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A Machine-Checked Formalization of the Generic Model and the Random Oracle Model [chapter]

Gilles Barthe, Jan Cederquist, Sabrina Tarento
2004 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
Using the proof assistant Coq, we provide a machine-checked account of the Generic Model and the Random Oracle Model.  ...  Such a view is permitted by the Generic Model and the Random Oracle Model which provide non-standard computational models in which one may reason about the computational cost of breaking a cryptographic  ...  We are grateful to the anonymous referees for their constructive and detailed comments, and to Guillaume Dufay for his help and comments on an earlier version of the paper.  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-540-25984-8_29 fatcat:gypsqwsobrcxrdvbzv3m6gewjy

A Machine-Checked Formalization of the Random Oracle Model [chapter]

Gilles Barthe, Sabrina Tarento
2006 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
Using the proof assistant Coq, we provide a machine-checked account of the Generic Model and the Random Oracle Model.  ...  Such a view is permitted by non-standard computational models such as the Generic Model and the Random Oracle Model.  ...  Acknowledgments We are grateful to the anonymous referees for their constructive and detailed comments.  ... 
doi:10.1007/11617990_3 fatcat:6ujuzfhbhbfrnjouxkuxy2gd5i

Formal Security of an Identity-Based Proxy Signature Scheme in the Random Oracle Model

Mohammad Beheshti-Atashgah, Mahmoud Gardeshi, Majid Bayat
2012 International Journal of Machine Learning and Computing  
s and show that this scheme is secure in the random oracle model. We show that their scheme's security can be reduced to the hardness of CDHP.  ...  Index Terms-ID-based proxy signature scheme, provable security, random oracle model, pairing.  ...  Without loss of generality, we assume that for any , queries ( ) before querying (•) , (•) , (•) and (•) . Our algorithm ℬ takes a random tuple ( , , ) , where is a random generator of .  ... 
doi:10.7763/ijmlc.2012.v2.134 fatcat:3l3wzxbrefbxzop7ivikqtxqya

Random testing of formal software models and induced coverage

David Owen, Dejan Desovski, Bojan Cukic
2006 Proceedings of the 1st international workshop on Random testing - RT '06  
This paper presents a methodology for random testing of software models.  ...  Random testing tools can be used very effectively early in the modeling process, e.g., while writing formal requirements specification for a given system.  ...  Any opinions, findings and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the sponsors.  ... 
doi:10.1145/1145735.1145739 dblp:conf/issta/OwenDC06 fatcat:oqonthzdlbhl5pqpfxwbc6ty2m

Positive Results and Techniques for Obfuscation [chapter]

Benjamin Lynn, Manoj Prabhakaran, Amit Sahai
2004 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
We focus on the goal of access control, and give several provable obfuscations for complex access control functionalities, in the random oracle model.  ...  We focus on the goal of access control, and give several provable obfuscations for complex access control functionalities, in the random oracle model.  ...  Acknowledgments We thank Dan Boneh for many useful discussions, and collaboration in early parts of this work. We also thank the anonymous referees for detailed comments on the presentation.  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-540-24676-3_2 fatcat:wlnxle5ojnfixgkdnhttrdtccy

Completing the Picture: Soundness of Formal Encryption in the Presence of Active Adversaries [chapter]

Romain Janvier, Yassine Lakhnech, Laurent Mazaré
2005 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
This work can be applied to check protocols in the computational model by using automatic verification tools in the formal model.  ...  In this paper, we extend previous results relating the Dolev-Yao model and the computational model. We add the possibility to exchange keys and consider cryptographic primitives such as signature.  ...  Acknowledgments This work has been partially supported by the RNTL project PROUVE-03V360 and the ACI project ROSSIG-NOL  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-540-31987-0_13 fatcat:qwo4enitp5e5nlpg5vziokb37e

Random-Oracle Uninstantiability from Indistinguishability Obfuscation [chapter]

Christina Brzuska, Pooya Farshim, Arno Mittelbach
2015 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
Assuming the existence of indistinguishability obfuscation (iO), we show that a number of prominent transformations in the random-oracle model are uninstantiable in the standard model.  ...  Our results call for a re-assessment of scheme design in the random-oracle model and highlight the need for new transforms that do not suffer from iO-based attacks.  ...  Acknowledgments Part of this work was done while Christina Brzuska was a post-doctoral researcher at Tel Aviv University and supported by the Israel Science Foundation (grant 1076/11 and 1155/11), the  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-662-46497-7_17 fatcat:x4kztrpkyrgm7clzws2z26oic4

Machine-Checked Proofs for Electronic Voting: Privacy and Verifiability for Belenios

Veronique Cortier, Constantin Catalin Dragan, Francois Dupressoir, Bogdan Warinschi
2018 2018 IEEE 31st Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF)  
Together, our results yield the first machine-checked analysis of both ballot privacy and verifiability properties for a deployed electronic voting protocol.  ...  We present a machine-checked security analysis of Belenios -a deployed voting protocol used already in more than 200 elections.  ...  The authors wish to thank the rest of the EasyCrypt development team, with particular thanks to Benjamin Grégoire and Pierre-Yves Strub, for their continued support of the tool.  ... 
doi:10.1109/csf.2018.00029 dblp:conf/csfw/CortierDDW18 fatcat:yca5itbsk5conofo547t7nghxy

Machine-Checked Proofs for Cryptographic Standards

José Bacelar Almeida, Pierre-Yves Strub, Cécile Baritel-Ruet, Manuel Barbosa, Gilles Barthe, François Dupressoir, Benjamin Grégoire, Vincent Laporte, Tiago Oliveira, Alley Stoughton
2019 Proceedings of the 2019 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security - CCS '19  
The proofs include new EasyCrypt libraries of independent interest for programmable random oracles and modular indifferentiability proofs.  ...  Concretely, our mechanized proofs show that: 1) the SHA-3 hash function is indifferentiable from a random oracle, and thus is resistant against collision, first and second preimage attacks; 2) the SHA-  ...  ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This work was supported by the ANR Scrypt project, grant number ANR-18-CE25-0014. This work was supported by the ANR TECAP project, grant number ANR-17-CE39-0004-01.  ... 
doi:10.1145/3319535.3363211 dblp:conf/ccs/AlmeidaBBBDGL0S19 fatcat:ywk5fizlmrcoti6g3uhph7s7h4

Model Learning: A Survey on Foundation, Tools and Applications [article]

Shahbaz Ali and Hailong Sun and Yongwang Zhao
2018 arXiv   pre-print
Formal models form the basis and are prerequisite for the application of these techniques.  ...  Model-based testing and formal verification techniques can be employed to enhance the reliability of software systems.  ...  Markus Frohme TU Dortmund for valuable discussions and generous sup-  ... 
arXiv:1901.01910v1 fatcat:ttfnf3elxfhjvdvtid5tzsmfbm

The random oracle methodology, revisited

Ran Canetti, Oded Goldreich, Shai Halevi
2004 Journal of the ACM  
We take a critical look at the relationship between the security of cryptographic schemes in the Random Oracle Model, and the security of the schemes that result from implementing the random oracle by  ...  The main result of this paper is a negative one: There exist signature and encryption schemes that are secure in the Random Oracle Model, but for which any implementation of the random oracle results in  ...  We thank Clemens Holenstein for uncovering a flaw in an earlier version of the proof of Proposition 5.5.  ... 
doi:10.1145/1008731.1008734 fatcat:i72j7bjkfzcahcytw7bwqqrd3a

Random Oracles with(out) Programmability [chapter]

Marc Fischlin, Anja Lehmann, Thomas Ristenpart, Thomas Shrimpton, Martijn Stam, Stefano Tessaro
2010 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
This paper investigates the Random Oracle Model (ROM) feature known as programmability, which allows security reductions in the ROM to dynamically choose the range points of an ideal hash function.  ...  Our negative results use a new concrete-security variant of Hsiao and Reyzin's two-oracle separation technique.  ...  Reduction-Centric Models In this section, we first formalize at an abstract level the general concept of a black-box reduction in the random oracle model.  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-642-17373-8_18 fatcat:yf6p7zxvqncqhkmcv7xiqhdjtq

Machine-Checked Security Proofs of Cryptographic Signature Schemes [chapter]

Sabrina Tarento
2005 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
Using the machine-checked account of the Generic Model and the Random Oracle Model formalized in Coq, we prove the safety of cryptosystems that depend on a cyclic group (like ElGamal cryptosystem), against  ...  A model that does not require the perfect cryptography assumption is the generic model and the random oracle model.  ...  Acknowledgments I am grateful to Gilles Barthe, for his constructive and detailed advices and to the anonymous referees for their useful comments.  ... 
doi:10.1007/11555827_9 fatcat:53qgs57tcfftleyiiyu3w7ij7q

Sound Computational Interpretation of Formal Encryption with Composed Keys [chapter]

Peeter Laud, Ricardo Corin
2004 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
The formal and computational views of cryptography have been related by the seminal work of Abadi and Rogaway.  ...  In this paper we consider an extension of the formal model presented by Abadi and Rogaway, in which it is allowed to use composed keys in formal encryption.  ...  We would like to thank Sandro Etalle and the anonymous reviewers for useful comments.  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-540-24691-6_5 fatcat:kfbtvmzizrgvjclxpqau4y2vn4

Non Observability in the Random Oracle Model [chapter]

Prabhanjan Ananth, Raghav Bhaskar
2013 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
The Random Oracle Model, introduced by Bellare and Rogaway, provides a method to heuristically argue about the security of cryptographic primitives and protocols.  ...  as an artificial artefact of the Random Oracle Model.  ...  For the two executions of the adversary, R 1 generates machines M 1 and M 2 that it will send to the two instances of the random oracle. Execution of the adversary .  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-642-41227-1_5 fatcat:poayfxplnjbgxbhwxrglrsrz7a
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