Sisejkovic, Ramesh Karri, Rolf Drechsler, Farhad Merchant, Akash Kumar
2021 2021 Design, Automation & Test in Europe Conference & Exhibition (DATE)   unpublished
Particularly in the domain of Intellectual Property (IP) protection, there is an urgent need to devise security measures at all levels of abstraction so that we can be one step ahead of any kind of adversarial  ...  to device-level security measures, from discussing various attack methods such as reverse engineering and hardware Trojan insertions to proposing new-age protection measures such as multi-valued logic locking  ...  ASSURE provides semantic-aware IP protection against an untrusted foundry.  ... 
doi:10.23919/date51398.2021.9474132 fatcat:7o4hzo7fbveh7jehpebscb4liq

2021 Index IEEE Transactions on Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) Systems Vol. 29

2021 IEEE Transactions on Very Large Scale Integration (vlsi) Systems  
., +, TVLSI Jan. 2021 189-202 ASSURE: RTL Locking Against an Untrusted Foundry.  ...  Ramanathan, N., +, TVLSI Jan. 2021 24-37 Foundries ASSURE: RTL Locking Against an Untrusted Foundry.  ... 
doi:10.1109/tvlsi.2021.3136367 fatcat:fwqswbyzejgfhgbzywrvsf2qgi
« Previous Showing results 1 — 15 out of 28 results