Intertheoretic Comparisons of Choice-Worthiness
Intertheoretic Comparisons of Choice-Worthiness release_dhceckwbrbandd3i352efqqq5q

by William MacAskill, Krister Bykvist, Toby Ord

Published in Moral Uncertainty by Oxford University Press.

2020   p112-149

Abstract

In this chapter we consider the extent to which different theories are unit-comparable, and what makes them comparable when they are. We consider three arguments for the conclusion that intertheoretic comparisons are always impossible: the appeal to cases argument, the swamping argument, and the arbitrary unit arguments. We argue against all three arguments. We distinguish between <italic>structural</italic> and <italic>non-structural</italic> accounts of intertheoretic comparisons. We argue in favour of non-structural accounts: we argue that intertheoretic comparisons are grounded in substantive facts about the theories themselves (rather than merely statistical properties of their choice worthiness function). We discuss a number of possible accounts of intertheoretic comparisons, ultimately arguing in favour of a 'universal scale' account.
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