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A Case Study on Covert Channel Establishment via Software Caches in High-Assurance Computing Systems [article]

Wolfgang Schmidt, Michael Hanspach, Jörg Keller
2015 arXiv   pre-print
In this case study, we investigate the possibility of covert channel establishment via software caches in the context of a framework for component-based operating systems.  ...  Covert channels can be utilized to secretly deliver information from high privileged processes to low privileged processes in the context of a high-assurance computing system.  ...  Regarding the concept of this covert channel, the covert channel is established over a software-based file system cache.  ... 
arXiv:1508.05228v1 fatcat:mtali7t4gnbjfd4jnog54julpy

Towards the Certification of Covert Channel Freeness in Cloud-based Systems

Jason Jaskolka, Ridha Khedri
2015 Procedia Computer Science  
In this paper, we outline a schema for certifying covert channel freeness in cloud-based systems.  ...  We also discuss how the proposed schema can be used for identifying ways in which an analyst may amend, modify, or redesign a system in order to make it more resilient to covert channels, and to potentially  ...  Such an assurance needs to be provided at the early stages of the software development life-cycle. In this paper, we outline a schema for assuring covert channel freeness in cloud-based systems.  ... 
doi:10.1016/j.procs.2015.05.100 fatcat:rd4erjyusne4rgt3tiyt6erway

A Taxonomy for Attack Patterns on Information Flows in Component-Based Operating Systems [article]

Michael Hanspach, Jörg Keller
2014 arXiv   pre-print
The systematic consideration of informations flows reveals a specific type of operating system covert channel, the covert physical channel, which connects two former isolated partitions by emitting physical  ...  We present a taxonomy and an algebra for attack patterns on component-based operating systems.  ...  [42] present a study on automatic identification of covert channels in Linux.  ... 
arXiv:1403.1165v1 fatcat:cx4f7ndgcbalfh6mrsxfnaf6ca

A Survey of Timing Channels and Countermeasures

Arnab Kumar Biswas, Dipak Ghosal, Shishir Nagaraja
2017 ACM Computing Surveys  
The advances in information theory and the availability of high performance computing systems interconnected by high speed networks, have spurred interest and development of various types of timing channels  ...  which the communicating entities are within a computing system.  ...  Here, the system refers to a computer system or a chip (like SoC, MP-SoC). In-system timing channel can either be a TSC or a covert timing channel.  ... 
doi:10.1145/3023872 fatcat:bj7jt5qwtbet3lzp5yghle4c3m

Covert Channels through Random Number Generator

Dmitry Evtyushkin, Dmitry Ponomarev
2016 Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security - CCS'16  
We quantify the capacity of the RNG channel under different settings and show that transmission rates in the range of 7-200 kbit/s can be achieved depending on a particular system used for transmission  ...  We demonstrate that a reliable, high-capacity and low-error covert channel can be created through the RNG module that works across CPU cores and across virtual machines.  ...  [39] developed a cross-core covert channel through shared Last Level Caches (LLC).  ... 
doi:10.1145/2976749.2978374 dblp:conf/ccs/EvtyushkinP16 fatcat:izu6ot3rdra4fbi23zogfoh5w4

Time Protection: the Missing OS Abstraction [article]

Qian Ge, Yuval Yarom, Tom Chothia, Gernot Heiser
2018 arXiv   pre-print
Timing channels enable data leakage that threatens the security of computer systems, from cloud platforms to smartphones and browsers executing untrusted third-party code.  ...  Preventing unauthorised information flow is a core duty of the operating system, however, present OSes are unable to prevent timing channels.  ...  Due to the collusion, a covert channel represents a worst case for bandwidth of a channel.  ... 
arXiv:1810.05345v2 fatcat:htf7p2oiwrgmzkl6l3szh37btq

Software-based Microarchitectural Attacks [article]

Daniel Gruss
2017 arXiv   pre-print
We show that microarchitectural attacks exist on any modern computer system, including mobile devices (e.g., smartphones), personal computers, and commercial cloud systems.  ...  These attacks are especially interesting in scenarios where the attacker is unprivileged or even sandboxed. In this thesis, we focus on microarchitectural attacks and defenses on commodity systems.  ...  We present a countermeasure against Prefetch Side-Channel Attacks on commodity systems, that involves reorganizing the user and kernel address space to protect KASLR.  ... 
arXiv:1706.05973v1 fatcat:4hwdpe4dancmblsxasg3a75h7a

SPEECHMINER: A Framework for Investigating and Measuring Speculative Execution Vulnerabilities [article]

Yuan Xiao, Yinqian Zhang, Radu Teodorescu
2019 arXiv   pre-print
It enables testing of a comprehensive list of exception-triggering instructions under the same software framework, which leverages covert-channel techniques and differential tests to gain visibility into  ...  This paper introduces SPEECHMINER, a software framework for exploring and measuring SPEECH vulnerabilities in an automated manner.  ...  Then the experiment is conducted and raw output data is collected via covert channels.  ... 
arXiv:1912.00329v2 fatcat:uvgvqxceovdznhaypbwsmdnqt4

The Last Mile

David Cock, Qian Ge, Toby Murray, Gernot Heiser
2014 Proceedings of the 2014 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security - CCS '14  
We perform such an analysis, collecting a large data set (2,000 hours of observations) for two representative timing channels, the locally-exploitable cache channel and a remote exploit of OpenSSL execution  ...  We also evaluate the effectiveness, in bandwidth reduction, of a number of black-box mitigation techniques (cache colouring, instruction-based scheduling and deterministic delivery of server responses)  ...  In summary: Closing timing channels remains difficult, even for a small high-assurance system like seL4.  ... 
doi:10.1145/2660267.2660294 dblp:conf/ccs/CockGMH14 fatcat:jnl7bomsfjh5zntliagbwyepyi

Aurora: Providing Trusted System Services for Enclaves On an Untrusted System [article]

Hongliang Liang, Mingyu Li, Qiong Zhang, Yue Yu, Lin Jiang, Yixiu Chen
2018 arXiv   pre-print
To mitigate this problem, we present Aurora, a novel architecture that provides TSSes via a secure channel between enclaves and devices on top of an untrusted system, and implement two types of TSSes,  ...  This makes enclaves vulnerable to Iago attacks DBLP:conf/asplos/CheckowayS13 in the face of a powerful malicious system.  ...  We are grateful to Kai Huang, Shweta Shinde for their feedback and help on Aurora.  ... 
arXiv:1802.03530v1 fatcat:nuuj74brjfchnd7xugubafgmo4

A Systematic Evaluation of Transient Execution Attacks and Defenses [article]

Claudio Canella and Jo Van Bulck and Michael Schwarz and Moritz Lipp and Benjamin von Berg and Philipp Ortner and Frank Piessens and Dmitry Evtyushkin and Daniel Gruss
2019 arXiv   pre-print
This observation led to a proliferation of new Spectre and Meltdown attack variants and even more ad-hoc defenses (e.g., microcode and software patches).  ...  However, we only have limited insight on residual attack surface and the completeness of the proposed defenses. In this paper, we present a systematization of transient execution attacks.  ...  We sent Intel a PoC leaking uncacheable-typed memory locations from a concurrent hyperthread on March 28, 2018.  ... 
arXiv:1811.05441v3 fatcat:pbsyzjdmozauvmuoz52ewg26ii

Implementing a High-Assurance Smart-Card OS [chapter]

Paul A. Karger, David C. Toll, Elaine R. Palmer, Suzanne K. McIntosh, Samuel Weber, Jonathan W. Edwards
2010 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
Building a high-assurance, secure operating system for memory constrained systems, such as smart cards, introduces many challenges.  ...  from malicious applications, resolution of covert channels, and assurance of both security and data integrity in the face of arbitrary power losses.  ...  Acknowledgements The Caernarvon project involved work by a number of people in addition to the authors of this paper, and we wish to acknowledge the contributions of, from IBM: Vernon Austel, Ran Canetti  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-642-14577-3_7 fatcat:dsompuuwubbb5ou74inch2evqa

Increasing the trustworthiness of commodity hardware through software

Kevin Elphinstone, Yanyan Shen
2013 2013 43rd Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN)  
Such an operating system could potentially consolidate safety and security critical software on a single device where previously multiple devices were used.  ...  Advances in formal software verification has produced an operating system that is guaranteed mathematically to be correct and enforce access isolation.  ...  between components of a computer system [1] .  ... 
doi:10.1109/dsn.2013.6575328 dblp:conf/dsn/ElphinstoneS13 fatcat:2uvav7y6h5djbipmlmgy7ip6jy

Model-Checking Speculation-Dependent Security Properties: Abstracting and Reducing Processor Models for Sound and Complete Verification

Gianpiero Cabodi, Paolo Camurati, Fabrizio Finocchiaro, Danilo Vendraminetto
2019 Electronics  
The theoretical flow, reliant on established formal verification results, is introduced and a sketch of proof is provided for soundness and correctness.  ...  The root cause of this type of side-channel attacks lies within the speculative and out-of-order execution of modern high-performance microarchitectures.  ...  In the case of Spectre and Meltdown, the attack is based on a covert side-channel that exploits the timing of cache-based memory accesses.  ... 
doi:10.3390/electronics8091057 fatcat:qobprib4lregbdi6fboehguhb4

Secure and Private Function Evaluation with Intel SGX

Susanne Felsen, Ágnes Kiss, Thomas Schneider, Christian Weinert
2019 Proceedings of the 2019 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Cloud Computing Security Workshop - CCSW'19  
at least two orders of magnitude over the GMW protocol in a high-latency Internet setting.  ...  We address the unresolved issue of countless software side-channel vulnerabilities in a unique way, namely by evaluating Boolean circuits -as used by cryptographic SFE protocols -inside an Intel SGX enclave  ...  The SGX SDK relies on AES-NI to implement AES-GCM, thereby preventing leaking the symmetric key via software side-channel vulnerabilities [65] (cf. App. A).  ... 
doi:10.1145/3338466.3358919 dblp:conf/ccs/FelsenK0W19 fatcat:ijad5buk2zavpbcbmvo2kdicy4
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