Anti-bribery control and incentives as agency theory approaches release_gnljrdg565hfnmi3wvb4bbtocq

by Fabian Teichmann

Released as a article-journal by Administration, Law and Social Sciences IIPCCL Publishing.

2017  

Abstract

This article takes an agency theory approach towards bribery in multinational corporations. In particular, it is advocated that incentives could help to align the interests of principals and agents and reduce information asymmetries. This could help to increase anti-bribery compliance and hence support the fi ght against corruption in Eastern Europe.
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