BibTeX
CSL-JSON
MLA
Harvard
Competition, Reputation and Compliance *
release_ths67g6dkvdvjne2tnyjwkhxfa
by
Paolo Vanin,
Heski Bar-Isaac,
Antonio Cabrales,
Matteo Cervellati,
Sjaak Hurkens,
Doh-Shin Jeon,
José Luis Moraga-González,
Joel Shapiro,
Yaron Yehezkel
Released
as a article-journal
.
2009
Abstract
This paper displays a linear demand oligopoly model, in which firms endogenously decide whether to enter the market and whether to specialize on high or low quality products, and then repeatedly interact to sell experience goods. It shows that the intuition that low and rising prices grant compliance with quality promises extends to this setting, provided that high quality is sufficiently important to buyers. JEL-Classification: L13, L14, L15
In text/plain format
Archived Files and Locations
application/pdf
208.3 kB
file_dwyxztvgzng53or3fb4bzyp6v4
|
amsacta.unibo.it (web) web.archive.org (webarchive) |
Read Archived PDF
Preserved and Accessible
Type
Stage
Year 2009
article-journalStage
unknown
Year 2009
Work Entity
access all versions, variants, and formats of this works (eg, pre-prints)
access all versions, variants, and formats of this works (eg, pre-prints)
Cite This
Lookup Links